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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This Special Analysis (SA) was prepared to assess the potential impact of inadvertent disposal of 
a limited quantity of transuranic (TRU) waste in classified Trench 4 (T04C) within the Area 5 
Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS).  The Area 5 
RWMS is a low-level radioactive waste disposal site in northern Frenchman Flat on the Nevada 
Test Site (NTS).  The Area 5 RWMS is regulated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
under DOE Order 435.1 and DOE Manual (DOE M) 435.1-1.   
 
The primary objective of the SA is to evaluate if inadvertent disposal of limited quantities of 
TRU waste in a shallow land burial trench at the Area 5 RWMS is in compliance with the 
existing, approved Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) issued under DOE M 435.1-1.  In 
addition, supplemental analyses are performed to determine if there is reasonable assurance that 
the requirements of Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191, Environmental 
Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
Level, and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, can be met.  The 40 CFR 191 analyses provide 
supplemental information regarding the risk to human health and the environment of leaving the 
TRU waste in T04C.   
 
In 1989, waste management personnel reviewing classified materials records discovered that 
classified materials buried in trench T04C at the Area 5 RWMS contained TRU waste.  
Subsequent investigations determined that a total of 102 55-gallon drums of TRU waste from 
Rocky Flats were buried in trench T04C in 1986.  The disposal was inadvertent because 
unclassified records accompanying the shipment indicated that the waste was low-level.  The 
exact location of the TRU waste in T04C was not recorded and is currently unknown.   
 
Under DOE M 435.1-1, Chapter IV, Section P.5, low-level waste disposal facilities must obtain a 
DAS.  The DAS specifies conditions that must be met to operate within the radioactive waste 
management basis, consisting of a performance assessment (PA), composite analysis (CA), 
closure plan, monitoring plan, waste acceptance criteria, and a PA/CA maintenance plan.  The 
DOE issued a DAS for the Area 5 RWMS in 2000.  The Area 5 RWMS DAS was, in part, based 
on review of a CA as required under DOE M 435.1-1, Chapter IV, Section P.(3).  A CA is a 
radiological assessment required for DOE waste disposed before 26 September 1988 and 
includes the radiological dose from all sources of radioactive material interacting with all 
radioactive waste disposed at the Area 5 RWMS.   
 
The approved Area 5 RWMS CA, which includes the inventory of TRU waste in T04C, indicates 
that the Area 5 RWMS waste inventory and all interacting sources of radioactive material can 
meet the 0.3 mSv dose constraint.  The composite analysis maximum annual dose for a future 
resident at the Area 5 RWMS was estimated to be 0.01 mSv at 1,000 years.  Therefore, the 
inadvertent disposal of TRU in T04C is protective of the public and the environment, and 
compliant with all the applicable requirements in DOE M 435.1-1 and the DAS. 
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency promulgated 40 CFR 191 to establish standards for 
the planned disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high level, and transuranic wastes in geologic 
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repositories.  Although not required, the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site 
Office requested a supplemental analysis to evaluate the likelihood that the inadvertent disposal 
of TRU waste in T04C meets the requirements of 40 CFR 191.  The SA evaluates the likelihood 
of meeting the 40 CFR 191 containment requirements (CRs), assurance requirements, individual 
protection requirements (IPRs), and groundwater protection standards.  The results of the SA 
indicate that there is a reasonable expectation of meeting all the requirements of 40 CFR 191.   
 
The conclusion of the SA is that the Area 5 RWMS with the TRU waste buried in T04C is in 
compliance with all requirements in DOE M 435.1-1 and the DAS.  Compliance with the DAS is 
demonstrated by the results of the Area 5 RWMS CA. Supplemental analyses in the SA indicate 
there is a reasonable expectation that the TRU in T04C can meet all the requirements of 40 CFR 
191. Therefore, inadvertent disposal of a limited quantity of TRU in a shallow land burial trench 
at the Area 5 RWMS does not pose a significant risk to the public and the environment. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
This report describes the results of a special analysis (SA) of the consequences of burial of small 
quantities of transuranic (TRU) waste in a low-level waste (LLW) disposal site on the Nevada 
Test Site (NTS).  NTS is a 3,561-square kilometer (km2) (1,375-square mile [mi2]) 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site 
Office (NNSA/NSO)-operated, restricted-access facility currently used for hazardous chemical 
spill testing, emergency response training, nonnuclear weapons testing, radioactive waste 
management, and environmental technology studies.  NTS is surrounded on most of its 
boundaries and further isolated by U.S. government-controlled land used as a military gunnery 
range and a wildlife refuge.  NNSA/NSO operates two LLW disposal facilities at NTS. 
 
1.1 Site Description 
 
The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) is a 296-hectare (ha) 
(732-acre [ac]) site allocated for LLW disposal in northern Frenchman Flat of NTS.  The 
Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) is the operationally active area, located on 
approximately 58 ha (144 ac) in the southeast corner of the RWMC.  The Area 5 RWMS 
includes the 37-ha (92-ac) low-level waste management unit (LLWMU) and an approximately 
21-ha (52-ac) northern expansion area where new disposal trenches have been developed since 
2002.  This SA addresses a small quantity of TRU waste buried in the LLWMU within the 
Area 5 RWMS. 
 
1.2 Operational History 
 
Disposal of LLW generated by NTS operations began at the Area 5 RWMS in 1961.  Classified 
materials have been accepted at the Area 5 RWMS since 1961.  Most classified waste has been 
buried in shallow land burial trenches or deep boreholes.  In 1978, the site began to accept 
unlimited quantities of LLW from offsite generators.  Most LLW has been disposed by shallow 
land burial in unlined pits and trenches 6- to 9-meters (m) (20 to 30-feet [ft]) deep and closed 
with 2.4-m (8-ft) operational covers.  
 
The Area 5 RWMS accepts LLW generated by DOE operations and classified radioactive 
materials generated by U.S. government agencies.  Categories of waste currently accepted for 
burial include classified materials, unclassified LLW, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA)-regulated waste, and Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)-regulated waste. 
 
In 1983, the Greater Confinement Disposal Test (GCDT) was initiated at the Area 5 RWMS to 
demonstrate the feasibility of disposal of high specific activity wastes in deep augered boreholes.  
The following year, operational disposal of waste began in 36-m (120-ft) deep, 3- to 3.6-m        
(10- to 12-ft) diameter, uncased greater confinement disposal (GCD) boreholes.  From 1984 to 
1988, eight GCD units received high specific activity wastes.   
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Although NTS waste acceptance criteria (WAC) have always prohibited disposal of TRU waste, 
in 1984 NTS was requested by DOE/Headquarters (DOE/HQ) to accept classified nuclear 
weapon accident residue (NWAR) TRU waste for national security purposes.  The NWAR 
wastes were placed in classified GCD boreholes 1, 2, and 3 (U5RWMS01C, U5RWMS02C, and 
U5RWMS03C).  Subsequent to the NWAR disposals, additional classified TRU wastes from 
Rocky Flats were disposed in GCD borehole 4 (U5RWMS04C) from July 1985 to October 1987.  
During this period, classified TRU waste from Rocky Flats, misidentified as LLW, was buried in 
classified Trench 4 (T04C).  This SA evaluates the suitability of permanently disposing of these 
materials in T04C.  Although for consistency with other documents this report may use the term 
“waste” to describe these materials, it should be recognized that from a security perspective this 
material must be managed as classified material. 
1.2.1 DOE Regulation/Authorization Basis 
 
Waste disposal units at the Area 5 RWMS are regulated under at least six different regulations, 
agreements, or DOE orders.  Individual disposal units are subject to different regulatory 
requirements based on the types of waste present and agreements between federal and state 
agencies.   
 
Radioactive waste disposed after 26 September 1988 is regulated by the DOE under DOE Order 
(DOE O) 435.1 and the accompanying DOE Manual (DOE M) 435.1-1 (DOE 2001a, b).  Wastes 
disposed before 26 September 1988 are subject to the DOE M 435.1-1, Chapter IV, Section P.(3) 
composite analysis process, which requires an assessment of the radiological dose from all 
sources of radioactive material interacting with DOE LLW.  Waste disposed before the 1987 
opening of the RCRA-regulated Pit 3 (P03U) mixed waste disposal unit (MWDU) is managed 
under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), a joint agreement among 
DOE, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and the state of Nevada that specifies a process for 
characterization, corrective action selection, and closure.  Eleven disposal units at the 
Area 5 RWMS comprising Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111 are managed under the FFACO.  
Wastes disposed in P03U are regulated under RCRA.  Pits 7 and 6 (P07U and P06UA) contain 
asbestiform waste regulated under TSCA.  TRU waste disposed in GCD boreholes is regulated 
under Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191, Environmental Radiation 
Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and 
Transuranic Radioactive Wastes. 
 
LLW disposal facilities must maintain a waste authorization basis under DOE M 435.1-1 (IV.D), 
which consists of physical and administrative controls that ensure the protection of workers, the 
public, and the environment.  The Area 5 RWMS waste authorization basis consists of a 
performance assessment (Shott et al. 1998; Bechtel Nevada [BN] 2006a), a composite analysis 
(BN 2001a), a disposal authorization statement (DOE 2000), a closure plan (BN 2005a), waste 
acceptance criteria (NNSA/NSO 2003), and a monitoring plan (BN 2005a). 
 
The TRU in T04C is regulated by DOE under the composite analysis process.  The existing Area 
5 RWMS composite analysis, which includes the inventory of TRU waste in T04C, indicates that 
the Area 5 RWMS waste inventory and all interacting sources of radioactive material can meet 
the 0.3 mSv dose constraint (BN 2001a).  The composite analysis maximum annual dose for a 
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future resident at the Area 5 RWMS was estimated to be 0.01 mSv at 1,000 years (BN 2001a).  
TRU waste components were not an important contributor to the dose.  A disposal authorization 
statement for the Area 5 RWMS was issued on 5 December 2000 after review and approval of 
the Area 5 RWMS composite analysis (DOE 2000).  Therefore, the Area 5 RWMS with the TRU 
in T04C is in compliance with DOE M 435.1-1 and its DAS. 
 
1.2.2 Management Options for Buried TRU Waste 
 
TRU wastes were first segregated from other low-level radioactive waste in 1970 when the 
Atomic Energy Commission issued an Immediate Action Directive requiring retrievable storage 
until a geologic repository was available for final disposal.  At that time, TRU waste was defined 
as waste containing transuranic alpha emitters above 10 nanoCuries per gram (nCi g-1).  The 
TRU waste definition was later changed to waste containing transuranic alpha emitters above 
100 nCi g-1 with half-lives greater than 20 years.  In 1986, TRU wastes were regulated under 
DOE O 5820.2, whose intent was to require retrievable storage of TRU waste until a geologic 
repository was available for permanent disposal (DOE 1984).  Multiple DOE sites used shallow 
land burial for retrievable storage of TRU during this period.  The TRU waste in T04C is 
different because it was most likely intended for disposal in the GCD boreholes and was 
accidentally buried in T04C.  Therefore, there never was any plan to retrieve the waste for 
disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).  In addition these wastes are classified and at 
the time of disposal would not have been eligible for disposal at WIPP.  Since then WIPP has 
begun accepting classified TRU. 
 
The TRU waste in T04C has unique characteristics that should be considered in selecting an 
appropriate management option, including: 
 
• Unplanned disposal in an authorized low-level waste disposal facility 
• Burial in a shallow land burial trench rather than in a geologic repository 
• Exact location of disposal is uncertain 
• TRU inventory is a minor component of the low-level waste disposal facility inventory 
• Costs and hazards of retrieval are high 
• Involves classified materials 
 
Multiple management options for the TRU in T04C have been considered (Crowe 2006) 
including:  
(1) Retrieve, characterize, and certify the waste for disposal at WIPP 
(2) Close in-place under a DOE-regulated process  
(3) Close in-place using a risk informed process to establish an exemption for limited 
quantities of TRU as envisioned by the National Research Council (National Academy of 
Sciences [NAS] 2005) 
(4) Close in-place under the alternative disposal provisions allowed by 40 CFR 191.16 
(5) Delay final closure until management options for disposal of buried TRU waste are 
identified at a national level. 
The SA evaluates option 2.  The previous section demonstrates that the disposal of TRU waste in 
T04C is in compliance with the composite analysis requirements, DAS, and all 435.1-1 
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requirements.  As a supplemental assessment of the impacts of the TRU waste, the SA evaluates 
the likelihood that this disposal can meet all the requirements of 40 CFR 191.  The analysis is 
considered supplemental because of the factors listed above (i.e., unplanned disposal, small 
quantity, near-surface disposal), which are inconsistent with the intent of 40 CFR 191.  40 CFR 
191 has been used in the past to regulate TRU disposal in GCD boreholes at the Area 5 RWMS 
 
1.2.3 History of TRU Waste in T04C 
 
In 1989, NTS waste management personnel were requested by DOE to identify sources of 
classified materials sent to NTS waste management facilities.  The review was conducted by 
examining the classified DOE/U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Form 741, “Nuclear 
Material Transaction Reports”, which accompanies any shipment of source material or special 
nuclear material subject to international safeguard agreements.  During the review it became 
apparent that some classified materials previously buried were TRU waste.  Subsequent 
investigations determined that a total of 102 55-gallon (gal) drums of TRU waste were buried in 
T04C.  The unclassified paperwork accompanying the shipments indicated that the materials 
were LLW.  Waste management personnel receiving and disposing the waste did not review the 
classified DOE/NRC Form 741 because it was sent to a security area and not readily available 
for review.   
 
The buried TRU wastes were shipped from Rocky Flats on two occasions.  The first incident 
occurred on 27 February 1986 when two shipments containing 76 55-gal drums were received.  
On 12 June 1986, an additional 26 55-gal drums of classified TRU waste were received from 
Rocky Flats.  During this period, classified TRU wastes were received from Rocky Flats and 
disposed in GCD boreholes.  However, because these materials were shipped as classified LLW, 
they were placed in T04C.  Several photographs from July 1986 confirm that the portion of 
Trench 4 west of the intersection with Classified Trench 9 (T09C) was operationally active at 
this time (Figure 1.1).  The exact location of the TRU waste in T04C was not recorded and is 
currently unknown.  The volume of TRU waste in T04C represents approximately 0.5 percent of 
the total disposal unit volume.   
 










Figure 1.1  July 1986 photo showing partially filled western arm of T04C (photo WB 593). 
 
1.3 Special Analysis Approach 
 
The SA approach consists of 1) determining that the TRU in T04C complies with the 
requirements of 435.1-1, which are the composite analysis requirements, and, although not 
required it is used as supplemental information, 2) determining the likelihood that the 
requirements of 40 CFR 191 can be met.  
1.3.1 Applicable Version of 40 CFR 191 
 
Two versions of 40 CFR 191 have been promulgated, requiring that a version be selected for the 
SA.  Portions of the regulation were remanded by the First Circuit Court in 1987 and in 1993 
Parts 191.15 and Subpart C were revised and reinstated.  The 1993 Part 191.15 individual 
protection requirements (IPRs) reduced the member of public dose limit from 0.25 to 
0.15 milliSievert (mSv) in a year, increased the compliance period from 1,000 to 10,000 years, 
and changed the dose calculation method.  The Subpart C groundwater protection standards were 
changed to broaden the definition of groundwaters protected, to move the point of compliance to 
the accessible environment, and to increase the compliance period from 1,000 to 10,000 years.   
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Although the 1985 version could be applicable to the TRU waste in T04C, several arguments 
support using the 1993 version. 
 
• The 1993 version is more restrictive than the 1985 version with respect to the IPRs and 
groundwater protection standards.   
• The 1993 version uses dosimetric quantities that are consistent with quantities currently 
used to regulate radiation exposure in the U.S. 
• DOE/HQ has issued guidance to DOE, Nevada Operations (DOE/NV), requiring the 
GCD performance assessment (PA) show compliance with the 1993 version of 
40 CFR 191 (DOE 1999a, 2002; Cochran et al. 2001).   
 
Therefore, the special analysis will use requirements from the 1993 version of 40 CFR 191. 
1.3.2 Containment Requirements 
 
The CRs in Part 191.13(a) require that: 
 
“Disposal systems for spent nuclear fuel, high-level or transuranic radioactive wastes 
shall be designed to provide a reasonable expectation, based upon performance 
assessments, that the cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment 
for 10,000 years after disposal from all significant processes and events shall: 
(1) Have a likelihood of less than one chance in 10 of exceeding quantities calculated 
according to Table 1 (appendix A); and 
(2) Have a likelihood of less than one chance in 1,000 of exceeding 10 times the 
quantities calculated according to Table 1 (appendix A).” 
 
As stated in Part 191.13(b), absolute proof that the CRs can be met is not required or obtainable 
due to uncertainties in estimating the performance of the disposal system over 10,000 years.  A 
reasonable expectation of meeting the CRs is provided by repeatedly simulating the cumulative 
radionuclide release of the disposal system and determining the frequency of realizations that 
exceed the release limits.  Each simulation represents an alternative stochastic realization of the 
system representing uncertainty (i.e., lack of knowledge) contributed by model parameters and 
the number and timing of human intrusion events.   Reasonable expectation is provided if the 
frequency of realizations exceeding the release limits is less than the likelihood limits in 
Parts 191.13(a)(1) and 191.13(a)(2) above. 
 
The accessible environment is defined as: 
 
(1) “The atmosphere; 
(2) Land surfaces; 
(3) Surface waters; 
(4) Oceans; and 
(5) All of the lithosphere that is beyond the controlled area.” 
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The phrase “beyond the controlled area” is assumed to apply only to the lithosphere, as in 
previous 40 CFR 191 PAs conducted at NTS (Cochran et al. 2001).  The controlled area is 
defined as: 
 
(1) “A surface location, to be identified by passive institutional controls, that 
encompasses no more than 100 square kilometers and extends horizontally in any 
direction from the outer boundary of the original location of the radioactive wastes in 
a disposal system; and 
(2) The subsurface underlying such a surface location.” 
 
The controlled area is assumed to describe the area within the 100-m (330-ft) RWMS boundary 
as assumed in previous NTS 40 CFR 191 PAs (Cochran et al. 2001).  The distance through the 
subsurface to the 100-m (330-ft) boundary is much greater than the distance to the land surface 
above the disposal unit.  Therefore, the cumulative release is calculated as the release to the land 
surface and atmosphere directly above T04C.  Releases by drilling intrusion are also included in 
the cumulative release.  These cumulative releases are calculated as the cumulative release over 












where R is the normalized cumulative release (dimensionless), Qi the cumulative release of 
nuclide i, and RLi the release limit of nuclide i (Table 1.1).  The 40 CFR 191, Appendix A, 
Table 1, release limits are scaled based on the type and quantity of waste.  The applicable waste 
type for T04C is TRU waste described in Note 1(e) as alpha-emitting transuranic radionuclides 
with half-lives greater than 20 years.  Under Note 1(e), the release limits are scaled per 
1 x 106 Curies (Ci) of TRU waste. 
 
Table 1.1  Release limits for the 40 CFR 191.13(a) containment requirements 
 
Radionuclide Release Limit per  
1 x 106 Ci of TRU Waste









230Th or 232Th 10
126Sn 1,000
233U, 234U, 235U, 236U, or 238U 100
Any other alpha-emitting radionuclide with a half-life greater than 20 yrs 100
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1.3.3 Assurance Requirements 
 
The regulation includes assurance requirements in Part 191.14 to “provide the confidence needed 
for long-term compliance with the requirements of 191.13.”  Six different types of assurance are 
required including: 
 
• Active institutional controls 
• Monitoring 
• Passive institutional controls including markers and records 
• Multiple barriers including natural and engineered barriers 
• Selecting a site without significant attractive resources 
• System design that does not preclude waste retrieval 
 
Active institutional controls are defined as: “(1) controlling access to a disposal site by means 
other than passive institutional controls; (2) performing maintenance operations of remedial 
actions at a site, (3) controlling or cleaning up releases from a site, or (4) monitoring 
parameters related to disposal system performance.”  Active institutional control is explicitly 
limited to 100 years.  Institutional control is assumed to begin at the time of final site closure 
when all closure barriers are installed based on previous DOE guidance (DOE 1999a). 
 
Passive institutional controls are defined as: “(1) permanent markers placed at the disposal site, 
(2) public records and archives, (3) government ownership and regulations regarding land or 
resource use, and (4) other methods of preserving knowledge about the location, design, and 
contents of the disposal system.” 
 
A barrier is defined as: “any material or structure that prevents or substantially delays movement 
of water or radionuclides toward the accessible environment.”  Although many alternative 
barrier systems are conceivable, the regulation does not identify any criteria or process for 
barrier selection.  During its regulation of the WIPP, EPA proposed that the DOE select barriers 
using cost-benefit analysis (EPA 1995).  Therefore, the best engineered barrier is assumed to be 
the most cost-effective barrier that meets the requirements of the regulation. 
 
The assurance requirements differ from the other requirements because they do not require 
technical analyses to demonstrate compliance.  Therefore, the SA demonstrates that the 
assurance requirements can be met by describing the planned site control and features that meet 
each specific requirement.  The SA model is used to identify potentially cost-effective 
engineered barriers. 
1.3.4 Individual Protection Requirements 
 
The 1993 version of the regulation states in Part 191.15(a) that: 
“Disposal systems for waste and any associated radioactive material shall be designed to 
provide a reasonable expectation that, for 10,000 years after disposal, undisturbed 
performance of the disposal system shall not cause the annual committed effective dose, 
received through all potential pathways from the disposal system, to any member of the 
public in the accessible environment, to exceed 0.15 mSv.” 
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“Any associated radioactive material” is not defined by the regulation.  The SA interprets the 
associated radioactive material to be any waste disposed in the same disposal unit, T04C.  The 
same disposal unit interpretation is consistent with the 40 CFR 191 PA for the GCD boreholes 
(Cochran et al. 2001).  T04C is close to or contiguous with adjacent disposal units.  At the time 
of disposal, the northernmost east-west oriented disposal unit in the classified materials area was 
designated T04C.  A perpendicular trench, T09C, was subsequently excavated, intersecting the 
ramp into T04C.  After this date, a disposal unit following the trend of T04C, designated 
T04C-1, was excavated eastward from the northern end of T09C.  The SA assumes that the TRU 
disposal unit is T04C, which is delineated as the northern most east-west trending trench in the 
classified area.  The eastern boundary of T04C is contiguous with T09C.  The delineation of the 
disposal unit affects the volume of low-LLW associated with the TRU waste, but will have no 
affect on the estimated individual dose.  The response of the dose assessment models used in the 
SA are linearly proportional to waste concentration.  The waste concentrations of surrounding 
disposal units are similar and the dose would not change significantly if additional disposal units 
where included in or excluded from the associated waste. 
 
The SA demonstrates that the IPRs are met by calculating dose using Monte Carlo simulation.  
Appendix C of the regulation states that when uncertainties are considered, the best estimate 
should be compared with the regulatory limit.  A reasonable expectation of meeting the dose 
limit is assumed to be provided if the mean and median of the result is less than 0.15 mSv in a 
year. 
 
Undisturbed performance is defined in Part 191.12 as: 
 
“…the predicted behavior of a disposal system, including consideration of the 
uncertainties in predicted behavior, if the disposal system is not disrupted by human 
intrusion or the occurrence of unlikely natural events.” 
  
Undisturbed performance clearly does not include human intrusion.  Climate change over the 
next 10,000 years is considered likely and included in the definition of undisturbed performance. 
 
Based on guidance in 40 CFR 191, Appendix B, the annual committed effective dose equivalent 
is assumed to be equivalent to the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) calculated using dose 
conversion factors published in Federal Guidance Reports 11 and 12  (Eckerman and Ryman 
1993; Eckerman et al. 1998).  The TEDE is calculated as the sum of the annual effective dose 
equivalent from external irradiation and the 50-year committed effective dose equivalent 
resulting from a year of intake.  The dose from internally deposited radionuclides is assumed to 
exclude the dose from inhalation of 222Rn and its short-lived progeny in air based on guidance 
provided by NNSA/NSO (2007a).  The 222Rn inhalation dose is excluded because it (1) is 
explicitly excluded from DOE performance assessments, (2) dominates the individual’s dose, but 
is not produced by the regulated TRU waste component, and (3) is not specifically included in 
the 40 CFR 191 IPRs.   
 
The regulation contains no details or guidance on selection of the exposure scenario except that 
the member of public is located in the accessible environment.  The accessible environment is 
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interpreted to include the land surface and atmosphere above the disposal unit.  The member of 
public is assumed to be located directly above the disposal unit because this is the location in the 
accessible environment with the highest expected radionuclide concentration and dose. 
 
Alternative exposure scenarios are possible.  One approach is to evaluate alternative exposure 
scenarios and calculate a mean dose weighted with the probability of each scenario.  Estimating 
the probability of exposure scenarios is problematic and the requirements for the 40 CFR 191 
IPRs are not probabilistic.  A single scenario was selected consistent with the exposure scenarios 
used in other PAs.  Assessments conducted under DOE M 435.1-1 are required to evaluate 
potential doses to representative critical groups receiving the highest doses assuming average 
living habits and exposure conditions.  For the Area 5 RWMS, the critical group receiving the 
highest doses is interpreted as those members of the public residing on the disposal unit.  
Members of the public residing at the disposal unit are assumed to have average living habits and 
exposure conditions.  Average residents of southern Nevada are not engaged in agriculture and 
the exposure scenario does not include agricultural pathways. 
1.3.5 Groundwater Protection 
 
Subpart C of 40 CFR 191 includes standards for groundwater protection.  The regulation 
specifically states that the groundwater protection standard “does not apply to waste disposed 
before the effective date” which is 19 January 1994.  The 1985 version of the regulation applies 
to a special source of groundwater.  Groundwater below the Area 5 RWMS does not meet the 
definition of a special source of groundwater (Chapman 1994) and this interpretation was 
accepted for the regulatory review of the GCD 40 CFR 191 PA (Cochran et al. 2001). 
 
If the regulation were applied to groundwater below the Area 5 RWMS, there is ample evidence 
that the travel time to groundwater exceeds 10,000 years (Shott et al. 1998).  Therefore, the SA 
does not evaluate a groundwater pathway.  
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2.0 Disposal Facility Characteristics 
 
Environmental conditions at NTS and the Area 5 RWMS have been reported extensively 
(Carr et al. 1975; Winograd and Thordarson 1975; Beatley 1976; DOE 1997; Shott et al. 1998; 
Ostler et al. 2000; BN 2001a).  The geologic and hydrologic setting of the Area 5 RWMS has 
been extensively characterized (Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company 1993, 1994; 
Istok et al. 1994; Blout et al. 1995). 
 
2.1 Site Characteristics 
 
2.1.1 Disposal Site Location 
 
NTS is in southern Nevada approximately 105 kilometer (km) (65 miles [mi]) northwest of 
Las Vegas.  The Area 5 RWMS is located in northern Frenchman Flat, a large closed basin in the 
southeast corner of NTS.  Counties falling within an 80-km radius of the Area 5 RWMS include 
portions of Nye, Lincoln, and Clark Counties in Nevada, and Inyo County, California.  The 
closest major metropolitan center is Las Vegas.  Closer, but much smaller rural communities 
include: Indian Springs (42 km [26 mi]), Amargosa/Lathrop Wells (52 km [32 mi]), Pahrump 
(80 km [50 mi]), and Beatty (82 km [51 mi]). 
 
The Area 5 RWMC is a 296-ha (732-ac) operational area set aside for LLW disposal.  The 
Area 5 RWMS describes the operationally active area within the RWMC, encompassing 
approximately 58 ha (144 ac) in the southeast corner of the RWMC (Figure 2.1).  For closure 
planning purposes, the Area 5 RWMS is divided into an older 37-ha (92-ac) disposal area 
referred to as the LLWMU, that is planned to be closed first, and a more recent northern 
expansion area.  The TRU waste is buried in T04C within the LLWMU. 
 
2.1.2 Disposal Site Description 
 
The Area 5 RWMC consists of five operational areas, the Area 5 RWMS, the Real-Time 
Radiography (RTR) system, the TRU Waste Storage Pad and TRU Pad Cover Building, the 
S02C classified area, and the Waste Examination Facility (WEF) (Figure 2.2).  The RTR is a 
radiography cell used for verification of mixed waste generated off site.  The TRU Waste 
Storage Pad and Pad Cover Building are hazard category 2 (HC-2) facilities used for storage of 
TRU waste.  The S02C Classified Area is a HC-2 facility consisting of seven cargo containers 
used for the storage of classified TRU waste.  The WEF is a HC-2 facility used to examine and 
repackage TRU waste for shipment to WIPP. 
 




Figure 2.1  Location of the Area 5 RWMS and other features within the Area 5 RWMC 




Figure 2.2  Operational areas, disposal units, and support facilities at the Area 5 RWMS 
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The active Area 5 RWMS is bounded on the north, west, and east by a flood protection system 
consisting of berms, levee extensions, and flood control channels.  The flood protection system 
was designed to provide protection from a 25-year, 24-hour storm as required under RCRA.  
Three pilot wells (UE5PW-1, UE5PW-2, and UE5PW-3), located outside of the Area 5 RWMS, 
are used for groundwater monitoring. 
 
T04C is located in the classified area within the LLWMU.  It is an approximately 221 m (725 ft) 
long and 6.4 m (21 ft) wide unlined shallow land burial trench.  T04C was excavated to 6.1 m 
(20- ft) below grade.  Wastes are typically stacked to within 1.2 m (4 ft) of grade, allowing a 
maximum waste thickness of 4.9 m (16 ft).  This is sufficient to allow stacking of 55 gal drums 
four high on end.  The total disposal unit volume is approximately 6,907 m3 (2.44E5 ft3).  
Assuming a 0.6 facility design factor, approximately 4,100 m3 (1.45E5 ft3) of waste could be 
disposed in the unit.  The unit is currently operationally closed with a 2.4 m (8 ft) alluvium 
cover. 
  
2.1.3 Population Distribution 
 
Permanent settlements in southern Nevada are clustered around a few relatively rare sites with 
access to water or important mineral resources.  Nevada’s population is predominantly urban, 
with most of the population living in the Las Vegas and Reno metropolitan areas.  Intervening 
areas are undeveloped arid shrublands or forested mountains, giving Nevada one of the lowest 
population densities in the U.S.    
 
Communities near NTS are growing, with large urban centers experiencing the most rapid and 
consistent increases.  The Las Vegas metropolitan area (composed of Las Vegas, North  
Las Vegas, Henderson, Boulder City, and Mesquite) is one of the fastest-growing metropolitan 
areas in the U.S., increasing from 4 to 8 percent per year.  In 2006, the population of the 
Las Vegas metropolitan area and Nye County were estimated to be more than 1.9 million and 
44,795, respectively (State of Nevada Demographer [SND] 2007).  Pahrump, a rural community 
in Nye County continues to grow rapidly with a 2006 population of 36,645 (SND 2007).  Long-
term population trends for smaller rural communities near NTS such as Amargosa, with a 2006 
population of 1,435, and Indian Springs, with a 2006 population of 1,907 indicate slower, less 
consistent increases, with small decreases occurring in some individual years.  By 2024, the 
approximate time of site closure, the population of Clark County is expected to increase to 
2.7 million and Nye County to 57,665 (SND 2007). 
 
2.1.4 Land Use 
  
The arid valleys and mountains of NTS comprise some of the least hospitable lands in the U.S.  
With the exception of the brief-lived Wahmonie mining camp, the 1,375 square mile NTS has 
probably never supported a population greater than 100 persons (Fehner and Gosling 2000).  
Native American populations have waxed and waned over the last 10,000 years as climatic 
conditions have varied.  In the late 1800s, NTS was reported to be the home of approximately 40 
Native Americans subsisting by hunting and gathering in the Pahute Mesa area.  During the 
second half of the 1800s, European immigrants began to traverse the area and to use the site for 
mining and grazing.  These activities were sparse and small scale except for the mining boom 
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town of Wahmonie which supported a peak population of 1,500 on the margin of Jackass Flats 
for approximately 2 years.  NTS range is suitable for grazing sheep and cattle, but lacks water 
resources.  Most ranchers using NTS have lived at nearby communities with permanent water 
resources.  Before DOE use, there was no evidence of settlement within Frenchman Flat.  The 
closest site with evidence of past human habitation is Cane Spring 14.3 km (8.8 mi) west of the 
Area 5 RWMS. 
 
Public access to NTS area has been restricted since at least the 1940s, when the land was part of 
a bombing and gunnery range under the jurisdiction of Nellis Air Force Base.  In 1951, NTS 
became the continental nuclear testing site.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission withdrew the land within NTS boundaries under four Public Land Orders.   
 
The site continues to be protected from public access and development by government control.  
Current land uses at NTS include hazardous chemical spill testing, emergency response training, 
nonnuclear weapons testing, radioactive waste management, and environmental technology 
studies.  Active DOE facilities in Frenchman Flat include the Device Assembly Facility (DAF), 
the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex, the Free-Air-Carbon dioxide Enrichment 
(FACE) facility and the Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex.  
The FACE facility is an outdoor environmental research experiment investigating the long-term 
effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide on desert ecosystems.  FACE is located south of the 
Frenchman Flat playa.  The Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation 
Complex is a research and testing facility for instrumentation for the detection of weapons of 
mass destruction located south of the DAF.   
 
The NNSA/NSO plans to restrict access to NTS in perpetuity (DOE/NV 2000).  The primary 
national security mission of NTS requires restriction of public access.  Residual radioactivity 
from past activities, including aboveground and underground nuclear testing, precludes release 
of large areas of NTS.  Restoration of some areas contaminated by nuclear testing may not be 
economically or technically feasible.  Such areas will be closed in place with permanent land-use 
restrictions.  The NNSA/NSO land-use plans for NTS includes prohibiting construction and 
drilling within the Area 5 RWMS in perpetuity. 
 
2.1.5 Meteorology and Climatology 
 
The present-day NTS climate is considered a dry interglacial period dominated by the 
Westerlies.  The climate is extremely arid due to the rain shadow created by the Sierra Nevada 
mountains to the west.  Conditions are characterized by a large number of cloudless days, low 
precipitation, and high daily temperatures, especially in the summer.  Precipitation varies with 
elevation with valley bottoms receiving the least precipitation.  The mean annual precipitation 
(MAP) for Frenchman Flat is 12 centimeters (cm) (4.7 inches [in.]).  Most rain falls in the winter 
months during long-duration, low-intensity storms.  A second smaller precipitation peak, 
characterized by brief but intense local thunderstorms, occurs in the late summer months. 
Meteorology data indicate that annual potential evapotranspiration (PET) calculated using the 
radiation based method of Doorenbos and Pruitt (1977) greatly exceeds annual precipitation.  
From 1994 through 2004, PET averaged 15 times annual precipitation (Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3  Annual potential evapotranspiration (PET) and annual precipitation at the Area 5 
RWMS 
 
2.1.6 Ecology  
 
The flora and fauna of NTS and their role in bioturbation of soils have been investigated by both 
literature reviews and site characterizations efforts (Hooten et al. 2004; Hansen and Ostler 2003; 
Shott et al. 1998; BN 2006a).   
 
Two major ecoregions occur on NTS: the Mojave Desert to the south, and the Great Basin Desert 
to the north, with a transitional desert separating the two regions (BN 2001b; Ostler et al. 2000).  
The Area 5 RWMS, which lies within the northern fringe of the Mojave Desert, is surrounded by 
a Larrea tridentata-Ambrosia dumosa (creosote bush-white bursage) Shrubland Alliance.  The 
plant community has a comparatively low rate of aboveground net primary productivity (ANPP), 
~300 kilograms per hectare per year (kg ha-1 yr-1).  Plant roots are rare below the near-surface 
zone (~2.5 m [8.2 ft]) where infiltrating precipitation is available.   
    
A diverse assemblage of invertebrate and vertebrate fauna occurs within the Mojave Desert.  
Insects and fossorial rodents are the most numerous and diverse groups present and are thought 
to be the most important in terms of burrowing.  Site characterization studies have identified two 
harvester ants (Pogonomyrmex rugosus and Messor pergandei) as the most important burrowing 
insects at the Area 5 RWMS.  While several termite species occur, no species has been identified 
that transport significant amounts of soil upward to the land surface.  Rodents move the largest 
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amounts of soil at the site, but the depth of their burrows is shallow.  Larger mammals, such as 
badgers, excavate to greater depths, but are rare at the site.  
 




Frenchman Flat is a closed basin bounded by the Halfpint Range to the north, the Ranger 
Mountains and the Spotted Range to the east-southeast, and Mount Salyer to the west.  
Elevations range from approximately 1,600 m (5250 ft) above mean sea level in the surrounding 
mountain ranges to 940 m (3080 ft) at its lowest point on Frenchman Flat playa.  
 
The Frenchman Flat basin is filled with alluvial sediments, which are 360- to 460-m (1180- to 
1500-ft) thick below the Area 5 RWMS.  The uppermost aquifer occurs at approximately 236-m 
(774-ft) depth in the alluvium.  Beneath the alluvium lies a thick sequence of interbedded 
Tertiary welded and non-welded tuff and local lava flows.  The volcanic section is estimated to 
be over 550-m (1,804-ft) thick and thins southeast across the basin.  The lower part of the 
volcanic section is zeolitized and forms a confining aquifer throughout most of the basin 
(BN 2006b).  The alluvial and volcanic sequences are underlain by an undetermined thickness of 
Paleozoic carbonate rocks with increased thickness of clastic rocks near the Paleozoic-




There is a significant potential for future seismic activity in NTS area including Frenchman Flat 
during the next 1,000 years (Shott et al. 1998).  The revised conceptual model of Frenchman Flat 
relates the origin of the Frenchman Flat basin to strike-slip faulting along the Rock Valley fault 
system that terminates in an extensional imbricate fan structure in the eastern margin of the basin 
(BN 2006b). Observational data suggest that this structure is still active.  Relatively large-
magnitude earthquakes (> magnitude 5.0) are expected events in the NTS region over time 
frames of 10,000 to 15,000 years. 
 
A formal seismic risk assessment has not been conducted for the Area 5 RWMS.  However, 
multiple lines of evidence support the conclusion that future seismic activity is unlikely to 
significantly degrade the isolation capability of shallow land pits and trenches. 
 
1. There are no observed offsets in alluvial deposits within the vicinity of the Area 5 
RWMS.  The active parts of the Rock Valley fault system and related imbricate fault 
systems are > 5 km (3 mi) from the facility.  A buried fault beneath the facility strikes 
northwest, a fault orientation that is not seismogenic in the current stress field (Carr 
1983).  Future ground ruptures from earthquake activity are not expected to disrupt the 
facility. 
 
2. The most likely effect of seismic activity is ground shaking associated with a distant 
earthquake event.  The primary concern with seismic activity ground shaking is 
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disruption of engineered components (geomembrane barriers, leachate collection system) 
that can lead to increased infiltration and/or enhanced vapor-phase transport.  Closure 
plans for the Area 5 RWMS include construction of a thick (> 3-m [9.8-ft]) monolayer-
evapotranspiration (ET) closure cover composed of alluvial soil.  This closure cover does 
not contain engineered components that could fail or be disrupted by seismic events.  The 
only anticipated effect of ground shaking is enhanced and/or accelerated 
compaction/subsidence.   
 
The important infiltration, water storage, and water removal characteristics of a monolayer-
ET cover are not expected to be adversely affected by minor compaction.  Kemnitz (1999) 
completed a seismic hazard assessment for the U3ax/bl monolayer closure cover at the Area 
3 RWMS.  Model parameters and site response assessments were performed for a bounding 
analysis to assess damage to a monolayer closure cover at the U3ax/bl disposal cell.  The 
controlling earthquake for the analysis is an earthquake event on the Yucca fault with a peak 
horizontal acceleration of 0.79 g, where g is the acceleration of gravity.  The maximum 
predicted deformation of the closure cover is between 2 and 8 cm (0.8 and 3 in.) (lateral and 
differential deformation).  These deformations are insignificant compared to the expected 
subsidence in the closure cover (Kemnitz 1999).  The effects of future seismic events are not 
important for the Area 5 RWMS monolayer-ET closure cover. 
 
Potential for Volcanic Activity 
 
The volcanic record of NTS was summarized in the Area 5 RWMS PA (Shott et al. 1998).  
Silicic volcanism in the region ceased following eruptions associated with the Black Mountain 
caldera about 8.5 million years ago (Ma) (Sawyer et al. 1994).  Small-volume basaltic volcanism 
persisted in the region following cessation of silicic volcanism.  All Quaternary basaltic volcanic 
activity in the NTS region is confined to the western and southwest parts of the region, including 
the basalt of Sleeping Butte, the Quaternary basalt of Crater Flat, and the Lathrop Wells volcanic 
center (Crowe 1990; Fleck et al. 1996; Heizler et al. 1999).  Basaltic volcanism in the Frenchman 
Flat basin includes buried basalt encountered in the alluvial section in multiple drillholes, 
including the underground testing area (UGTA) northern drillhole cluster (Carr et al. 1975; BN 
2005b).  The age of these buried basalt lavas is about 8.5 Ma (RSN 1994).  Local vents for the 
buried basalt are present in Scarp Canyon, immediately north of Frenchman Flat (Crowe 1990).  
The youngest basalt centers in the basin vicinity are the basalt of Nye Canyon.  This volcanic 
unit consists of three basalt centers aligned along a north-northeast trend and the centers have 
been dated at about 7.3 Ma (RSN 1994). 
 
The absence of nearby Pliocene or Quaternary basaltic volcanism in the Frenchman Flat area is 
the primary basis for an assessment of minimal risk to the Area 5 RWMS from the recurrence of 
future volcanism.  The nearest site of Quaternary basaltic volcanism is the Lathrop Wells center, 
over 50 km (31 mi) from the Area 5 RWMS.  The absence of young volcanic centers in the area 
classifies the facility as removed from zones of active volcanism and in a setting of background 
volcanic rates for the southern Great Basin.  Background volcanic rates for the southern Great 
Basin region have been estimated by multiple researchers.  Crowe et al. (1998) calculated a 
Quaternary recurrence rate of 3.7 x 10-6 events yr-1 for post-caldera basaltic volcanism within an 
area encompassing the NTS region and including Frenchman Flat.  The likelihood of magmatic 
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disruption of a 2.5-km2 (1-mi2) area equivalent to the dimensions of the Area 5 RWMS using this 
recurrence rate is 2 x 10-9 events yr-1.  Connor et al. (2000) calculated an event rate of 
1.3 x 10-9 events yr-1 per km2 for the last 2.0 Ma for the western Great Basin.  Application of this 
rate to a 2.5-km2 (1-mi2) facility area gives a volcanic disruption probability of 
3.2 x 10-9 events yr-1.  These event rates are equal to a disruption probability of about 1 in 
300 million per year, a sufficiently low probability to dismiss volcanism as a concern for the 
Area 5 RWMS.  
 
2.1.8 Hydrology  
 
Surface Water Hydrology 
 
Surface water occurs intermittently in Frenchman Flat in washes and on the playa after intense 
convective summer storms or prolonged winter rains.  Cane Spring, a small spring issuing from a 
perched aquifer 14.3 km (8.8 mi) west of the Area 5 RWMS, is the closest naturally occurring 
source of surface water. 
 
Vadose Zone Hydrology 
 
The conceptual model of unsaturated flow in the vadose zone was developed to understand liquid 
fluxes capable of transporting radionuclides.  The model, based primarily on observed water 
potential and chloride profiles, hypothesizes four regions of flow in the vadose zone (Figure 2.4).  
Zone boundaries are approximate and may vary from location to location within Frenchman Flat.  
In Zone I, a near-surface zone approximately 35 m (115 ft) thick, the water potential indicates a 
potential for upward liquid flux.  Zone II, occurring from approximately 40 to 90 m (131 to    
295 ft), is a static region with negligible liquid flux.  Zone III, an intermediate region with 
downward liquid fluxes driven by gravity, occurs from approximately 90 m (295 ft) to within a 
few centimeters of the saturated zone.  The final region, Zone IV, is a few centimeters thick 
transition zone between the vadose zone and the saturated zone where water potential and flow 
are negligible. 
 
Zone I includes a dynamic and transitory region in the upper few meters of the vadose zone, 
where the water potential gradient periodically reverses as precipitation infiltrates and is returned 
to the atmosphere by ET.  A strong upward potential for flow is maintained in Zone I by the 
roots of xeric desert plants.  Although there is a potential for upward flow in Zone I, the soil is 
normally so dry that liquid advection is very slow.  In the very near-surface, where plant roots 
maintain low moisture contents, upward water movement occurs predominantly in the vapor 
phase (and through plant roots) and the upward advection of soluble radionuclides may become 
negligible.  The conceptual boundary where upward liquid advection rates approach zero is 
referred to as the no-liquid flux boundary (NLFB). 
 
The large accumulation of chloride in Zone I below 2 m (6.6 ft) indicates that transient 
infiltration events are stopped above this depth and returned to the atmosphere by ET.  Assuming 
a constant atmospheric chloride source and downward liquid advection, the observed near-
surface chloride accumulation below the root zone is estimated to require from 10,000 to 
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15,000 years to form, which corresponds with the end of the last pluvial period, approximately 





































Figure 2.4  Schematic diagram of vadose zone conceptual model of the Area 5 RWMS under 
present-day climatic conditions.  Orange-shaded layer is the waste zone and the blue-shaded 
layer is the water table. 
 
The chloride accumulated throughout the entire profile at pilot wells UE5PW-1 and UE5PW-3 
suggest that infiltration at these locations has not reached the water table for 95,000 to 
110,000 years (Tyler et al. 1996).  The chloride profile at UE5PW-2 suggests that the sub-root 
zone chloride bulge was flushed from this profile at some time before 15,000 years ago, perhaps 
indicating that spatially variable recharge occurred during an earlier pluvial period.  The chloride 
profiles in the vadose zone near the Area 5 RWMS suggests that recharge through the alluvium 
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Zone I-Region of Slow Upward Flow: 
Region where the combination of low 
precipitation and high potential evapo-
transpiration leads to a dry zone, 
inducing upward flow of pore water in 
the unsaturated zone from as deep as 
about 35 m.  Median upward flux: 
0.003 mm yr-1 
 




Zone III-Region of Slow Downward 
Flow: region of steady downward flow 
(increased water contents allow down- 
ward drainage). Water in the vadose 
zone currently recharging the water 
table probably infiltrated during past 
pluvial climate cycles.  
 
No aerially distributed recharge to the 
groundwater table under current conditions. 
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ended after the last pluvial period when the climate became drier and mesic vegetation was 
replaced by more xeric desert shrubs.   
 
Using surface boundary conditions for infiltration and root-zone matric potentials based on a 
110,000-year paleoclimate reconstruction for southern Nevada, Walvoord et al. (2002) were able 
to simulate matric potential and chloride profiles observed at the Area 5 RWMS pilot wells, 
UE5PW-1, UE5PW-2, and UE5PW-3.  Sub-root zone upward liquid fluxes were estimated to 
range from 2 x 10-5 to 1 x 10-3 mm yr-1 under the current climatic conditions.  The hydraulic 
response time, the time required for an e-fold (1 – e-1) change in matric potential from the initial 
to steady-state profile, was estimated to be 300,000 years for Frenchman Flat, again suggesting 
that the pilot well profiles are not at equilibrium, but drying very slowly. 
 
Wolfsberg and Stauffer (2003) have extended and refined the modeling of Walvoord et al. 
(2002) to estimate present-day upward liquid fluxes at the Area 5 RWMS.  Varying the timing of 
the last pluvial period, pluvial infiltration rate, alluvium properties, and the interpluvial root-zone 
matric potential, Wolfsberg and Stauffer (2003) produced 32 simulation results matching 
chloride profiles for the Area 5 RWMS pilot wells.  The simulations include realizations which 
used measured unsaturated hydraulic conductivities for Area 5 RWMS soils, rather than modeled 
conductivities.  The upward near-surface liquid fluxes in their simulations ranged from 0 to 
0.02 mm yr-1.  The transition from upward to downward liquid flux occurred from 20 to 70 m 
(66 to 295 ft).  The estimated upward liquid fluxes were most sensitive to the timing of the end 
of the last pluvial period, which was assumed to be 26,000 or 13,000 years ago.  Wolfsberg and 
Stauffer (2003) also conclude that solute diffusion in the liquid phase may be more important 




Groundwater movement on NTS can be divided into intrabasin and interbasin flow.  Intrabasin 
flow describes the downward flow of water through the alluvial and volcanic aquifers and 
aquitards to the underlying carbonate aquifer.  Interbasin flow describes the lateral movement of 
groundwater within the lower-carbonate aquifer, confined by the lower-clastic aquitard on the 
bottom and either the upper-clastic or tuff aquitard above.  Interbasin flow in the southeast corner 
of NTS is generally from the northeast to the southwest toward Amargosa Valley, Ash Meadows, 
and Death Valley.  
 
Groundwater flow through Frenchman Flat Basin is driven primarily by areas of higher hydraulic 
head west of the basin and by recharge.  Present-day recharge is estimated to be one percent or 
less of the total fluxes passing through the basin (Stoller-Navarro 2006).  Head gradients are 
small suggesting slow groundwater flow.  Flow is predominantly through three hydrogeologic 
units (Stoller-Navarro 2006): 
 
1. Alluvial aquifer within saturated parts of the basin fill. 
2. Welded tuff and vitric aquifers in the volcanic section. 
3. Fracture and fault controlled sections of the lower-carbonate aquifer. 
 
        Special Analysis of TRU in T04C 22
Faults are an important component of the Frenchman Flat flow system with the Rock Valley 
fault system probably controlling the general basin flow to the southwest.  Hydraulic heads are 
higher in the alluvial aquifer than the lower-carbonate aquifer consistent with separation of the 
intrabasin flow in the alluvial aquifer from the regional interbasin flow system of the lower-
carbonate aquifer (Stoller-Navarro 2006). 
 
The three pilot wells (UE5PW-1, UE5PW-2, and UE5PW-3) have been used to monitor the 
uppermost alluvial aquifer below the Area 5 RWMS since 1992.  Water table elevation 
measurements are performed quarterly at the pilot wells.  Water table elevations indicate that the 
uppermost aquifer below the Area 5 RWMS is essentially flat with negligible lateral flow.  Some 
vertical flow to the underlying regional lower carbonate aquifer is suspected to occur.  Although 
the vertical flow is uncharacterized at this time, it is expected to be extremely slow.   
 
In addition to water level monitoring, semiannual samples are collected for five contamination-
indicating parameters (pH, specific conductance, total organic carbon, total organic halides, and 
tritium) and water chemistry parameters (major cations, anions, and alkalinity).  Biennial 
samples are collected for the radiological monitoring parameters (gross alpha, gross beta, 
gamma-emitting radionuclides, and plutonium).  All data indicate that Area 5 RWMS waste 
disposal operations have not had any measurable impact on the uppermost aquifer (BN 2005b). 
 
2.1.9 Geochemistry  
 
The water content of alluvium at the Area 5 RWMS is extremely low and aqueous phase 
transport of radionuclides is expected to be very slow.  Dissolved solutes are assumed to 
precipitate and partition between the liquid phase and solid phase as described by the solubility 
constant (Ksp) and soil-water distribution coefficient (Kd).   
 
2.1.10 Natural Background Radiation 
 
Natural background radiation in the vicinity of the Area 5 RWMS has been previously described 
(Shott et al. 1998, BN 2001a).  Although Frenchman Flat has been the site of 14 aboveground 
nuclear tests, 10 belowground nuclear tests, and 24 safety tests, surface soils at the Area 5 
RWMS contain levels of man-made radionuclides typical of global fallout. 
 
2.2 Future Site Characteristics 
 
2.2.1 Future Climate 
 
The climatic history of the southwest U.S. recorded in packrat middens, lake sediments, and 
calcite deposits indicates that climate change is likely over the next 10,000 years 
(Forester et al. 1999).  Glacial and various glacial-transition climate regimes account for 
approximately 87 percent of the last 400,000 years and are likely to occur in the future.  The 
monsoon climate regime has occurred frequently in the past.  During the monsoon climate 
regime, the Subtropical Highs expand northward causing increased summer monsoon activity in 
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southern Nevada (Bechtel SAIC 2004a).  These monsoon periods are characterized by increased 
temperature and increased summer precipitation.  Glacial-transition climates with increased 
Polar Low influence are also possible over the next 10,000 years.  These climate regimes are 
characterized by lower temperatures and increased winter precipitation.  
 
Predicting future climate is highly speculative.  The SA adapts the Yucca Mountain Project 
(YMP) climate change forecast for use at the Area 5 RWMS.  The YMP has developed a model 
of future climate using a climate forecasting method based on the earth’s orbital cycles 
(Forestor et al. 1999; Bechtel SAIC 2004a).  The climate forecast method attempts to establish 
the relationship between past climate states and periodic variations in the earth’s orbital motion 
and to project these changes into the future. 
 
The YMP climate forecast begins by reconstructing the sequence of past climates that have 
occurred over the last 500,000 years in the Southwest region (Forester et al. 1999).  Descriptions 
of past climate states are based on present climatic conditions, stable isotope data from  
Devil’s Hole, NV, the microfossil record from Owen’s Lake, CA, and plant macrofossil records 
recorded in packrat middens.  The next step in the climate forecast is to assume Milankovitch 
theory which holds that global climate is influenced by periodic variation in the distance of the 
earth from the sun and orientation of the earth’s axis of rotation relative to the sun 
(Imbrie et al. 1993).  These variations include at least three different orbital motions (orbital 
eccentricity, obliquity, and precession of the earth’s axis of rotation) and are predictable and 
repeat approximately every 400,000 years.  These periodic variations change solar insolation 
which influences global climate.  The relationship between orbital variation and regional climatic 
conditions can be established, once the sequence of past climate states has been dated.   
 
Since orbital variations repeat themselves over an approximately 400,000 year period, the future 
climate at the site can be forecast as the sequence of regional climate regimes observed 
approximately 400,000 years ago.  A Southern Hemisphere precession maximum occurred 
approximately 1,000 years ago during the present-day interglacial period.  This maximum has 
been matched with a precession maximum occurring 399,000 years ago.  The future climate 
forecast is then based on the sequence of climate states observed starting at 398,000 years ago. 
Using this approach, movement away from the present-day interglacial conditions is expected to 
begin in approximately 400 to 600 years (Table 2.1) (Bechtel SAIC 2004a).  The following 
period is forecast to be a 900 to 1,400-year monsoon period.  The remainder of the 10,000 year 
period is expected to be a glacial-transition period. 
 
Table 2.1  Summary of future climate states and their present-day analog sites as forecasted by 
the YMP (Bechtel SAIC 2004a). 
 
Climate State Duration Analog Site 




900 – 1,400 years Upper Limit: Sonoran/Chihuahuan Desert  
(Nogales AZ, Hobbs NM) 
Lower Limit: Current Site Conditions 
Glacial Transition Remainder of 
10,000 year period 
Upper Limit: Eastern Slope of the Cascades (Spokane, 
Rosalia, and St. John, WA) 
Lower Limit: Great Basin Desert (Beowawe, NV, Delta, UT) 
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During the monsoon period, the subtropical high is assumed to move northward, producing a 
warmer climate with a wetter summer monsoon season, similar to conditions currently observed 
in the Sonoran and Chihuahuan deserts of southern Arizona and New Mexico.  The glacial 
transition period is expected to be wetter and colder than present-day conditions.  Three sites on 
the eastern slope of the Cascade Mountains were selected as upper-limit analog sites for the 
glacial transition period.  These sites are under greater influence of the polar front and in the rain 
shadow of the Cascades.  The lower limit conditions for the glacial-transition period are based on 
Great Basin Desert sites. 
 
The YMP future climate states are considered beliefs of subject matter experts based on observed 
data.  Based on the speculative nature of the estimates and lack of credible alternative views, the 
YMP climate regime durations are adopted for use in the SA as ranges of a uniform distribution 
(Table 2.2). 
   
Table 2.2  Duration of future climate states assumed for Frenchman Flat. 
 
Climate State Adopted Distribution 
Inter-glacial (Present-Day Conditions) Duration_IG U(400, 600 yr)† 
Inter-glacial with increased summer monsoon Duration_M U(900, 1400 yr) 
Glacial-transition Duration_GT =  10,000 y – Duration_IG – Duration_M 




Site meteorological conditions are inputs to infiltration process models used to evaluate potential 
changes to the hydrogeologic conceptual model under climate change and to estimate soil 
moisture contents.  Meteorological conditions also guide selection of parameters describing 
future flora and fauna.  The meteorological conditions at Frenchman Flat during future climate 
regimes were estimated by scaling present-day conditions using the relative changes predicted 
for Yucca Mountain.  Relative changes were estimated by comparing analog sites with current 
Yucca Mountain conditions (Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3  Mean annual precipitation and temperature for current and future climate conditions as 
assumed by the YMP (Bechtel SAIC 2004b) 
 






Current inter-glacial mean Yucca Mountain Region 188.5 15.1
Current inter-glacial upper limit Yucca Mountain Region 265.5 18.2
Monsoon mean Nogales, AZ; Hobbs, NM 300.5 17.2
Monsoon upper limit Nogales, AZ; Hobbs, NM 412.5 17.3
Glacial-transition mean Rosalia, Spokane, St. John, WA 316.1 9.8
Glacial-transition upper limit Rosalia, Spokane, St. John, WA 431.1 10.2
† - Celsius 
 
The relative changes were then used to scale the present-day Frenchmen Flat conditions to future 
conditions (Table 2.4).   
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Table 2.4  Mean annual precipitation and temperature for current and future climate regimes for 
Frenchman Flat 
 
Relative Change Climate State 
Precipitation Temperature
Estimated Frenchman 
Flat Mean Annual 
Precipitation (mm) 
Estimated Frenchman 
Flat Mean Annual 
Temperature, ºC 
Present-day 1X ±0 N(123.82, 8.112)† N(15.2)
Monsoon 1.59X +0.6 N(197, 322) N(15.8, 0.042)
Glacial-transition 1.68X -5.3 N(208, 322) N(9.9, 0.172)
†- Normal distribution(mean, variance) 
2.2.2 Future Hydrologic Conditions 
 
Future hydrologic conditions are estimated from the results of hydrologic process models using 
the climatic conditions described above and site specific soil properties.  Monsoon climate 
regime analog sites do not appear to currently have infiltration below the plant root zone 
(Scanlon et al. 1999).  The Hanford Site, an analog site for the glacial-transition period, has been 
reported to have low recharge rates ranging from 0.2 to 5 mm yr-1 (Mann et al. 2003).  
2.2.3 Future Ecology 
 
Estimating the ecologic effects of climate change was approached by first attempting to 
understand the type of change expected for a parameter (i.e., increase, decrease, or no change) 
given the assumed change in climate.  When a parameter was expected to change, the scientific 
literature was reviewed for data from appropriate analog sites, and quantitative estimates of the 
expected value and its uncertainty were made.  When published literature supporting a new 





Expected climate change impacts on the floral community are limited on a conceptual basis to 
the following areas: 
 
• Plant community or species composition of plant associations 
• Aboveground net primary productivity of plants (ANPP) 
• Allometric structure of plants (i.e., root-to-shoot ratio, rooting depth, root depth 
distribution) 
 
Primary productivity is the rate of production of plant biomass by the process of photosynthesis.  
Model plant-soil concentration ratios are generic and are assumed to be unaffected by climate 






        Special Analysis of TRU in T04C 26
 
Monsoon Climate Regime 
 
Monsoon climate analog sites with similar MAP and mean annual temperature (MAT) can be 
found on NTS, but these sites differ in the seasonal distribution of rainfall.  Beatley (1974) has 
reported that Larrea is limited to a MAP less than 160 – 183 mm yr-1 on NTS.  Beatley’s data 
would suggest that a Coleogyne association is more likely for a MAP of 197 mm yr-1.   
 
Another source of analog sites for the monsoon period is the Sonoran and Chihuahuan Deserts.  
Larrea communities occur in the Sonoran Desert in areas receiving up to 300 mm yr-1 of 
precipitation (USDA 2007), suggesting that Larrea communities may persist at the site during 
the monsoon climate regime.  The Chihuahuan Desert perhaps has a stronger monsoon signature 
with as much as 70 to 80 percent of annual precipitation falling between April and September 
(USDA 2007).  In contrast, NTS Mojave Desert sites typically receive 40 percent of their 
precipitation from March to August (USDA 2007).  Larrea communities also commonly occur at 
lower elevation sites in the Chihuahuan Desert.  Sonoran and Chihuahuan Deserts analog sites 
indicate that a Larrea community may still be present during a monsoon climate regime. 
 
The Sonoran and Chihuahuan Deserts differ most noticeably from Mojave Desert communities 
by the presence of deep rooted trees including Prosopis spp. (mesquite), Cercidium spp. 
(paloverde), and Acacia spp. (acacia).  However, these trees are most commonly found in 
drainage ways with higher infiltration, and therefore are not expected on the bajadas near the 
Area 5 RWMS. 
 
Under the monsoonal climate regime, Larrea tridentata is expected to remain as the dominant 
species surrounding the Area 5 RWMS.  The plant community during the monsoonal period is 
assumed to have the same species compositions as present-day communities with increased 
primary productivity due to increased water availability. 
 
Glacial-Transition Climate Regime 
 
The glacial-transition climate is expected to be 5.3 degrees Celsius (ºC) colder than present-day 
conditions and precipitation is expected to increase 1.68 times.  The precipitation pattern is also 
expected to be changed, with increased precipitation occurring in the Winter-Spring period when 
it can be used more effectively for plant production.  A change in the dominant plant alliances 
and associations is considered likely for the glacial-transition climate regime.   
 
The plant community assumed for the glacial-transition climate regime is based on present-day 
communities observed at analog sites with similar climatic and soil conditions.  The upper limit 
analog climate sites selected by the YMP are sites in Eastern Washington in the rain shadow of 
the Cascade mountain range.  The Pacific Northwest sites receive more precipitation than 
1.68 times present-day Frenchman Flat rainfall, but may provide some indication of the types of 
plant communities possible.  Low elevation areas in this region typically support shrub-steppe 
communities with Big Sagebrush (Artemisia tridentata) as the dominant species (Figure 2.5) or 
in the past supported the now rare Palouse Prairie, a bunchgrass community dominated by 
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bluebunch wheat grass (Agropyron spicatum) and Idaho fescue (Festuca idahoensis) 




Figure 2.5  View of an Artemisia spp. shrub-steppe community on the Columbia Plateau of Central 




Figure 2.6  View of a remnant of Palouse Prairie, a bunchgrass prairie, in eastern Oregon. 
 
Great Basin Desert shrub-steppe communities occur on NTS, including the Artemisia spp. 
Shrubland Alliance and Pinus monophylla/Artemisia spp. Woodland Alliance which occur at 
colder, wetter, higher elevation sites.  Pinus monophylla woodlands typically develop on steeper 
slopes with shallow soils (Ostler et al. 2000).  Under wetter conditions, the deeper soils at the 
Area 5 RWMS will support the growth of grasses which can promote fire.  If grass production is 
sufficient, periodic fires will remove large slow-growing woody species from these environments 
and favor faster-growing grasses and shrubs.  Consequently, the 
Pinus monophylla/Artemisia spp. Woodland Alliance is considered unlikely to develop on the 
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deep soils at the Area 5 RWMS, but might be expected on the steeper slopes and shallower soils 
of the Massachusetts Mountains to the north (Hansen and Ostler 2003).   
 
No grassland communities currently occur on NTS, but if soil moisture conditions can support 
sufficient grass production, periodic fire may remove woody shrubs.  Palouse Prairie develops on 
deep loamy soils of the Columbia Plateau and typically receives more precipitation (250 to 750 
mm yr-1) than expected for Frenchman Flat during the glacial-transition climate regime.  Palouse 
Prairie seems an unlikely analog given the coarser NTS soils and more arid conditions, but 
development of a grassland community at the Area 5 RWMS is still considered possible, within 
the upper limit of precipitation in the glacial-transition climate regime.  Over the last century, the 
sagebrush-steppe of the Great Basin Desert has seen an invasion of Bromus tectorum 
(cheatgrass) that has replaced native bunchgrasses and woody perennial shrubs (Knapp 1996).  
This trend is also observed on NTS.  A grassland dominated by cheatgrass may be another 
possible future state.   
 
Pearson (1965) found that the aboveground biomass of an Artemisia tridentata Shubland was 
partitioned as 65 percent Artemisia tridentata, 6.4 percent Chrysothamnus viscidiflorus (green 
rabbitbrush), and 29 percent grasses and forbs.  Boindini et al. (1985) found that Artemisia 
tridentata comprised from 60 to 80 percent of the canopy of an Artemisia tridentata Shubland.  
Grassland communities are assumed to be 100 percent grasses and forbs.  As no information is 
available on the relative probability of these two communities, the life-form composition of the 
glacial-transition plant community is simulated as a continuous gradation between the two 
communities.  The glacial transition community is divided into three life-forms, sagebrush with 
Artemisia tridentata as the dominant species, other shrubs typified by Chrysothamnus spp., 
Krascheninnikovia lanata (winterfat), and Grayia spinosa (spiny hopsage), and grasses/forbs.  
The fraction of aboveground biomass that is Artemisia tridentata is assumed to vary uniformly 
between 0 (grassland) and 0.8 (pure Artemisia tridentata shrubland).  The biomass fraction of 
other shrubs is assumed to be 0.1 times the Artemisia tridentata fraction.  The grass and forb 
fraction is calculated as 1.0 minus the total shrub fraction.  These distributions simulate a 
gradation of communities that includes the range of possible future states.  The fraction of each 




Monsoon Climate Regime 
 
Primary productivity in desert plant communities is strongly limited by the availability of water 
(Hadley and Szarek 1981; Ehleringer et al. 1991).  The seasonal timing of rainfall impacts its 
utilization by different species in the plant community.  During the monsoon climate regime, late 
summer precipitation is expected to increase relative to Winter-Spring precipitation.  Those plant 
species able to utilize summer rains will differentially benefit during this climate regime.  Plants 
most susceptible to water stress, herbaceous species and shallow rooted woody species, appear 
most likely to respond to summer precipitation (Ehleringer et al. 1991; Lin et al. 1996).  In the 
Mojave Desert as much as 37 percent of woody perennial ANPP can occur in the fall after late 
summer rains (Rundel and Gibson 1996).  In addition, Mojave Desert communities typically 
include a summer annual community that is specifically adapted to utilize summer rains.   
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Aboveground net primary productivity in Sonoran and Chihuahuan Deserts which already 
experience a monsoonal climate regime is reported to range from 920 to 1,860 kg ha-1yr-1 
(Whittaker and Niering 1975; Sims et al. 1978a).  Conceptually, increasing summer rainfall will 
increase ANPP, but this increase is likely to be less than if the Winter-Spring rainfall was 
increased because a limited number of species respond to summer precipitation while nearly all 
species respond to Winter-Spring rainfall.  Specific data to estimate the effect of summer rains 
on Larrea community productivity are not available.  Therefore, ANPP and growing season 
(September to August) precipitation data are used.  The range of these data is expected to bound 
the expected increase in primary productivity occurring during the monsoon climate regime. 
 
Two data sets are available describing shrub ANPP in Larrea tridentata-Ambrosia dumosa 
Shrubland Alliance and growing season precipitation (Rundel and Gibson 1996; Thompson 
Ramo Wooldridge Inc. [TRW] 1996).  Shrub ANPP is assumed to be correlated with growing 
season precipitation.  The correlation between precipitation and shrub ANPP is maintained by 
using a Bayesian linear regression to probabilistically simulate ANPP.   
 
Three data sets are available describing grass and forb ANPP in Larrea tridentata-Ambrosia 
dumosa Shrubland Alliances and growing season precipitation (Rundel and Gibson 1996; TRW 
1996, and Beatley 1969).  Grass and forb ANPP is assumed to be correlated with growing season 
precipitation.  The correlation between precipitation and grass/forb ANPP is maintained by using 
Bayesian linear regression to simulate ANPP from precipitation   
 
Glacial-Transition Climate Regime 
 
The relationship between MAP and ANPP for the glacial transition climate regime was 
developed from 13 data points for eight sites with Artemisia spp. shrub-steppe communities or 
semi-arid grassland communities from the western United States (Pearson 1965; Webb et al. 
1978; Sims et al. 1978a, b; Gholz 1982; Law and Waring 1994; Hansen et al. 2000; Knapp and 
Smith 2001).  Selected grassland communities were limited to those with MAT from 8 to 12ºC 
and MAP less than 400 mm yr-1.  Data from grazed sites was not used.  No relationship between 
precipitation and ANPP was observed for these data and the distribution of ANPP was estimated 
by resampling with replacement.  The simulated mean ANPP data were well fit by a normal 
distribution with mean 1,130 kg ha-1 yr-1 and standard deviation of 171 kg ha-1 yr-1. 
 
Rooting Depth and Distribution 
 
Monsoon Climate Regime 
 
Precipitation falling during summer months, when PET is at its highest, would not be expected to 
infiltrate deeply into the soil before ET returns it to the atmosphere.  Conceptually, plants 
utilizing summer rains would be expected to increase shallow roots or lateral roots to withdraw 
infiltrating water near the surface. 
 
Statistical analysis of plant rooting data for arid ecosystems has shown that only shrub roots 
show a response to summer-dominated precipitation (Shenk and Jackson 2002).  Shrubs (defined 
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as shrubs > 1 m [3.28 ft] in height) growing in arid environments with summer-dominated 
precipitation tended to have shallower roots than shrubs in environments without seasonal 
precipitation variation or winter-dominated precipitation, while other life-forms including 
shrubs < 1 m [3.28 ft] in height were unaffected (Shenk and Jackson 2002).   Given the 
apparently weak relationship between plant root depth distribution and summer-dominated 
precipitation, plant rooting depths are assumed not to change for the monsoon climate regime.   
 
Root biomass can be expected to increase relative to aboveground biomass in environments 
where water or nutrients are limited.  In a global study of major terrestrial biomes, Jackson et al. 
(1996) found that tundra, cold deserts, and grasslands had the largest root-to-shoot ratios.  
Tundra and cold deserts are environments with limited water and nutrient availability.  Shenk 
and Jackson (2002) reviewed the relative size of roots to aboveground plants as reported in the 
literature and concluded that grass and forb root-to-shoot ratio decreases with increasing MAP 
and PET.  The data for woody plants (i.e. shrubs, semi-shrubs, and trees) was equivocal with a 
weak increase in root-to-shoot ratio with increasing MAP. 
 
Conceptually, increasing precipitation should increase water availability, which should reduce 
root-to-shoot ratio.  However, the data for a broad range of environments appear weak.  
Therefore, root-to-shoot ratios are assumed not to change for the monsoon climate regime.   
 
Glacial-Transition Climate Regime 
 
Rooting depths are determined by plant genetics and environmental factors including water, 
oxygen, and nutrient availability.  The glacial-transition climate regime is expected to change 
both the plant association and soil water content, so changes in rooting depths and distributions 
are possible.  Maximum rooting depths were selected as the maximum value found in the 
literature for the three different life-forms.  The selected values were 2.48 m (8.1 ft) for 
sagebrush (Hampton 2006), 2.93 m (9.6 ft) for other shrubs (Hampton 2006), and 2.7 m (8.8 ft) 
for grasses (Canadell et al. 1996). 
 
The SA model describes the plant root density with depth using the fraction of plant roots below 









where z is the depth, zmax, the maximum root depth, and b a fitted parameter.  The b parameter 
for Artemisia spp. was estimated by fitting 13 root profiles from the literature.  The distribution 
of the mean of b was simulated by resampling with replacement.  The simulated means were 
well fit by a N(5.19, 0.712) distribution.  The distribution was truncated at 1.0, which 
corresponds to a uniform distribution with depth. 
 
The b parameter for other shrubs was fit for 10 profiles from the literature.  The 10 b values were 
resampled with replacement.  The means of the simulated data were well fit by an 
N(10.03, 2.772) distribution.  Only three depth profiles could be located for grasses.  The b 
parameter for grasses was modeled as an N(4.17, 0.182) distribution. 
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The data for Artemisia spp. and grass root-to-shoot ratio are sparse.  The Artemisia spp. root-to-
shoot ratio was modeled as a U(0.38, 1.8) distribution.  The single grass value was modeled 
using the present-day distribution.  The other shrubs root-to-shoot ratio was estimated by 
resampling with replacement using five data points from the literature.  The data were well fit by 
a N(1.47, 0.552) distribution. 
 
2.3 Facility Features Supporting Assurance Requirements 
 
Under 40 CFR 191, the disposal system is required to include features that increase confidence in 
the long-term compliance with the containment requirements.  This section describes features 
planned for the Area 5 RWMS which meet these requirements.  Chapters 3 and 4 describe the 
results of analyses performed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative engineered barriers 
required to increase confidence in the isolation of waste. 
2.3.1 Active Institutional Controls 
 
Active institutional controls are defined by 40 CFR 191 to include access controls, site 
maintenance, remedial actions, control and clean-up of releases, and monitoring.  NTS’s national 
security mission, legacy of aboveground and below ground nuclear testing, and waste disposal 
operations, require access controls.  Access controls are currently in place.  Federal ownership of 
NTS lands and numerous commitments in DOE land-use planning and policy documents ensure 
that access controls will continue indefinitely.  Closure planning documents for the 
Area 5 RWMS include provisions for inspections and maintenance of passive institutional 
controls, the landfill cover, and the environmental monitoring system.  Closure plans also include 
provisions for detecting and responding to releases. 
 
Access-Control and Site Security 
 
Located in a remote and sparsely populated region, NTS is an ideal location for sensitive or 
hazardous national security activities.  The U.S. government has committed to oversight and 
management of NTS into the foreseeable future for the purposes of national security.  The NTS 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (DOE/NV 1996) and Resource Management Plan 
(DOE/NV 1998a) state a primary mission of NTS is to “preserve the capability to resume 
underground nuclear testing . . . and accomplish stockpile stewardship and national security 
missions.”  Therefore, it is expected that public access will be restricted as long as NTS is an 
operational Defense Program facility.   
 
Current access-controls and site security features are summarized in the following passage from 
the Resource Management Plan (DOE/NV 1998a): 
 
NTS is surrounded by government-controlled buffer zones and protected by 
Security Police officers, mobile patrols, and highly trained emergency response 
teams. Sensitive areas within NTS use chain-link fencing, protective alarms, 
closed-circuit television, and secure communications systems. The Nye County 
Sheriff’s Department provides civil law enforcement.  
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NTS is a controlled-access area with road access beginning at the Security Station 
on Mercury Highway, 5 miles (mi) from the U.S. Highway 95 Mercury turnoff. 
Although a security clearance is not required for entry, access is not allowed 
without proper identification and an identification badge. Personnel are issued 
dosimetry badges if entering areas where they might be exposed to radiation 
levels above background. Security areas within NTS have stringent personnel 
controls, requiring the appropriate security clearance and an operational need 
before access is allowed.  
 
The entire perimeter of NTS is not fenced, but it is posted as a restricted area; 
access is prohibited except at designated entrances. Beyond the perimeter, the 
BLM and NAFR (Nellis Air Force Range) (now NTTR [Nellis Test and Training 
Range]) provide buffer zones. Barricades and/or Security Stations control the few 
roads that access NTS boundaries. Perimeter barricades are checked by security 
force patrols. (DOE/NV 1998a, page 8-2) 
 
As long as the NTS national security mission continues, access controls will ensure 
that the public does not have access to the Area 5 RWMS.   
 
Post-Closure Inspections and Maintenance  
 
Post-closure inspection and maintenance activities for the Area 5 RWMS are outlined in the 
Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (ICMP) (BN 2005a).  The final inspection and 
maintenance strategy will be presented in the post-closure care plans for the Area 5 RWMS.  
Inspection and maintenance requirements for the 92-ac LLMU will require compliance with 
RCRA requirements for the closure of the Pit 3 MWDU.   
 
The operational inspection program has requirements for environmental monitoring equipment, 
fire protection systems, safety and emergency equipment, security devices, and operating or 
structural equipment that are critical to prevent, detect, or respond to human health or 
environmental hazards.  Records will be used by RWMS personnel to ensure inspections are 
conducted according to established schedules. 
 
Post-closure inspection and maintenance will be minimized to the extent possible by the design 
of the disposal unit and closure cover system, and the additional site security measures.  Post-
closure inspections will include: 
 
• General facility inspection 
• Boundary monument inspection  
• Warning sign inspection   
• Cover inspection 
• Run-on/runoff inspection 
 
During each inspection, any changes in the condition of the closure cover, vegetation, or fenced 
area will be documented [Title 40 CFR part 265.310(b)(1)].  Specific changes noted on the 
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current condition of the cover include, but are not limited to, trash and debris within the fenced 
compound, animal burrows or nesting activity, and erosion of the cover. 
 
Maintenance activities will be based on inspection results.  Custodial maintenance or repair 
actions may include:  repair of fences; replacement of warning signs; re-establishment of 
location control monuments; removal of unwanted vegetation; reconstruction of slopes, cover, or 
embankments. 
 
All repair work to the cover will ensure that the integrity of the cover and design is maintained 
“as built.”  For RCRA-regulated disposal units, if cover repair requires modifications of the 
closure cover design, NNSA/NSO will present a formal design modification request to the NDEP 
prior to making the design modification. 
 
Closure and post-closure monitoring documentation will be maintained in the Area 5 RWMS 
files and at the NNSA/NSO Technical Library in North Las Vegas. The files will be available for 




Except for extraordinary events, the site access restrictions, closure cover design, post-closure 
inspections and preventive maintenance are expected to mitigate the need for emergency release 
response during the active control period.  NTS environmental surveillance and site-specific 
monitoring programs are designed to detect conditions indicating a potential containment breach.  
After detection, further investigation may be necessary to confirm site conditions and to assess 
the scope and nature of the problem.  The type and level of response will depend on the scope 
and nature of the problem and the hazards that must be addressed to implement the response 
safely.  The response may include several phases of activity including quick containment 
measures and longer-term construction projects.  NTS has on site capacity to address many types 
of emergencies rapidly and is likely to maintain such capacity while active DoD and DOE 




An integrated closure and monitoring plan has been developed for the Area 5 RWMS 
(BN 2005a).   
 
The Area 5 RWMS monitoring system consists of a combination of direct monitoring of 
radionuclides released from the disposal system as well as monitoring transport mechanisms, 
which could lead to the release of radionuclides to the accessible environment.  The monitoring 
system consists of the following elements: 
 
• Vadose Zone Monitoring 
• Groundwater Detection Monitoring 
• Radon Monitoring 
• Meteorology Monitoring 
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• Biota Monitoring 
• Subsidence Monitoring 
• Air Monitoring 
• Soil Gas Monitoring at GCD borehole 5 (U5RWMS05U) 
 
Current monitoring locations are shown in Figures 2.7 and 2.8.  The monitoring program will be 
applied to the entire Area 5 RWMS including T04C. 
 
 
Figure 2.7  Meteorology, soil gas, and vadose zone monitoring stations at the Area 5 RWMS 
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Figure 2.8  Groundwater wells, weighing lysimeters, rain gauge and other monitoring stations near 
the Area 5 RWMS 
 
Vadose Zone Monitoring 
 
Vadose zone monitoring is conducted to confirm the key assumption of no downward pathway, 
to detect changes in system performance, and establish baseline data for long-term monitoring.  
The vadose monitoring system consists of weighing lysimeters and instrumented operational 
covers.  Two precision weighing lysimeters have been in continuous operation since March 
1994.  One lysimeter is vegetated with native plant species at the approximate density of the 
surrounding desert, and the other lysimeter is kept bare to simulate operational covers.  The 
lysimeters are capable of measuring changes in storage of ±800 grams or ± 0.1 mm of water.  
Additionally, both lysimeter soil columns are instrumented with time domain reflectometers 
(TDR) for volumetric water content and heat dissipation probes (HDP) for matric potential and 
soil temperature measurements. 
 
Three operational covers and one pit floor are instrumented with TDR probes.  Sensors are 
installed throughout the cover profile to a depth of 1.80 m (6 ft).  HDP arrays are also installed in 




Groundwater monitoring has been conducted for a suite of radiologic and chemical constituents 
at the three wells surrounding the Area 5 RWMS since 1993.  The wells have been sampled 
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semi-annually for RCRA compliance and biennially as part of the site-wide groundwater 
monitoring program.  Water table elevation measurements taken at the three wells surrounding 
the RWMS, as well as neighboring wells, indicate the uppermost aquifer is approximately 236 m 
(775 ft) below ground surface and is essentially flat, with little to no appreciable groundwater 




Detailed meteorological data are collected at the Area 5 RWMS.  Measurements include: 
precipitation, air temperature, relative humidity, wind speed and direction, barometric pressure 
and incoming solar radiation.  Hourly data are recorded.  These basic meteorological parameters 
are required to quantify the exchange of water and heat between the soil and atmosphere.  
Meteorological measurements are taken to (1) confirm the RWMS is sited in an arid environment 




Subsidence has been formally monitored since 2000.  Subsidence occurs most commonly in 
recently filled disposal units, especially between the trench wall and the waste stack where soil 
backfill may not be completely compacted.  Subsidence monitoring ensures subsidence features 




Air particulate samples are collected weekly at two stations surrounding the Area 5 RWMS using 
glass fiber filters.  Air particulate samples are screened for gross alpha and gross beta activity 
weekly.  Monthly composites are analyzed by gamma spectrometry for gamma-emitting 
radionuclides and by radiochemical analyses for americium (Am) and plutonium (Pu). 
 
Atmospheric moisture is collected and analyzed for tritium (3H) at two stations.  Tritium samples 
are collected over a two week period.  Tritium acts as a conservative tracer and therefore is an 
excellent indicator of volatile radionuclide migration from waste cells. 
 
Soil Gas Monitoring 
 
Soil gas sampling for 3H has been conducted approximately annually at GCD borehole 5 since 
1990.  GCD borehole 5 has a large 3H inventory (~ 8.1E4 teraBequerel [TBq] at time of 
disposal).  GCD borehole 5 has the same approximate geometry and is located near the 
40 CFR 191 regulated GCD boreholes and therefore is a direct performance analogue for the 
40 CFR 191 regulated GCD units. 
 
Biota Monitoring  
 
Vegetation growing on and around waste disposal units is periodically sampled.  Vegetation 
sampling provides a direct measure of radionuclide transport through plant uptake.  Due to its 
high mobility, 3H is the primary target analyte, although other radionuclides are often included in 
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Although significant radon flux is not expected for T04C in the near-term, the dose from 222Rn 
progeny is important for long-term performance.  Radon flux measurements are taken at other 
locations within the Area 5 RWMS, which have the highest expected present-day fluxes, to 




Monitoring data will be evaluated and compared on an annual basis against PA/SA model 
assumptions to confirm conceptual and parameter assumptions are not changing. 
Included in these evaluations will be recommendations for changes in frequency or 
addition/deletion of monitored parameters.   
 
2.3.3 Passive Institutional Controls 
 
Passive institutional controls are defined by 40 CFR 191 to include markers, public records and 
archives, government ownership, land- and resource-use policies.  Land-use policies for NTS 
reflect the need to control residual radioactive contamination from past activities.  Inactive 
facilities and areas known to be contaminated and require access controls are fenced and posted 
with warning signs.  In remote areas where personnel rarely work, appropriate posting at the 
perimeter boundary as well as access roads to the contaminated area may be substituted for 
fencing.  Further program enhancement is accomplished by following the Integrated Safety 
Management guiding principles and core functions (DOE/NV 1998c, page 9-8) 
 
Markers, Signs and Fencing 
 
Classified Trench 4 is already marked by concrete boundary markers at its four corners.  
Although these markers may be buried during final site closure, intruders may still detect their 
presence and be alerted to the potentially hazardous nature of the site.  Concrete boundary 
monuments with metal placards warning of buried TRU wastes are planned for the four corners 
of T04C at final closure.  GCD boreholes with regulated TRU waste in close proximity to T04C 
will also have monuments. 
 
Fencing with warning signs every 100 feet will be installed around the Area 5 RWMS.  
Regulated units within the Area 5 RWMS that have specific posting requirements include 
FFACO-regulated units (CAU 111), TSCA-regulated asbestiform disposal units, and LLW 
disposal units which must be posted as buried radioactive materials areas.  These controls will 
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Land Ownership and Land Use 
 
NTS occupies federally owned public lands that are administered by the Department of Interior 
and Bureau of Land Management (BLM).  Most of the land surrounding NTS is also owned and 
controlled by various agencies of the federal government (Figure 2.9).   
 
DOE has jurisdiction of NTS through withdrawals under public land laws, including mining and 
mineral leasing laws through the public land orders, and a memorandum of understanding 
(NNSA/NSO 2006).  In 1983, BLM reviewed the four land withdrawals comprising NTS.  BLM 
concluded the lands were still being used for the purposes withdrawn, but recognizing the 
potential end of testing, recommended another review in 100 years. (NNSA/NSO 2006, page 
36).  Although the agency with jurisdiction over NTS land may change, federal responsibility for 
NTS is expected to continue in perpetuity.  There are currently no plans to remove institutional 




NNSA/NSO has entered into the FFACO with the DoD and the state of Nevada (State of Nevada 
et al. 1996).  This agreement specifies a process for the identification, remediation, and closure 
of CAUs on NTS.  The FFACO land-use restrictions for CAUs near the Area 5 RWMS are part 
of the active institutional control strategy for the Area 5 RWMS.  Anticipated FFACO land-use 
restrictions in Frenchman Flat have implications for future public access to the area for drilling 
water wells, and for the likelihood of human intrusion at the site.   
 
The Area 5 RWMS is within the Frenchman Flat UGTA CAU.  The UGTA CAUs are identified 
as Restricted Use Zones in local directives.  The corrective action strategy for UGTA is based on 
a corrective action process where boundaries are identified for each CAU that encompass 
geographic areas containing groundwater that may be unsafe for domestic and municipal use.  
Each UGTA CAU will be evaluated through data collection, evaluation and numerical modeling 
leading to predictions of the maximum extent of groundwater flow and contaminant transport 
from underground testing of nuclear weapons.  The vertical and horizontal extent of contaminant 
migration will be predicted for each CAU.  The contaminant boundary will be used to negotiate a 
compliance boundary between NNSA/NSO and the Nevada Department of Environmental 
Protection (NDEP).  With establishment of a regulatory compliance boundary, remedial actions 
will be evaluated and a 5-year monitoring plan will be developed to assess adequacy of CAU 
surveillance.  If the monitoring plan is found acceptable, a closure plan for the CAU will be 
developed followed by a long-term closure monitoring program.  
 
The expectation of the UGTA is that protection of human health and the environmental will be 
based on controlled access to areas of contamination (areas within the compliance boundary).  
As part of the FFACO process land use restriction forms and maps are approval by NDEP and 
become official records for documenting sites with remaining contamination after closure.  
NNSA/NSO, BLM and the U.S. Air Force will maintain use restriction records as long as the 
land is under their jurisdiction.  
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Figure 2.9  Ownership of lands surrounding NTS 
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Current results are inconclusive whether the Area 5 facility will be included in the contaminant 
and compliance boundaries associated with a cluster of underground tests in northern Frenchman 
Flat.  The model boundaries are expected to be close to the Area 5 RWMS and the Assistant 
Manager for Environmental Management, NNSA/NSO, has administratively agreed that the 
facility will be included within the contaminant and compliance boundaries for the Frenchman 
Flat CAU 98. 
 
The land-use restrictions will prohibit public access to contaminated groundwater within the 
NDEP compliance-negotiated boundaries for 1,000 years.  Land-use restrictions will ensure that 
the member of public is farther than at the 100-m (330-ft) site boundary and will reduce the 
likelihood of releases caused by inadvertent intrusion. 
 
Public records of T04C will be recorded as part of final closure of the site and compliance with 
the FFACO.  Final closure of the Area 5 RMWS under the FFACO requires that a survey plat of 
the site include the location and dimensions of all disposal units be submitted to NDEP.  Land-
use restrictions for the site will also be recorded in the FFACO and the NTS Information 
Management Systems databases.  
 
Federal Land Use and Long-Term Stewardship Policies 
 
Numerous government policies for NTS land-use and long-term stewardship written to manage 
resources and provide protection from residual radioactive contamination provide another 
assurance of continuing institutional control.  The NTS EIS (DOE/NV 1996) defined NTS land 
uses for planning purposes. The Area 5 RWMS is designated as a “Waste Management Site” and 
is managed through a comprehensive waste management program in accordance with pertinent 
DOE Orders, policies, and federal regulations.  Closure requirements are designed to help protect 
future users of the property from exposure to the contaminants in waste. 
 
The NTS Resource Management Plan indicates that the Area 5 RWMS is within a Restricted Use 
Zone (DOE/NV 1998a).  Activities within a Restricted Use Zone must, among other criteria, be 
“compatible with NTS natural and manmade resources” and there must be a “compelling need 
(such as security, restricted access, remote location, physical characteristics) that drives the 
project to be located within the security boundary of NTS.” 
 
Processes and permits that ensure land-use plans are enforced during the period of active 
institutional control include: 
 
• FFACO land-use restrictions for the CAU 98 (Frenchman Flat Underground Testing 
Area) and CAU 111 (Area 5 RWMS Shallow Land Burial Trenches). 
• NTS excavation permits 
• NTS radiological work permits 
• State of Nevada groundwater well permits 
• National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) checklist reviews and compliance for 
planned NTS activities 
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The U.S. government’s commitment to the long-term environmental stewardship of NTS while 
accomplishing agency missions has been stated in many planning and policy documents 
including: 
 
• DOE Policy P 430.1 Land and Facility Use Planning (DOE 1996)  
• Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure (DOE 1998) 
• Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV 1998c) 
• From Cleanup to Stewardship (DOE 1999b) 
• NTS Resource Management Plan (DOE/NV 1998a) 
• Performance Management Plan (NNSA/NSO 2002) 
• U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Test Site, Environmental Management, End State 
Vision (NNSA/NVO 2006) 
 
The DOE’s policy is to manage its “land and facilities as valuable natural resources, with 
stewardship based on principles of ecosystem management and sustainable development…The 
goal of NTS ecosystem management is to accomplish the DOE/NV missions of national security, 
EM (Environmental Management), technology diversification, energy efficiency and renewable 
energy, and NTS stewardship while at the same time, sustaining the health and biological 
diversity of NTS ecosystems.”  (DOE/NV 1998c, page 4-1).  Furthermore, “DOE will maintain a 
presence at NTS to ensure reduced risks to human health and the environment.  This long-term 
stewardship will include passive and active institutional controls, the degree of which will be 
determined through negotiations between DOE/NV, regulators, Tribal Nations, and 
stakeholders” (DOE/NV 1998c). 
 
The NNSA/NSO and DOE contractors at NTS must comply with DOE O 450.1, “Environmental 
Protection Program” (DOE 2003a).  The principle objective of DOE O 450.1 is “To implement 
sound stewardship practices that are protective of the air, water, land, and other natural and 
cultural resources impacted by Department of Energy (DOE) Operations and by which DOE cost 
effectively meets or exceeds compliance with applicable environmental; public health; and 
resource protection laws, regulations and DOE requirements” (DOE 2003a).  
 
The NNSA/NSO Performance Management Plan (NNSA/NSO 2002) is compliant with DOE 
Policy P455.1 Use of Risk-Based End States (DOE 2003b).  Expected future land uses are a 
driver in selecting acceptable end state conditions and clean-up goals for NTS.  NNSA/NSO 
EM’s land management assumptions and framework for Environmental Management activities 
include:  
 
“The NTS will remain under federal control in perpetuity as an NNSA test site, 
and the large buffer zone surrounding the NTS (the Nevada Test and Training 
Range) is assumed to remain under the control of the U.S. Air Force. There are no 
plans for transfer of any NTS lands to other agencies or public entities. Access 
will continue to be restricted to the NTS and the surrounding areas.  
 
For management purposes, NNSA/NV EM activities have been established based 
on the source of contamination and type of waste requiring management. 
Environmental Restoration activities within the state of Nevada fall under the 
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purview of a formal regulatory agreement, the FFACO.  Waste Management 
activities are governed by the Federal Facility Compliance Act and Consent 
Order (FFCAct) and the Mutual Consent Agreement (MCA). A Joint Low-Level 
Waste Oversight Agreement is in place to allow State of Nevada representatives to 
participate in review and approval processes associated with waste receipt and 
disposal operations“ (NNSA/NSO 2002, page 5). 
 
The DOE EM End State Vision for NTS (NNSA/NSO 2006) addresses contaminated sites 
controlled by NNSA/NSO EM.  “The long-term end state vision of the NTS is to restore the 
environment to an extent that will allow the maximum continuation of the National security 
mission conducted by the NNSA/NSO, the national laboratories and contractors” (NNSA/NSO 
2006, page ES-1).   
 
DOE criteria for free release of land may result in an extended federal environmental 
stewardship role.  Because of past activities, including both atmospheric and underground 
nuclear weapon tests, some land within NTS boundary cannot be released for unrestricted use 
without remediation. It may not be cost-effective to remediate residual contamination from 
underground nuclear testing and long-term land-use restrictions may be required. 
 
The NNSA/NSO has programs to ensure compliance with DOE O 5400.5 that limits annual 
exposure of the public to 0.1 mSv in a year (DOE 1990).  DOE O 5400.5 also contains 
conditions and requirements for unrestricted release of land.  Because some of the residual 
contamination from past nuclear tests is likely to be closed in place, and will persist for many 
years, portions of NTS (e.g., Yucca Flat and Frenchman Flat) may not meet unrestricted release 
requirements.  Therefore, use restrictions will preclude new rural development, mining permits, 
groundwater wells, and other intrusive uses, even after DoD and DOE activities cease.   
 
DOE/NV (1998c) projects long-term federal stewardship: “Institutional control of the NTS is 
assumed in perpetuity at the existing boundaries.” If DOE ceases to exist, it is assumed that 
“another federal agency will become the landlord....as institutional control of the site is 
considered an obligation of the federal government and one that is expected to be maintained.”   
 
Although the SA assumes institutional control only will last 100 years in accordance with 




Convening a panel of independent SMEs (Black et al. 2001), NNSA/NSO evaluated the 
effectiveness and probable duration of long-term institutional controls in Frenchman Flat.  The 
SMEs unanimously agreed that a combination of active and passive institutional control would 
not last for 10,000 years (the elicitation’s target compliance period) because no human 
institution, government, or political civilization has lasted for this length of time.  Instead the 
SMEs focused on the time frame in which institutional control might be lost. The consensus 
opinion was that institutional control would be lost within 1,000 years (90% probability), that 
institutional control has a reasonable chance of lasting about 250 years (50% chance), and that it 
was very likely to last at least 50 years (90% chance). The SMEs also suggested that 2,000 years 
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is the longest period of time for which institutional control could reasonably be expected to last. 
The SMEs considered a time frame of 100 to 500 years for institutional control because they 
expected that it would take this long for sociopolitical will to erode sufficiently for institutional 
control to cease. 
 




Barriers are defined in 40 CFR 191 as “any material or structure that prevents or substantially 
delays movement of water or radionuclides toward the accessible environment.”  Previous PAs 
have identified numerous natural barriers at the Area 5 RWMS including: 
 
• The thick dry vadose zone below the site.  The extremely low hydraulic conductivity of 
the dry alluvium (approximately 1 x 10-10 cm s-1) and thickness of the vadose zone 
(236 - 272 m [774 – 892 ft]) leads to extremely long travel times.  The median travel time 
for water under current conditions has been estimated to be 51,000 years (Shott et al. 
1998). 
• The thick homogenous alluvium below the site.  Contaminants must migrate through a 
tortuous porous medium rather than through rapidly flowing fractures in rock. 
• The nearly flat groundwater table below the site.  If any contaminants were to reach the 
saturated zone, lateral migration to the edge of the controlled area would be extremely 
slow because of the negligible gradient. 
• The extremely dry cover soil conditions.  Mean cover volumetric water contents range 
from 0.058 to 0.079.  The low water contents are maintained by high PET and low 
precipitation. 
• The alkaline soil conditions which retard the migration and reduce the solubility of most 
cationic metals. 
• The adaptations of native plants to xeric conditions.  Native Mojave Desert plants are 
able to efficiently withdraw water from cover soil and maintain extremely negative soil 
matric potentials. 
• The low primary productivity of native plants.   The present-day Mojave Desert 
assemblage has an ANPP of only approximately 300 kg ha-1 yr-1. 
• The shallow rooting depth of native plants.  Native plants roots seldom penetrate below 
the dynamic range of infiltrating precipitation, 2 to 3 m (6.5 to 9.8 ft). 




Engineered barriers are interpreted to be materials or structures intentionally placed at the site to 
increase the isolation of the waste from the accessible environment.  Engineered barriers already 
present include the waste containers and the 2.4-m (8-ft) operational closure cover. 
 
Previous PAs have identified a number of alternative barriers that might be expected to provide 
additional assurance that the requirements can be met (Black et al. 2001; National Security 
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Technologies [NSTec] 2007).  Because all release and transport pathways are upward, barriers 
that block biointrusion, upward liquid advection/diffusion, gaseous diffusion, and deter human 
intrusion are obvious choices.  Barriers can be categorized as subsurface resistive barriers which 
resist biointrusion and slow upward advection/diffusion, subsurface intrusion barriers, and 
surface intrusion barriers.  Increasing cover thickness beyond the current 2.4-m (8-ft) operational 
cover is also considered an engineered barrier. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 describe evaluations that rank the cost-effectiveness of alternative engineered 
barriers.  Cost-benefit analysis will be used in final closure planning to determine if additional 
engineered barriers are justified for T04C. 
2.3.5 Natural Resources 
 
Disposal systems regulated under 40 CFR 191 must be sited at locations where attractive natural 
resources are not present.  Resources to be considered includes minerals, petroleum or natural 
gas, valuable geologic formations, and ground waters that are either irreplaceable because there 
is no reasonable alternative source of drinking water available for substantial populations or that 
are vital to the preservation of unique and sensitive ecosystems. 
 
Several assessments show that the Area 5 RWMS is not sited near any significant economic 
mineral deposits, viable petroleum or natural gas deposits, valuable geologic formations, or 
irreplaceable sensitive water supplies.  The Area 5 RWMS is located on an alluvial fan, in an 
arid, remote, alluvium-filled basin, with deep groundwater.  Biological studies show the Area 5 
RWMS is not located near unique or sensitive ecosystems.  
 
Gustafson et al. (2007) identified potentially exploitable resources near the Area 5 RWMS that 
could lead to inadvertent human intrusion after active institutional control ends.  They considered 
sand and gravel, minerals, petroleum, and water.  Quality, quantity, availability of better sources, 
transport costs, and limited local demand are likely to limit commercial extraction of geologic 
economic resources in the NTS region.   
  
Gustafson et al. (2007) also reviewed examinations of rural land use potential (Case et al. 1984; 
Richard-Haggard 1983) and concluded “Alternative land uses such as agriculture, grazing, and 
hunting, do not appear to be potential causes for inadvertent human intrusion.”   
 
Sand and Gravel Resources 
 
Although there are sands and gravels in the upper alluvium at the Area 5 RWMS, the quality of 
the material is poor and the location is far from the most likely sources of demand for roadways, 
building pads, and other fill structures.  Samples of alluvium from excavations in the Area 5 
RWMS indicate the shallow gravels are composed of fragments of predominantly pyroclastic 
volcanic rocks derived from nearby exposures in the Half Pint range.  The pyroclastic volcanic 
rocks are too friable to be suitable for many typical commercial uses.  Current existing 
population centers (Alamo, Beatty, and Pahrump) and major highways (I-95) are far from the 
Area 5 RWMS.  If development were to occur in the Frenchman Flat region in the future, gravel 
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resources are more likely to be extracted from the south side of the basin where the material may 




There is no record of historic mining activities within Frenchman Flat.  Four mining districts 
have been identified on NTS: Calico Hills, Wahmonie, Mine Mountain, and Oak Spring.   The 
nearest recorded mineral deposits are 23 km (14 mi) northwest of the Area 5 RWMS in the Mine 
Mountain Mining District.   
 
The economic mineral potential of these districts was summarized by Shott et al. (2000).  Silver 
may be present in the Oak Spring District.  Potentially economic mineral deposits may remain in 
the Wahmonie District.  Commercial tungsten mining occurred in the Oak Spring District in the 
1950s and early 1960s.  NTS is considered to have a moderate potential for tungsten skarn 
deposits.  Molybdenum is associated with these deposits.  Although these sites may be developed 
in the future, they are relatively distant from the Area 5 RWMS. 
 
Although there are natural zeolites in some of the volcanic tuffs underlying Frenchman Flat, the 
likelihood of the Area 5 RWMS being mined for zeolites is very low.  Only one of the ten 
companies that mined natural zeolites in the U.S. in 2005 was located in Nevada, and the U.S. 
produced less than 3 percent of the world production in 2005.  The main domestic uses for 
natural zeolites are for animal feed, water purification, and pet litter (Virta 2006).  There are 
alternative materials for these products.   Many commercial industrial applications use 
synthesized zeolites for their purity and unique characteristics.  Most of U.S. foreign trade in 
zeolites is in synthetic zeolite products (Virta 2006). 
  
Projections for growth in demand and production of natural zeolites in the U.S. are modest.  New 
products and markets, such as lightweight aggregate for specialty concrete products are in 
development.  Based on recent trends, the U.S. Geological Survey predicts U.S. production and 
sales of natural zeolites will increase by at least 4 to 5 percent per year for the next 2 to 3 years 
(Virta 2006).    
 
Natural zeolite resources, however, are not unique to the Frenchman Flat area.  There are 
existing operations in the U.S. extracting higher quality and more accessible material.  In the 
unlikely event that a local market for zeolites would ever develop within NTS, the mid-fan 
location of the Area 5 RWMS is less likely to be a viable source than volcanic tuffs in alkaline 




Petroleum exploration in Nevada has been very limited.  Petroleum had been produced from 
wells in Railroad Valley, approximately 150 km (92 miles) north of the Area 5 RWMS and in the 
Blackburn Field, Eureka County.  The potential for oil and natural gas is rated low for Southern 
Nye County in two Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology Reports (Garside et al. 1988; 
Castor et al. 1990).  Four oil and gas exploration holes within 40 miles of the Area 5 RWMS 
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developed before 1992, ranging in depth from 447 to 1,702 m (1,468 to 5,583 ft) depth, were dry 
holes.   
 
Groundwater and Surface Water Supplies 
 
Pilot wells at the Area 5 RWMS indicate depth to groundwater is about 236 m (775 ft) 
(BN 2005d).  The results from the pilot wells indicate the groundwater is good quality in the 
immediate vicinity of the Area 5 RWMS.  These wells tap the uppermost alluvial aquifer, which 
is not regionally extensive and is locally impacted by radionuclides in the vicinity of nearby 
nuclear tests which were conducted below or near the water table.  Many corrective action units 
have been identified in Frenchman Flat.  It is anticipated that the Area 5 RWMS will be included 
inside the boundary of a use restriction area to be established for the Frenchman Flat UGTA 
CAU 98. 
 
Gustafson et al. (2007) identifies at least three potential uses for groundwater from the aquifer, 
assuming the aquifer is accessible and there is water in sufficient quantity: agricultural irrigation, 
commercial geothermal energy development, and human consumption.  However, the cost of 
developing deep wells and pumping groundwater makes these uses unlikely. The nearest spring 
is Cane Spring, about 14.3 km (8.8 mi) southwest of the Area 5 RWMS.  Future settlers are more 




Unique and sensitive areas of NTS have been identified through biological studies.  The 
Area 5 RWMS is not within an area identified as “important habitat” based on high species 
diversity, uniqueness, pristineness, or sensitive habitat that would be slow to recover from 
disturbances (DOE/NV 1998c).  The floral community at the Area 5 RWMS is classified as a 
Larrea tridentata-Ambrosia dumosa assemblage, a common community within the Mojave 
Desert.   
 
Large portions of NTS are within the range of the Western burrowing owl, which is protected by 
the state of Nevada.  There is no evidence that the Area 5 RWMS operations have affected the 
owls, which often reside in culverts and abandoned conduit pipes.  The Area 5 RWMS is also 
within the range of the desert tortoise, a threatened species protected under the Endangered 
Species Act, but in an area of relatively low abundance.  Activities within tortoise habitat are 
conducted in accordance with a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Biological Opinion which includes 
provisions for surveys, relocations, and mitigation.  The NTS Resource Management Plan 
(DOE/NV 1998a) and annual Nevada Test Site Environmental reports provide further 
information on monitoring and protection programs for flora, fauna, water supplies, and other 
critical resources of NTS. 
 
Agriculture and Range 
 
Site conditions do not appear to be favorable for intensive agriculture or livestock grazing.  
There are irrigable soils in Frenchman Flat, but the soils have poor water-retention 
characteristics.  Although, it is technically feasible to produce hay crops such as alfalfa in the 
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Frenchman Flat basin, the demand for irrigable land in southern Nevada is currently low and 
likely to remain low in the future.  Only 5 percent of the irrigable land in Nevada is in use 
(Richard-Haggard 1983) probably because the cost of infrastructure and power to extract water 
makes irrigation economically infeasible.  Southern Nevada farming tends to be located near 
surface water or shallow groundwater supplies.  
 
Mojave Desert plant communities are suitable for livestock grazing, but the low population 
density and productivity of forage shrubs and annual grasses limits the population of cattle that 
can be supported.  Comparison of the average animal unit month for BLM grazing permits issued 
in Nevada to the estimated capacity of Frenchman Flat suggests that Frenchman Flat is less 
productive than average BLM controlled Nevada rangeland.  The greatest obstacle to livestock 
grazing is the lack of surface water resources requiring that deep groundwater be used or water 
be trucked in.  The costs of obtaining water and the low productivity of the Mojave Desert make 
Frenchman Flat an unlikely site for grazing. 
2.3.6 Waste Retrieval 
 
The TRU waste in T04C is packaged in steel 55-gal drums and buried below a 2.4-m (8-ft) 
operational cover.  Final closure may require installation of additional engineered barriers.  
Nevertheless, the excavation of these materials from near-surface alluvium deposits is 
technically feasible.  The waste containers may eventually degrade and loose their integrity.  
This may increase the required radiological controls, but containment technologies, remote 
handling equipment, and personal protective equipment exist that would allow safe retrieval.  
NNSA/NSO maintains a retrieval plan for wastes disposed at the Area 5 RWMS 
(NNSA/NSO 2007b). 
 
2.4 Waste Characteristics 
 
Waste characterization requirements have changed significantly since 1986 when TRU waste 
was buried in T04C.  Unclassified records for these waste containers are limited to the generator, 
volume, and activity of nuclides subject to material controls, and accountability (i.e., fissionable 
radionuclides). 




The T04C TRU waste inventory is limited to the 102 containers from Rocky Flats.  The waste 
inventory for these containers is based on a memorandum summarizing a review of the disposal 
records (SNL 1992).  The inventory in the memo has been revised to account for other 
radionuclides likely present in weapons-grade Pu and highly enriched uranium, but not reported.  
The Area 5 RWMS Inventory model, v2.021, was used to estimate the inventory at the assumed 
date of final site closure in 2028 (see Appendix A1).   
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The TRU inventory consists of 21 m3 (741 ft3) of waste containing approximately 5.7E12 Bq of 
long-lived radionuclides.  The TRU inventory is predominately 239Pu throughout the analysis 
period (Figure 2.10).  The TRU waste in T04C is a minor component of the 239Pu disposed at the 
Area 5 RWMS.   The T04C 239Pu inventory represents approximately 16 percent of the 239Pu  
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Figure 2.10  Inventory of TRU waste buried in T04C as a function of time. 
 
expected to be disposed by shallow land burial at the Area 5 RWMS by closure and 19 percent of 
the inventory disposed in GCD boreholes. 
 
Co-Located LLW Inventory 
 
The dose assessment for the IPRs includes the dose from LLW disposed in T04C.  This waste is 
referred to as the co-located low-level waste.  Database records for T04C are incomplete.  
Therefore, the inventory is estimated as the product of the T04C trench volume, corrected for the 
TRU volume, and the mean activity concentration of pre-1988 low-level waste.  The co-located 
waste inventory was also estimated with the Area 5 RWMS Inventory model (see Appendix A1). 
 
The co-located low-level waste inventory consists of an estimated 4,126 m3 (1.4E5 ft3) of waste 
containing 8.2 x1014 Bq of long-lived radionuclides.  The inventory is initially predominantly 3H, 
strontium-90 (90Sr) and cesium-137 (137Cs) (Figure 2.11).  After a few hundred years, 
uranium-238 (238U), 234U, technetium-99 (99Tc), and 239Pu are most abundant.  The total TRU 
nuclide inventory in T04C is dominated by the Rocky Flats TRU waste. 
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Figure 2.11  Estimated inventory of low-level waste disposed in T04C as a function of time. 
 
2.4.2 Waste Forms and Containers 
 
Waste forms and containers disposed in T04C are poorly known.  However, the TRU waste in 
T04C was generated at Rocky Flats and Rocky Flats TRU waste disposed in GCD boreholes 
from 1985 to 1987 has been described (Chu and Bernard 1991).  Rocky Flats TRU waste during 
this period was packaged in fiberboard drums, placed in a plastic bag, and overpacked in 55 gal 
steel drums.  The waste forms consist of uranium and plutonium surface contaminated plastic 
and metal parts used in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons.  Specific waste forms are graphite 
shapes used for casting weapon parts, tooling used to machine weapons components, plastic 
shapes used during shipment of weapon components, studs from uranium parts, and metal parts 
from retired weapons.  
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3.0 Method of Analysis 
 
The purpose of the SA model is to estimate the 40 CFR 191 regulated end points, which are the 
normalized cumulative release to the accessible environment and dose to the public.  The 
modeling process follows a logical sequence of activities beginning with interpretation of 
regulatory requirements and proceeding through site characterization, conceptual model 
development, mathematical model development, performance assessment modeling, uncertainty 
analysis, sensitivity analysis, and finally an assessment of the likelihood of meeting regulatory 
requirements.  If uncertainty analysis indicates that the likelihood of compliance is too low, 
sensitivity analysis can identify parameters for further uncertainty reduction through additional 
data collection.  The SA model was developed from previous iterations of PA modeling 
completed for DOE-regulated and GCD TRU waste disposed at the Area 5 RWMS (Shott et al. 
1998; BN 2001a; Cochran et al. 2001; BN 2006a).   
3.1 Overview of Methods 
 
The interpretation of the 40 CFR 191 regulatory requirements is summarized in Chapter 1.  The 
two SA model endpoints are the normalized cumulative release as summarized by a 
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) and the TEDE to a member of the 
public residing in the accessible environment. 
 
The data collected to support PA modeling is summarized in the previous chapter and has been 
discussed in detail in the Area 5 RWMS and the GCD TRU PAs (Shott et al. 1998; BN 2001a, 
Cochran et al. 2001, BN 2006a).  Site characterization data describe the properties and 
characteristics of environmental media in the model (i.e., waste, alluvium, air, water, biota) and 
rates of processes.  Alluvium above and below the NLFB are assumed to have different water 
contents.  Waste is assumed to have the same properties as alluvium below the NLFB.  No new 
data were developed for the SA except for the description of the TRU waste inventory and data 
used to support model parameters for future climate regimes. 
 
The conceptual model of site performance is unchanged from the model developed for the low-
level waste PA (Shott et al. 1998; BN 2006a).  Identifying features, events, and processes (FEPs) 
that affect long-term performance is an integral part of conceptual model development.  The 
40 CFR 191 compliance period (10,000 years) is substantially longer than the 1,000-year period 
used for LLW.  The longer compliance period requires that the FEP list be reconsidered for 
processes that may be important over 10,000 years.  Climate change was included as a base case 
FEP due to the increased length of the compliance period. 
 
Previous PA analyses have indicated that the Area 5 RWMS is well suited for waste disposal and 
amenable to relatively simple models.  An important simplifying feature is that a groundwater 
pathway is extremely unlikely.  In addition, the site is located within laterally extensive alluvial 
deposits which are relatively homogenous in the horizontal plane.  This allows 1-dimensional 
(1-D) model implementation in the vertical plane.     
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All radionuclide release and transport pathways are assumed to transport contaminants upward to 
the land surface and atmosphere.  Important transport processes are assumed to be upward liquid 
advection, diffusion in the liquid and gas phase, plant uptake, and animal burrowing.  Nuclides 
migrating in the liquid phase are assumed to instantaneously precipitate or adsorb on alluvium as 
predicted by thermodynamic equilibrium constants.   
 
The model solves for the time-dependent radionuclide concentration in the accessible 
environment.  The time-dependent media concentrations are integrated to calculate the 
cumulative release and multiplied by pathway dose conversion factors to calculate the dose to the 
member of the public in the accessible boundary.  The dose is calculated for an on site residential 
exposure scenario without agriculture.   
 
3.2 Conceptual Model Development 
 
3.2.1 Important Assumptions 
 
A simulation as complex as the SA makes numerous assumptions: some obvious and some more 
difficult to identify.  Important assumptions are summarized in this section and elaborated upon 
in the following sections.  Important modeling assumptions include: 
 
• Radionuclides are immediately available for release and transport. 
• Subsidence will occur, but will have negligible effects on site performance. 
• All important radionuclide release and transport pathways are upward to the land surface. 
• A groundwater pathway will not occur over the next 10,000 years. 
• The upward transport processes can be modeled by a 1-D finite difference equation, with 
15 nodes distributed over the approximately 9-m (29-ft) model domain. 
• Upward liquid advection and liquid-phase diffusion are negligible above the NLFB. 
• Future climate can be forecast from periodic variation in past climate.  Biotic 
communities present under future climate regimes can be characterized from present-day 
analog sites with similar climate. 
• Human-related FEPs are assumed to be limited to present-day conditions.  
• The site will be closed with a 4-m (13-ft) monolayer-ET cover. 
• The appropriate exposure scenario for representative members of a critical group is 
exposure of a resident living on the T04C disposal unit.  The resident is a commuter that 
works at a distant site and does not produce any food at the residence. 
 
3.2.2 Features, Events and Processes Affecting Site Performance 
 
Part 191.13 states that the CRs shall be estimated for “all significant process and events that may 
affect the disposal system.”  Appendix C of Part 191 states that processes or events with less than 
one chance in 10,000 in 10,000 years or unlikely to significantly change cumulative releases 
need not be considered.  
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The Part 191.15 IPRs are different because doses are to be estimated for undisturbed 
performance through all potential pathways.  Undisturbed performance is defined to exclude 
human intrusion and unlikely natural events. 
 
The minor difference noted above requires that the CR and IPR analysis use a slightly different 
FEP list. The FEPs included in the SA model were developed from the results of previous PA 
model development cycles (Guzowski and Newman 1993; Shott et al. 1998; Cochran et al. 2001; 
BN 2006a).  Human-induced FEPs such as land use and intrusion scenarios are based on 
elicitation of a panel of SMEs (Black et al. 2001).  The probability of intrusion, as estimated 
from the opinions of SMEs, is within a range that would require inclusion of intrusion in 
calculation of the CRs.  Intrusion is explicitly excluded from the IPRs, so FEP lists for the two 
endpoints are the same except that human intrusion is excluded from the IPR analysis. 
 
Natural FEPs in the SA model that influence radionuclide release and transport are: 
 
• Existence of a NLFB above which no liquid phase transport (i.e, advection and diffusion) 
occurs due to low water content 
• Upward liquid advection below the NLFB 
• Liquid-phase diffusion below the NLFB 
• Precipitation/dissolution of solutes 
• Adsorption on solid surfaces  
• Gas-phase diffusion 
• Animal burrow excavation and collapse 
• Plant uptake, translocation, and senescence 
• Radioactive decay and ingrowth 
• Climate change 
• Changing soil moisture contents in response to climate change 
• Changing water potential gradients in response to climate change 
• Changing primary productivity in response to climate change 
• Changing flora and fauna composition and characteristics (i.e. root allometry, burrow 
excavation rates, and depth distributions) in response to climate change 
 
Decay, collapse, and settlement of waste leading to subsidence is assumed to occur, but has no 
identified consequences for simulations with the monolayer-ET cover and is not explicitly 
included in the base case model. 
 
Human-induced FEPs include: 
 
• Establishment of a rural community of commuters within Frenchman Flat 
• Drilling for groundwater 
 
Irrigation, although possible, is considered too unlikely due to the cost of obtaining water from 
deep groundwater.  Basement construction is eliminated based on the low frequency of 
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basements in Southern Nevada, 1 per 100 residences, low probability of an on site residence, and 
the low consequences expected for a 4 m (13 ft) cover.   
3.2.3 Waste Source Term 
 
The Rocky Flats TRU waste is believed to be packaged in fiberboard drums, overpacked in 55 
gal steel drums.  The suspected waste forms are surface contaminated plastic, metal, and 
graphite. 
 
Rather than explicitly account for the uncertainty in the performance of waste containers and 
forms, a conservative bounding assumption is made.  All radionuclides are assumed to be 
immediately available for release and transport in a soil-like form for the CR and IPR analyses.  
One exception is 222Rn which is assumed to be fractionally released to the air-filled pore space.  
The fraction released is described by the radon emanation coefficient, a stochastic model 
parameter selected to span a large range of waste forms.   
 
The suspected waste components, fiberboard, plastic, metal, and graphite are insoluble and not 
expected to enhance transport.  Given the dry oxic conditions in the vadose zone, these waste 
forms are not expected to generate significant degradation products that could enhance transport. 
3.2.4 Subsidence 
 
Subsidence of T04C is likely to occur over time as voids in waste containers and between waste 
containers fill in, as waste and waste containers decay, and as waste and soil backfill compacts.  
A previous analysis has estimated the extent, timing, and potential consequences of subsidence 
for the Area 5 RWMS (DOE/NV 1998b).  The maximum subsidence predicted for classified 
materials trenches was 2.4 m (8 ft).  By the end of the 100-year institutional control period, 
wooden boxes and steel drums are expected to be 75 percent or more degraded and steel boxes 
20 percent degraded.  The most significant consequences of subsidence are expected to be 
exposure of waste at the ground surface and enhanced infiltration in subsidence depressions. 
 
Subsidence is not expected to have any consequences for radionuclide release and transport.  
Most subsidence is expected to occur during the period of active institutional control and will be 
repaired.  In addition, the planned cover thickness, 4 m (13 ft), is expected to be sufficient to 
prevent waste exposure based on the conclusions of SMEs reviewing subsidence consequences 
(DOE/NV 1998b).  The 4-m (13-ft) cover will also remain above grade after subsidence, 
preventing storm water run-on, and minimizing increases in infiltration.   
3.2.5 Radionuclide Transport Pathways 
 
Multiple natural FEPs operate to transport radionuclides upwards from the waste to the land 
surface and atmosphere.  Radionuclides reaching the land surface or the atmosphere are assumed 
to be in the accessible environment and included in the calculation of the cumulative release.  
The surface soil and atmospheric concentrations are also used to calculate the dose for the 
member of public.  
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The conceptual model assumes that the following FEPs are operating to release and transport 
radionuclides: 
 
• Existence of a boundary, the NLFB, above which no liquid phase transport occurs, due to 
the disconnected state of the soil pore water 
• Upward liquid advection below the NLFB of soil pore water driven by the strongly 
negative matric potentials maintained at the surface by ET 
• Liquid phase diffusion below the NLFB of dissolved solids, driven by the concentration 
gradient between waste and the surface 
• Precipitation/dissolution of solutes, assumed to be in thermodynamic equilibrium with a 
solid phase as described by the solubility constant (Ksp) 
• Retardation of solute transport by adsorption on solid surface, as described by a 
distribution coefficient (Kd) 
• Gas phase diffusion of volatile species, driven by the concentration gradient between the 
waste air-filled pore space and atmosphere 
• Animal burrow excavation with deposition of spoils on the surface, with subsequent 
collapse and infilling with overlaying soil 
• Plant radionuclide uptake, translocation to aboveground plant tissue, and deposition in 
surface soil after senescence and decay 
• Radioactive decay and ingrowth 
• Resuspension of radionuclides in soil to the atmosphere and advection off-site 
 
This conceptual model of radionuclide transport has been successfully implemented in PA 
models for the Area 5 RWMS, the GCD boreholes, and the Area 3 RWMS.  These models have 
been used to support DOE-approved PA/CAs for the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS and for a 
40 CFR 191 PA for the GCD boreholes (Shott et al. 1998, 2000; BN 2001a, 2006a; 
Cochran et al. 2001). 
3.2.6 Climate Change 
 
Three climate regimes are forecast for the next 10,000 years for the Area 5 RWMS.  Present-day 
conditions are assumed to persist for 400 to 600 years.  A monsoon period with increased 
summer precipitation and MAT is assumed to follow for 900 to 1,400 years.  The remainder of 
the compliance period is assumed to be a glacial-transition period with colder temperatures and 
increased precipitation.  These changes are assumed to occur instantaneously, but the timing is 
assumed to be uncertain (Figure 3.1). 
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Present-Day: 400 - 600 yrs
Monsoon: 900 - 1400 yrs 
Glacial-Transition: Remainder
 
Figure 3.1  Conceptual model of future climate sequence. 
 
Hydrologic Response to Climate Change 
 
Current hydrologic conditions with negligible infiltration below the plant root zone are assumed 
to persist as long as the present-day climate continues.  During the monsoon climate regime, 
precipitation will increase during the summer months.  The increasing temperatures expected for 
the monsoon climate regime, high summer temperatures, and increased plant growth in response 
to increased precipitation are all assumed to work together to maintain high ET during the 
monsoon climate.  Therefore, hydrologic conditions during the monsoon climate regime are 
assumed to be the same as present-day conditions.   
 
With the onset of the glacial-transition period, colder temperatures and increased winter 
precipitation are expected to change site hydrology.  Future hydrologic conditions were 
evaluated using the hydrologic process model, UNSAT-H v3.01 (Fayer 2000).  Uncertainty in 
future hydrologic conditions was assessed by evaluating model cases for the mean and 
99th percentile MAP.  Ninety-year simulations were run using daily precipitation and PET time 
series developed from NTS data.  Mean glacial-transition precipitation was simulated from 
46 years of daily precipitation records for 40-Mile Canyon station in NTS Area 30.  The MAP 
for 40-Mile Canyon is 20.9 cm (8.3 in.) compared with 20.8 cm (8.2 in.) forecast for Frenchman 
Flat during the glacial-transition climate regime.  The 99th percentile glacial-transition 
precipitation was simulated from a 48-year daily precipitation record for NTS Area 12.  The 
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Area 12 data were scaled by 0.907 to give a MAP of 28.3 cm (11.2 in.), equivalent to the 99th 
percentile expected for the glacial-transition climate regime.  Daily PET time series were 
simulated using 13 years of meterological data recorded at the Area 5 RWMS.  Daily air 
temperatures were reduced by 5.3 ºC to simulate glacial-transition conditions.  The UNSAT-H 
results for the mean and 99th percentile MAP simulations were used to estimate the mean and 
99th percentile future vadose zone conditions. 
 
Based on the UNSAT-H simulations, alluvium moisture contents are assumed to increase during 
the glacial-transition climate regime.  Infiltration below the plant root zone is also assumed to 
occur (Figure 3.2).  The onset of infiltration below the plant root zone does not necessarily 
indicate recharge of the aquifer throughout the basin in 10,000 years.  One argument against 
recharge is that the low water content and thickness of the vadose precludes transport to the 
water table in 10,000 years.  In addition, the chloride accumulation at pilot wells 1 and 3 
indicates that complete flushing of the vadose zone has not occurred over the last 95,000 to 
110,000 years (Tyler et al. 1996).  The historical record suggests that increased water availability 
does not necessarily lead to complete flushing of the soil column.  Upward advection is assumed 

































Figure 3.2  Conceptual model of site hydrology under climate change. 
 
Ecological Response to Climate Change 
 
Floral communities are assumed to change in response to climatic conditions.  During the 
monsoon climate regime, the current plant community is assumed to persist, but increased 
precipitation causes increased primary productivity.  An Artemisia spp. shrubland or grassland is 
assumed to be established during the glacial-transition climate regime.  Primary productivity and 
its uncertainty are assumed to increase for future climate regimes (Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3  Comparison of simulated ANPP for present-day, monsoon, and glacial-transition 
climate regimes. 
 
The response of the fauna to changing climatic conditions is inherently more difficult to 
understand.  Increased primary productivity and water availability are assumed to increase 
population densities.  Changing climate and floral communities are also expected to change 
species composition.  Due to the increased uncertainty, the fauna are assumed to change with the 
onset of the monsoon climate regime.  The fauna present, their population densities, and burrow 
characteristics are estimated for Artemisia spp. dominated analog sites in the Pacific Northwest.  
The most significant change is expected to be an increase in the population of large fossorial 
mammals such as badgers and rabbits.  The assumed parameter values for future climate states 
leads to an increase in animal excavation rates and an increase in uncertainty (Figures 3.4 
and 3.5). 
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Figure 3.4  Comparison of simulated ant soil excavation rate under present-day and future climate 
regimes. 
Mammal Excavation Rate (kg ha-1 yr-1)




















Figure 3.5  Comparison of simulated mammal soil excavation rate under present-day and future 
climate regimes. 
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3.2.7 Human Intrusion 
 
The type and frequency of future intrusion at the Area 5 RWMS is uncertain due to lack of 
knowledge about future economic conditions, resource needs, and technology development.  
Quantifying and reducing these uncertainties by frequentist methods is not practical, because 
historical records of intrusion do not exist.  One approach to addressing the likelihood of future 
intrusion scenarios is the informed opinions of SMEs. 
 
A panel of SMEs was convened to develop quantitative models for human intrusion at the 
Area 5 RWMS (Black et al. 2001).  The SMEs specifically considered community development 
scenarios that would lead to intrusion at the Area 5 RWMS.  A major SME assumption was that 
future societal patterns would be the same as presently observed.  SMEs identified four possible 
development scenarios for Frenchman Flat that could lead to members of the public living near 
the site.  All of the scenarios require that individual or multiple water withdrawal wells be 
developed to supply drinking water to an individual homesteader or to a community water 
system.  The number of replacement wells required by the community during its life time was 
also considered.  SMEs were also queried about the effectiveness of markers and placards to 
deter intrusion.  SME responses were used to estimate the probability of intrusion in 10,000 
years, a probability mass function (pmf) for the number of wells to be developed under each 
scenario, and the effectiveness of institutional control over time. 
 
The cumulative release from an intrusion event might also be enhanced by excavation of a 
basement during construction of a residence.  Basements are uncommon in rural areas 
surrounding the NTS.  A survey of tax assessment roles indicates that one percent of homes in 
rural southern Nevada have a basement (BN 2001c).  The mean probability of an on site resident 
as estimated by the SME elicitation was approximately 0.03 in 10,000 years.  The probability of 
an on site resident with a basement is then only about 3 chances in 10,000.  The release caused 
by excavation of a basement is also unlikely to be important for a 4 m (13 ft) cover relative to a 
borehole drilled through the disposal unit, because a basement excavation will not contact waste 
directly.  Appendix C of 40 CFR 191 allows exclusion of unlikely events with less than a 1 
chance in 10,000 of occurrence or that are unlikely to affect the CCDF.  The low probability of 
an on site resident with a basement combined with the small release expected for a 4 m cover, 
supports a conclusion that basement excavation not be included in the CR analysis. 
3.2.8 Containment Scenarios 
 
A single base case scenario is evaluated for the 40 CFR 191.13 CRs.  The scenario includes the 
radionuclide release and transport FEPs listed in Section 3.2.4, climate change, and probabilistic 
human intrusion by water well drilling.   
 
3.2.9 Assurance Requirements: Engineered Barriers 
 
All radionuclide release processes at the Area 5 RWMS release radionuclides upward to the land 
surface.  Features, events, and processes potentially transporting radionuclides to the land surface 
are gaseous diffusion, liquid diffusion, liquid advection, bioturbation, and human intrusion.  
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Climate change may initiate percolation of water below the root zone, but recharge of the water 
table is not expected to occur within 10,000 years.   
 
Barriers that prevent or substantially delay upward releases were identified from past PAs and 
evaluated for their effectiveness.  The barriers were ranked for cost-effectiveness using the 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP), a multicriteria decisional analysis (MCDA) method that 
decomposes complex decisions into a series of simple pair-wise comparisons (Saaty 1990). 
 
The effectiveness of alternative engineered barriers is assessed through the following three steps. 
 
Step 1) Identify Alternatives:  Engineered barriers are identified that may prevent or reduce 
releases to the accessible environment.  As the distance to the land surface and the atmosphere is 
much less than to any other part of the accessible environment, barrier options that limit releases 
to these points are emphasized.  Model processes releasing radionuclides to the land surface and 
atmosphere include liquid advection/diffusion, gaseous diffusion, plant uptake, and animal 
burrowing.  It is also appropriate to include barrier features that deter intrusion because 
40 CFR 191.14 requires engineered barriers that increase confidence in compliance with the 
40 CRF 191.13 CRs.  The 40 CFR 191 CRs include releases caused by human intrusion. 
 
Step 2) Develop a Model of Barrier Performance:  Conceptual models of alternative barrier 
performance are developed and tested.  Models are designed to be simple.  Although the model is 
probabilistic, the changes implementing alternative barrier performance are deterministic.  
Uncertainty is accounted for by selecting deterministic parameters that will tend to overestimate 
the benefit of alternative barriers.  This is conservative in the sense that it increases the 
likelihood that a barrier will be judged cost-effective. 
 
Step 3) Score Performance of Alternative Barriers:  The performance of barrier alternatives is 
evaluated using the 90th and 99.9th percentile of the normalized cumulative release, and the 
member of public TEDE at 10,000 years. 
 
A total of 12 alternative barriers are evaluated (Table 3.1).  The release and transport processes 
altered for each barrier are indicated.  The SA model automatically accounts for the effects of 
increased cover thickness.  All of the CR models also include excavation of a basement with a 
probability of occurrence of 0.01 per residence.  Basement excavations are assumed to be 3-m 
(10-ft) deep and have a mean area of 94.5 m2 based on data for southern Nevada (BN 2001c).   
The alternatives are compared with a 2.8-m (9.2-ft) monolayer-ET cover selected as the 
minimum cover that can meet the 40 CFR 191 IPRs. 
 
Base Case: 2.8-m Evapotranspiration Cover 
 
The base case is a vegetated 2.8-m (9 ft) thick monolayer evapotranspiration cover.  A 2.8-m 
(9-ft) cover is selected as the base case because this was the minimum cover thickness that met 
the IPR dose limit.  The base case barrier is simulated using a version of the 40 CFR 191 SA 
model modified to include probabilistic basement excavation as a process in the cumulative 
release analysis.
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Table 3.1  Barrier alternatives evaluated 
 
Release Processes Modified by Barrier? Alternative 
Number 
Description Cover 
Thickness (m) Biointrusion Human Intrusion 
Base Case 2.8 m ET Cover (Base Case) 2.8 No No 
1 Asphalt Layer 4.0 Yes No 
2 Capillary Break Layer 4.0 Yes No 
3 Rubber Tire Layer 12.5 No Yes 
4 Bailing Wire Layer 12.5 No Yes 
5 Reinforced Concrete Layer 5.0 Yes Yes 
6 Boulder Field on 2.8-m Cover 2.8 No Yes 
7 Boulder Wall on 2.8-m Cover 2.8 No Yes 
8 Boulder Mound on 2.8-m Cover 2.8 No Yes 
9 Thick (4 m) ET Cover 4.0 No No 
10 Boulder Field on 4.0-m Cover 4.0 No Yes 
11 Boulder Wall on 4.0-m Cover 4.0 No Yes 
12 Boulder Mound on 4.0-m Cover 4.0 No Yes 
 
Alternative 1: Asphalt Barrier Model 
 
Asphalt barriers are resistive barriers employing an asphalt concrete layer overlain by a fluid-
applied asphalt geotextile or geosynthetic clay liner.  Asphalt barriers can be effective barriers to 
moisture movement and biointrusion while intact.  Asphalt barriers are expected to be vulnerable 
to shear with differential subsidence. 
 
The asphalt barrier model is based on a design for a proposed low-level waste disposal site in 
Texas (Scanlon et al. 1997).  A 0.25-m (0.8-ft) asphaltic concrete layer is assumed to be installed 
directly on the 2.4-m (8-ft) operational cover.  The asphalt layer is assumed to be covered with a 
geosynthetic clay layer.  The barrier is overlain by 1.35 m (4.4 ft) of alluvium.  The barrier is 
assumed to eliminate all biointrusion below 1.35 m (4.4 ft) for as long as it is intact.  The barrier 
is assumed to remain intact until the end of the period of subsidence.   The longevity of steel 
barrels and boxes has been estimated to be approximately 500 years or less at the Area 5 RWMS 
(DOE/NV 1998b).  Therefore, the barrier is assumed to be effective for 500 years.  The barrier is 
assumed to have no effect on hydrology because it is above the NLFB. 
 
Alternative 2: Capillary-Break Barrier Model 
 
Capillary-break barriers consist of a sequence of layers where the particle size increases with 
increasing depth in the cover.  The overlaying fine layer must become almost saturated before 
water will flow into the coarser underlying layer.  Capillary-break barriers were originally 
intended as barriers to moisture flow, but have also been shown to be effective barriers to plant 
roots and ant burrowing if the pores in the course material layer remain open and dry (Cline et al. 
1980; Link et al. 1995).  Over time fine particulates may filter into the open pores and greatly 
reduce the effectiveness of the barrier.  The effectiveness of the barrier can be enhanced by 
placing a layer between the fine and coarse material that maintains a clean separation.  Poor 
construction practices may also cause mixing of fine- and coarse-grained materials at certain 
spots or the pores of the coarse material will infill overtime.  The barrier may also saturate and 
fail if the fine layer becomes saturated, for example, during snow melt. 
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The capillary-break barrier design features are based on the Idaho Completion Project (ICP) (ICP 
2004) and Scanlon et al. (1997).  The capillary-break barrier is assumed to be constructed 
directly on the existing 2.4-m (8-ft) operational cover.  The barrier consists of a 0.3-m (1-ft) sand 
layer, 0.3-m gravel layer and a 0.3-m cobble layer.  It is assumed that an additional 0.7 m (2.3 ft) 
of alluvium is placed over the capillary barrier, for a total cover thickness of 4 m (13 ft).  The 
capillary-break barrier is assumed to completely stop biointrusion below 0.7 m (2.2 ft).  No 
hydrologic effects are assumed because the barrier is above the NLFB.  The capillary-break 
barrier is assumed to be somewhat resistive to subsidence because the layer can flow and heal 
breaches.  The barrier is assumed to be effective for 1,000 years. 
 
Alternative 3: Waste Rubber Tire Layer 
 
Previous PA evaluations have proposed a subsurface intruder barrier consisting of a 9-m (30-ft) 
layer of waste rubber tires (Black et al. 2001; NSTec 2007).  Subject matter experts believed that 
the discovery of this material by a driller might cause the driller to move to another location.  
The tire layer is assumed to be placed on the 2.4-m (8-ft) operational cover.  An additional 1.1 m 
(3.6 ft) of alluvium is assumed to be placed above the tires to stabilize the tires and support 
revegetation.  The entire cover is 12.5-m (41-ft) thick.    
 
Voids in the tire layer are assumed to be filled with soil.  Therefore, the tire layer is assumed to 
have no effect on biointrusion or cover alluvium properties.  The barrier is assumed to deter 
intrusion only.  SMEs believed the probability of deterring intrusion to be between 0.05 to 0.1 in 
10,000 years. 
 
Alternative 4: Bailing Wire Layer 
 
This barrier consists of a 9-m (30-ft) layer of bailing wire.  The SMEs believed that a bailing 
wire layer might cause a driller to relocate.  The wire layer is assumed to be placed directly 
above the 2.4-m (8-ft) operational cover.  An additional 1.1 m (3.6 ft) of alluvium is assumed to 
be placed above the wire to stabilize the wire layer and support revegetation.  The entire cover is 
12.5 m (41 ft) thick.    
 
The wire layer is assumed to have no effect on biointrusion or cover properties.  The barrier is 
assumed to deter intrusion.  The subject matter experts believed the probability of deterring 
intrusion to be 0.1 in 10,000 years. 
 
Alternative 5: Subsurface Reinforced Concrete Layer 
 
This subsurface intruder barrier is a 1.5-m (5-ft) thick reinforced concrete slab.  The slab is 
assumed to have 1-in. rebar spaced at 6-in. intervals.  The SMEs believed this layer would 
destroy drill bits and, if sufficiently thick, a driller would consider relocation after destroying 
several bits.   
 
The concrete layer is assumed to be installed directly on the existing 2.4-m (8-ft) operational 
cover.  An additional 1.1 m (3.6 ft) of alluvium is assumed to be placed above the concrete layer 
to allow revegetation.  The total cover thickness is 5.0 m (16 ft).   
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The concrete layer is assumed to stop all biointrusion for as long as it is intact.  The barrier is 
assumed to be more robust than the asphaltic concrete layer and capillary-break barrier.  The 
barrier is assumed to be effective for 3,000 years.  Based on SME opinion, the barrier is assumed 
to reduce the probability of intrusion to 0.5 over 10,000 years. 
 
Alternatives 6 and 10:  Surface Boulders on a 2.8 or 4.0-m Cover 
 
Alternatives 6 and 10 use evenly spaced boulders over the disposal unit to deter placement of a 
drill rig.  The two alternatives consider different underlying cover thicknesses.  The SMEs 
proposed 10-ton boulders at 3-m (10-ft) spacing.  A spherical 10-ton boulder would have an 
approximate diameter of 2 m (6 ft).  This barrier is estimated to have 0.1 probability of deterring 
intrusion over 10,000 years (Black et al. 2001).  The barrier was evaluated for a 2.8- and 4.0-m 
(9-ft and 13 ft) cover. 
 
Alternatives 7 and 11:  Wall of Boulders on a 2.8- or 4.0-m Cover 
 
This barrier is a 3-m (10-ft) high wall of boulders with a 2:1 slope.  The wall surrounds the 
disposal unit.  The boulder wall is estimated to have a 0.5 probability of deterring intrusion.  The 
barrier is evaluated for a 2.8- and 4.0-m (9-ft and 13 ft) cover. 
 
Alternatives 8 and 11: Mound of Boulders on 2.8- or 4.0-m Cover 
 
This barrier is a 10-m (35-ft) high mound of boulders completely covering the disposal unit.  
This barrier is estimated to have a 0.95 probability of deterring intrusion in 10,000 years.  The 
boulder mound is also assumed to make construction of a residence directly above the disposal 
unit impossible, and the member of public dose is evaluated at a distance of 100 m (330 ft) from 
T04C.  The barrier is evaluated for a 2.8- and 4.0-m (9-ft and 13 ft) cover. 
 
Alternative 9:  4.0-m Evapotranspiration Cover 
 
This barrier consists of a vegetated 4-m (13-ft) thick monolayer of alluvium.   
3.2.10 Member of Public Exposure Scenarios 
 
A single base case scenario is evaluated for the 40 CFR 191.15 IPRs.  A resident exposure 
scenario was selected to be consistent with PA guidance, which requires evaluation of dose to 
representative critical groups receiving the highest doses assuming average living habits and 
exposure conditions.  The representative critical group receiving the highest dose is assumed to 
be a member of public residing at T04C.  Members of the critical group are assumed to be 
residents at the disposal unit because a panel of SMEs considering intrusion identified three 
different development scenarios that could lead to a homesteader or community being 
established within Frenchman Flat.  Agricultural production at the site is not included because it 
is not an average living habit or condition for southern Nevada locations without access to 
surface waste or shallow groundwater.  
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The scenario includes the radionuclide release and transport FEPs listed in Section 3.2.4, climate 
change, and exposure of an on site resident living on the T04C disposal unit.  Direct intrusion 
into the waste is not included.  The resident is assumed to be a commuter who is absent from the 
site 40 hours per week, because the SMEs believed that the most likely development scenarios 
for Frenchman Flat were individual homesteaders or a rural community with residents 
commuting to a more likely location for development such as Jackass Flats (Black et al. 2001).   
 
The member of public is exposed to radionuclides released to surface soil and the atmosphere.  
Exposure pathways are assumed to include: 
 
• External irradiation from radionuclides in soil 
• External irradiation from particulate and volatile radionuclides in air 
• Inhalation of particulate and volatile radionuclides in air, excluding 222Rn and its short-
lived progeny 
• Dermal absorption of 3H in air 
• Inadvertent soil ingestion 
 
Agricultural pathways are not included because they are not likely for a site in southern Nevada 
without surface water or shallow groundwater. 
 
3.3 Model Implementation 
 
All SA models are integrated in a single meta-model using the GoldSim probabilistic simulation 
platform (GTC 2007).  GoldSim was developed specifically for probabilistic PA simulation. 
 
3.3.1 GoldSim Overview 
 
Goldsim is an object-orientated highly graphic simulation environment.  Multiple object classes 
(e.g., stochastic and deterministic data sources, mathematical functions, radionuclide transport 
pathways, and result summaries) are programmed by the user through graphical user interfaces.   
 
The model is graphically organized in a hierarchy of containers that logically compartmentalize 
related calculations.  Graphical model documentation, element influences, and equations allow 
users to visualize model structure and function, allowing greater understanding of the model. 
 
GoldSim was developed specifically for PA and offers multiple features that make it a logical 
choice for the SA modeling including: 
 
• Built-in radioactive contaminant transport pathways which include diffusive and 
advective transport in porous media, adsorption, precipitation, and radioactive decay 
and ingrowth 
• Simulation of random events 
• A probabilistic dynamic simulation environment 
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• Graphic features (i.e., graphics, photos, and text), hot-links to external documents and 
internet content, and note panes designed to document model assumptions, structure, 
and data sources 
• A versioning feature which documents and records changes during model development 





Simulating the future performance of a waste disposal system is subject to considerable 
uncertainty.  Understanding, defining, and introducing uncertainty into a simulation model is a 
complex process.  Uncertainty can broadly be divided into aleatory uncertainty or natural 
variability in populations, space or time, and epistemic uncertainty or lack of knowledge.  A 
hierarchy of epistemic uncertainty can exist in a simulation model including model 
(e.g., conceptual, mathematical) uncertainty and parameter uncertainty. 
 
The SA primarily addresses epistemic parameter uncertainty by assigning probability density 
functions (pdfs) or pmfs to important input parameters and propagating this uncertainty through 
the model by Monte Carlo simulation.  Variability is addressed by assigning pdfs that represent 
uncertainty in the average parameter value over the population, region, or duration of the model.  
The parameter pdfs express lack of knowledge about the mean parameter value averaged over 
the population, region, and/or time period simulated.   
 
Although uncertainty analysis can be extended to include model uncertainty by randomly 
selecting alternative FEPs and models, this is seldom performed because of the additional model 
complexity and lack of knowledge of FEP and model probability.  All SA FEPs are combined 
into a single base case because they have a reasonably high probability of occurrence and are not 
mutually exclusive.  Human intrusion is simulated as a discrete event occurring randomly in 
time.  Some simulations may include no intrusion events and other simulations many events.  
The exposure scenario is relevant to the IPRs only, which are not a probabilistic standard.  The 
selected scenario represents the most probable scenario as selected by a panel of SMEs. 
 
The uncertainty analysis begins by developing pdfs for input parameters.  Input distributions are 
developed based on expert judgment, relevant literature, and site-specific characterization data.  
The pdfs are documented in external model documentation packages that can be accessed 
through model links.  Again, the pdfs are selected to represent uncertainty or lack of knowledge 
about the population-average, long-term or spatially averaged value of the parameter.   
 
Monte Carlo simulation begins by generating a random or stochastic value for each input 
parameter.  The SA generates stochastic input vectors using the process of Latin hypercube 
sampling (LHS).  GoldSim then solves the model equations as a function of time holding the 
input parameters constant.  Discrete events such as intrusion may be generated randomly during 
the simulation.  With climate change, different parameter values are used for each of the 
different climate regimes.  The model outputs for the realization as a function of time are 
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recorded.  The process is repeated thousands of times, accumulating a vector of output results.  
The distribution of the model output represents uncertainty in the model result. 
 
3.3.3 Model Development Process 
 
The SA model is the result of multiple cycles of model development and testing.  A model 
improvement cycle begins when the model development team agrees that a need for a change 
exists.  The proposed changes are documented in an Engineering Analysis/Calculation package 
which is subject to technical review and management approval.  A single copy of the current 
model version is maintained in a write-protected model repository.  The proposed changes are 
made to a working copy of the model.  If the model is found acceptable, the changes are 
implemented in the current model by the model custodian, and the changes are confirmed by a 
reviewer.  The changes are automatically recorded by the GoldSim versioning feature and 
recorded by the model custodian in the model change log.  The new version is run and the results 
recorded in the model output log which tracks how model output has changed over time with 
each version.  The completed model is submitted to NNSA/NSO for acceptance testing.  A more 
complete description of software quality assurance procedures can be found in Appendix A2.   
 
The 40 CFR 191 SA model, version 1.002, originated from the Area 5 RWMS PA model, which 
has been subjected to external peer review.  The most recent review was for the update of the 
Area 5 RWMS PA (BN 2006a) which was accepted without conditions (DOE 2007).  The 
Area 5 RWMS PA model was initially modified to calculate the regulatory endpoints of 
40 CFR 191.  Starting with the Area 5 RWMS PA model v4.000, a process of simplification and 
modification was begun to create the final SA model.  The steps involved were: 
 
• Adding model elements to implement stochastic climate regime periods. 
• Adding additional model parameters describing hydrologic conditions, plant uptake, and 
animal burrowing during future climate regimes. 
• Deleting un-needed model components including cost-benefit optimization, composite 
analysis, and un-used disposal configurations (i.e., shallow land burial [SLB], Pit 6, Pit 
13, Candidate 1, Candidate 2), and un-used waste inventories (i.e., post-1988 SLB, 
future waste inventory, thorium nitrate, Fernald thorium, pre-1988 GCD, post-1988 
GCD, Fernald Silo wastes). 
• Adding an on site residential exposure scenario without agriculture as the IPR scenario. 
 
3.3.4 Radionuclide Release and Transport 
 
Radionuclide release and transport are implemented as a series of connected mixing cells.  
Specifically for T04C, the model consists of a sink, an atmospheric mixing cell, four cover 
mixing cells above the NLFB, four cover mixing cells below the NLFB, and five waste mixing 
cells (Figure 3.6).  The unsaturated porous medium is represented by three materials in each 
mixing cell: alluvium, air, and water.   
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Figure 3.6  Diagram of waste and cover configurations for TRU waste units at the Area 5 RWMS 
(not to scale). 
 
Built-in features of the GoldSim mixing cells implement the following features: 
 
• Advection of water as an advective material flux; water advection links are included for 
cells below the NLFB only 
• Retardation of dissolved solutes using constant radionuclide-specific soil-water 
distribution coefficients, Kd 
• Instantaneous precipitation/dissolution of solutes based on the total aqueous 
concentration of an element and its equilibrium solubility constant, Ksp 
• Liquid and air-phase diffusion implemented as diffusive fluxes 
• Radioactive decay and ingrowth 
Special Analysis of TRU in T04C  69  
• Plant uptake and animal burrowing are modeled using direct transfer rates between 
mixing cells 
 
When modeling radioactive decay chains, the model assumes that short-lived progeny are in 
secular equilibrium and are transported with their long-lived parent.  Explicitly modeled 
members of decay chains are listed in Appendix A1, Figure A1.1. 
 
Plant and animal transfer rates between mixing cells are calculated externally to the mixing cells.  
The plant transfer rate is a function of the mixing cell concentration, plant-soil concentration 
ratio, primary productivity, and fraction of plant roots in the mixing cell.  All contaminants 
transferred to aboveground plant tissue are assumed to be immediately transferred to the surface 
soil layer.   
 
Animal burrowing transfer rates are the net rate calculated as the difference between removal 
from the mixing cell by excavation and input by collapse of the overlying layer required to 
maintain constant mass in the cell.  The radionuclide-specific excavation rate is a function of the 
mixing cell concentration, soil excavation rate, and fraction of burrow volume in the mixing cell.  
The collapse rate is a function of the overlying mixing cell concentration and the burrow 
excavation rate in the underlying cell.   
 
Radon diffusion calculations are adjusted to account for the coarse spatial and temporal 
discretization of the model relative to the short half-life of 222Rn.  A calibration factor, obtained 
from an analytical solution of the diffusion equation (NRC 1989), is applied to the radon 
diffusion coefficient to correct for the numerical error in the GoldSim result. 
 
3.3.5 Climate Change 
 
The climate regimes intervals are implemented as status elements in GoldSim (Figure 3.7).  The 
climate status elements are controlled by timed event and event delay elements.  Each interval 
length is a stochastic element with a uniform pdf.  The triggering of the status elements can be 
turned off when the climate change process is turned off in the process switches dashboard.  A 
switch element selects the appropriate parameter value based on the climate state.  A separate 
switch is implemented for each parameter impacted by climate change. 
 



















Figure 3.7  GoldSim model design for selecting alternative parameter distributions for future 
climate states. 
 
3.3.6 Human Intrusion 
 
The probability of intrusion is represented by a pdf describing the intrusion rate (probability per 
year).  Random intrusion events are generated as a Poisson process by a timed event element.  
The intrusion rate is modified over time by a deterministic function that represents SME opinion 
about marker and placard effectiveness.  This causes the probability of intrusion to increase over 
time as markers are judged to become less effective.  Another stochastic element simulates the 
total number of wells developed for each intrusion event. 
 
3.3.7 Cumulative Release 
 
The cumulative release to the accessible environment is calculated as the cumulative release of 
volatile species to the atmosphere and of volatile and particulate radionuclides to the upper 
15 cm (6 in.) of soil by plant uptake and animal burrowing.  The transfer rates for these processes 
are continuously input to an integrator element, which does not perform radioactive decay.  
Therefore, the cumulative release does not include the radioactive decay and ingrowth of 
radionuclides that occurs between the time they reach the accessible environment and the end of 
the 10,000 year compliance period. 
 
3.3.8 Assurance Requirements: Alternative Engineered Barrier Evaluation 
 
The cost-effectiveness of alternative barriers is assessed by using AHP, a MCDA method 
(Saaty 1986, 1990).  The AHP decomposes a complex decision into a series of simple pair-wise 
comparisons.  The decision is defined by identifying the goal, decision criteria, and decision 
alternatives.  The criteria or alternatives are then compared pair-wise with respect to each of the 
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criteria at the next higher level.  The result is a ranking of the decision alternatives that reflects 
the importance of the decision criteria and performance of the decision alternatives.  
 
The AHP was implemented using the following five step process. 
 
1) Define the Goal 
The goal is to identify cost-effective engineered barriers that increase confidence in the 
containment of TRU waste disposed in T04C. 
 
2) Define the Criteria that Measure Achievement of the Goal 
Two categories of criteria are considered: benefits and costs. 
 
Criteria that Measure Benefit 
 
Reduction in the normalized cumulative release, R, at the 99.9th percentile.:  This is defined as 
the reduction in the 99.9th percentile R relative to a 2.8-m (9-ft) cover without any intrusion 
barriers.  This criterion is selected because it is the 40 CFR 191.13(a)(2) regulatory standard.  
The R reduction is obtained from results of a simple model modified to simulate the barrier 
alternatives as described in Section 3.2.9. 
 
Reduction in the normalized cumulative release, R, at the 90th percentile.  This is defined as the 
reduction in the 90th percentile R relative to a 2.8-m (9-ft) cover without intrusion barriers.  This 
criterion is selected because it is the 40 CFR 191.13(a)(1) regulatory standard. The R reduction is 
obtained from results of simple model modified to simulate the barrier alternatives described in 
Section 3.2.9. 
 
Reduction in the on site resident TEDE at 10,000 years.  This is defined as the reduction in the 
mean on site resident TEDE at 10,000 years relative to results obtained for a 2.8-m (9-ft) cover 
without intrusion barriers.  This is selected because it is the 40 CFR 191.15(a) regulatory 
standard. 
 
Hydrologic Performance.  Hydrologic performance describes the ability of the alternative cover 
to limit infiltration into waste relative to a 2.8-m (9-ft) vegetated ET cover.  
 
Reliability.  Reliability describes the expected ease or difficulty of constructing an alternative 
cover that functions as designed. 
 
Criteria that Measure Cost 
 
Cost of Construction.  Costs associated with planning, design, supervision, labor, and equipment 
needed for barrier construction. 
 
Cost of Materials.  Costs associated with materials needed for barrier construction. 
 
Cost of Maintenance.  Costs associated with maintaining the barrier during active institutional 
control including: inspections, environmental monitoring, and repairs. 
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Worker Safety.  Costs associated with risks to workers during barrier construction. 
 
Compatibility.  Compatibility describes design, planning, construction and materials costs 
needed to make the barrier compatible with the cover on surrounding disposal units.  The 
surrounding final closure cover is assumed to be a vegetated 2.8-m (9-ft) ET cover. 
 
Step 3) Identify Alternative Barrier Choices 
Twelve alternative barriers are identified in Section 3.2.9 and evaluated.   
 
Step 4) Make Pair-Wise Comparative Judgments 
The decision is decomposed into two goals, each with five decision criteria, and 12 barrier 
alternatives (Figure 3.8).  Pair-wise comparisons of criteria (or alternatives) with respect to a 
higher level criterion are made.  The criteria are compared by asking two questions: 1) which is 
more important, with respect to the higher level criteria, and 2) how strongly using a scale from 1 
to 9 (Table 3.2)?  The decision criteria are compared relative to the decision goal.  The decision 
alternatives (i.e., the 12 alternative covers) are compared relative to the decision criteria.  The 
comparisons are only made one time.  For example, if A is first ranked three times more 
important than B, the rank of B relative to A is assumed to be 1/3.  
 
Table 3.2  Scale of relative importance for pair-wise comparison of decision criteria. 
 
Importance Definition 
1 Equal importance for goal 
3 Moderate importance 
5 Strong importance 
7 Very strong importance 
9 Extreme importance 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values 
Reciprocal Values Inverse of above relationships 
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Figure 3.8.  Analytic hierarchy process decomposition of the decision to select the most cost-
effective barrier for isolation of buried TRU waste in T04C. 
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Step 5) Calculate Alternative Rankings 
If the decision maker is totally consistent in the pair-wise comparison of the decision criteria (or 



































where wi is the weight (or local priority) of the ith criterion.  Multiplying A by the vector of 





































































where λ is a scalar.  If the comparisons are totally consistent, λ is equal to n, the dimension of the 
matrix.  Writing this expression in equation form: 
wwA λ=  
it can be seen that λ is an eigenvalue of A and the vector of weights, w, is the eigenvector 
associated with λ. 
 
Therefore, the weights of the decision criteria (or alternatives) can be obtained from a matrix of 
the pair-wise comparisons by solving for the dominant eigenvalue.  The weights, w, are the 
eigenvector associated with the dominant eigenvalue.   
 
For a consistent n x n matrix, the dominant eigenvalue is equal to n.  In practice, the decision 
makers’ pair-wise comparisons will not be totally consistent.  Preparation of the matrixes 
requires redundant comparisons.  For example if A is judged to be two times as important as B 
and B two times as important as C, then C and A need not be compared as these prior judgments 
imply C is four times as important as A.  Nevertheless C is compared with A and it is inevitable 
that some redundant comparisons will not be consistent with earlier judgments.  The eigenvalues 
can still be determined but will be slightly perturbed.  The degree of perturbation is estimated by 
the consistency ratio which is the ratio of the matrix inconsistency divided by the average 
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The final rankings of the decision alternatives (or criteria priorities), rj, are then obtained as the 
product of the matrix whose columns are the local priorities of the alternatives and the vector of 

































































where wi,j is the local priority of the jth alternative with respect to the ith decision criterion, wi the 
priority of the ith decision criterion, and rj the rank (or global priority) of the jth alternative.  The 
rankings for effectiveness and cost are combined by taking the ratio of the effectiveness rank to 
the cost rank.  The preferred alternative has the highest effectiveness/cost ratio. 
 
The effectiveness of the alternative barriers is determined from modified versions of the SA 
model described in Section 3.2.8.  The results from these models were post-processed by an 
Excel spreadsheet using a Visual Basic Application macro to calculate the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors using the methods of Press et al. (1986).   
 
3.3.9 Individual Protection Requirements 
 
The transport portion of the model calculates the radionuclide concentration in air above the 
disposal unit and in surface soil.  The on site resident TEDE is calculated as the product of the 
media concentrations and pathway dose conversion factors calculated for each radionuclide and 
each exposure pathway.  The dose conversion factors for long-lived members of radionuclide 
decay chains include the contribution from short-lived progeny assumed to be in secular 
equilibrium.  Long-lived members of radionuclide decay chains explicitly included in the model 
are listed in Appendix A1, Figure A1.1. 
 
3.3.10 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis is the process of quantifying how uncertainty in model input contributes to 
model output uncertainty.  Understanding this relationship can be useful for understanding and 
interpreting model behavior, comparing model behavior with the actual system, building model 
credibility, identifying model errors, and/or reducing output uncertainty.   
 
The sensitivity analysis approach was to use multiple methods to confirm sensitivity ranking as 
recommended by Frey and Patil (2002).  The methods used are the methods included in the 
GoldSim multivariate result element and Sobol’ sensitivity indices calculated for a generalized 
boosted model (gbm) fit to GoldSim model inputs and outputs (R Project 2007; Ridgeway 2007; 
Sobol’ 2001).  Complete details of the sensitivity analysis methods and results can be found in 
Appendix A3. 
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4.0 Results of Analysis 
 
The SA model produces probabilistic results for the regulatory endpoints.  This section 
summarizes the distributions of the results, the likelihood of meeting the requirements in light of 
uncertainty, and the sensitivity of the model to uncertainty in input parameters. 
 
4.1 Containment Requirements 
 
Ten thousand realizations of the cumulative normalized release, R, for a 4-m (13-ft) monolayer-
ET cover over 10,000 years were generated using LHS.  The containment requirements are given 
as a likelihood of R exceeding limits scaled to total inventory.  The probability of R exceeding 
one must be less than 1 in 10 (i.e., Pr[R>1] < 0.1) and the probability of R exceeding 10 must be 
less than 1 in 1,000 (i.e., Pr[R>10] < 0.001).   
 
The probability of R exceeding one for the present simulation was estimated to be 0.0093, an 
order of magnitude less than the 0.1 limit (Table 4.1).  The largest value of R in 10,000 
realizations was 4.9.  Because there was no realization greater than 10, it is concluded that the 
Pr(R>10) is less than 0.0001.  The performance assessment results provide a reasonable 
expectation of meeting the 40 CFR 191.13(a) CRs. 
 
Table 4.1  Comparison of the 40 CFR 191.13 containment requirements with simulated cumulative 
normalized release, R, at 10,000 years. 
 
Containment Requirement  Likelihood Limit Simulated Likelihood 
40 CFR 191.13(a)(1)  Pr(R>1) < 0.1  Pr(R>1) = 0.0093 
40 CFR 191.13(a)(2) Pr(R>10) < 0.001 Pr(R>10) < 0.0001† 
† - Maximum normalized release, R, less than 1 in 10,000 
 
4.1.1 Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function 
 
Comparison of the disposal system performance with the containment requirements can also be 
visualized by the CCDF (Figure 4.1).  The CCDF shows on the y-axis the probability of R 
exceeding the values on the x-axis.  The red-hatched area shows the region that constitutes a 
violation of the CRs.  The CCDF does not intersect the probabilistic release limits, indicating 
that the disposal system meets the containment requirements.  The markedly different slopes of 
the CCDF indicate the pdf of R is at least bimodal.  The lowest mode, which includes most of the 
probability, is composed of realizations where T04C is not disturbed by human intrusion.  The 
realizations with the higher mode include intrusion events. 
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Figure 4.1  Complementary cumulative distribution function of the cumulative normalized release, 
R, over 10,000 years for the TRU waste buried in T04C.  
 
4.1.2 Uncertainty Analysis 
 
The CRs are probabilistic limits and the CCDF is an expression of uncertainty in the cumulative 
release.  Two experiments were conducted to assess the adequacy of the sample size.  The first 
experiment evaluates the precision of the 90th and 99.9th percentile cumulative normalized 
release as a function of sample size.  The model was run repeatedly with increasing sample sizes 
and different seed numbers.  The distribution of the 90th and 99.9th percentile cumulative release 
was estimated by resampling with replacement for each sample size.  The 90th percentile 
normalized cumulative release appears to be stable by 3,500 realizations, but the 99.9th percentile 
continues to show significant variation with up to 10,000 realizations (Figure 4.2).  A sample 
size of 10,000 is selected as a reasonable compromise between output stability and the 
availability of computer resources. 
 
The second experiment evaluates the precision of the CCDF using 10,000 realizations by 
estimating the 95-percent centered confidence intervals about the CCDF.  The confidence 
intervals were estimated using the percentile bootstrap confidence interval method (Hogg et al., 
2005).  The process proceeds by 1) drawing a random sample with replacement (n=10,000) from 
the normalized cumulative release, R, data, 2)  assembling a new CCDF from the resampled 
data, 3) repeating the above steps 10,000 times, and 4) determining the 2.5th and 97.5th 
percentiles of the CCDF values from the 10,000 CCDFs.  The confidence intervals indicate that 
the precision of the CCDF is sufficient to make a determination that the CRs are met (Figure 
4.3).   
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Figure 4.2  Boxplots of bootstrapped 90th and 99.9th percentile normalized cumulative release as a 
function of sample size.  Boxplots show mean (yellow), median, 25th and 75th percentiles (box), 
10th and 90th percentile (whiskers), and outliers (dots). 
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Figure 4.3  Complementary cumulative distribution function of the cumulative normalized release, 
R, over 10,000 years for the TRU waste buried in T04C with error bars.  Error bars show the 
95-percent central interval for 10,000 replicates generated by resampling with replacement. 
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Length of Compliance Period 
 
The time-dependent behavior of the model may be subject to uncertainty.  The model simulation 
duration was increased to assess the likelihood that uncertainty in the model’s time response 
could impact the confidence in the conclusion that the requirements are met.  The conceptual 
model and assumptions may become invalid as the model duration is increased.  For example, 
infiltration below the root zone is expected to begin with the glacial-transition climate regime.  If 
this infiltration is sufficient to reach the uppermost aquifer, a groundwater pathway may be 
present in the future.  If the model duration were increased beyond this time, the model results 
would be misleading because the model does not include a groundwater pathway.   
 
The model duration was increased to 20,000 years.  An extension to 20,000 years was judged 
sufficient to investigate uncertainty in model response times, while not being so long that a 
groundwater pathway would be likely.  Increasing the model duration to 20,000 years shifts the 
CCDF to the right, but not enough to violate the CRs (Figure 4.4).  Uncertainty in the time 
response of the model does not appear to be sufficient to raise concerns about the model 
exceeding the CR limits. 
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Figure 4.4  Complementary cumulative distribution function of the normalized cumulative release, 
R, at 10,000 and 20,000 years for the TRU waste buried in T04C.   
 
Hydrogeologic Conceptual Model 
 
The hydrogeologic conceptual model assumes that upward advection ceases during the glacial-
transition climate regime.  The effect of this assumption was evaluated by running an alternative 
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model with upward advection continuing throughout the glacial-transition period.  The upward 
advection pdf was the same as during the present-day period.  
 
The CCDF with upward advection continuing through the glacial-transition period is nearly 
identical to the base case CCDF.  The 50th percentile cumulative normalized release increases 
from 8.8E-5 to 9.1E-5 with continuing upward advection.  Uncertainty concerning the status of 
upward advection during the glacial-transition period contributes negligibly to uncertainty in the 
cumulative release.  
 
4.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The SA relies on regression techniques which adequately describe sensitivity to the extent that 
the regression model fits the data.  The adjusted coefficient of determinations for the normal 
linear regression (R2 = 0.90) and the gbm (R2 = 0.94 ) indicate that the cumulative release 
regression models fit the data reasonably well and should provide accurate qualitative ranking of 
input parameter sensitivity.  All of the sensitivity methods indicate that the normalized 
cumulative release is strongly sensitive to the total number of intruder boreholes.  The Sobol’ 
total effects sensitivity indices for the gbm indicate that there is moderate sensitivity to the 
number of boreholes per intrusion event and a slight sensitivity to the 239Pu inventory.  See 
Appendix A3 for complete details of the sensitivity analysis. 
 
4.2 Assurance Requirements: Alternative Barrier Evaluation 
 
The performance of the alternative engineered barriers was evaluated for the CRs using 10,000 
LHS realizations and for the IPRs using 3,500 LHS realizations of the SA model.  Each 
alternative barrier has a specific cover thickness.  Performance is measured relative to a 2.8-m 
(9-ft) cover, the minimum cover thickness required to meet the CRs and IPRs. 
 
4.2.1 Alternative Engineered Barrier Benefits 
 
The benefit criteria were ranked based on their ability to increase confidence in meeting the 
requirements.  Improved performance, as demonstrated by changes in the CR and IPR results of 
alternative engineered barrier models, was given the highest weight.  Alternative barrier 
effectiveness with respect to hydrologic performance and reliability was ranked using 




The normalized cumulative release results for the alternative barriers cluster about several points 
(Figure 4.5).  At the 90th percentile, the alternatives fall into four groups that share common 
cover thicknesses.  Alternatives 6, 7, 8, and the base case all have a 2.8-m (9-ft) cover. 
Alternatives 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, and 12 have a 4-m (13-ft) cover.  Alternative 5 has a 5-m (16-ft) 
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cover and alternatives 3 and 4 have a 12.5-m (41-ft) cover.  Cover thickness appears to be the 
most important factor affecting cumulative release at the 90th percentile.   
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Figure 4.5  Effect of alternative engineered barriers on the CCDF. 
 
The cumulative release at the 99.9th percentile falls into two groups, alternative 12 and all other 
alternatives.  Alternative 12 has a thick 4-m (13-ft) cover and a highly effective intruder barrier.  
The remaining alternatives are clustered together, but appear to be ranked according to the 
effectiveness of their intruder barrier.  At the 99.9th percentile, cover thickness does not appear to 
be important for the cumulative release, but effective intruder barriers seems to add benefit, 
especially if the cover is at least 4-m (13-ft) thick.    
 
The highest weights were given to alternatives 3 and 4, the rubber tire and bailing wire 
subsurface intrusion barriers, at the 90th percentile (Figure 4.6).  These two alternatives have the 
thickest cover.  Alternative 12, the 4-m (13-ft) monolayer-ET cover with a boulder mound, had 
the highest score for the 99.9th percentile cumulative release.  The 2.8-m (9-ft) monolayer-ET 
cover with surface intruder barriers performed no better than the base case. 
 
The CCDF for alternative 9, the 4-m (13-ft) monolayer ET cover, also provides a check of the 
assumption that basement construction has negligible impact.  The CCDF for alternative 9 
includes basement construction.  Comparison with the CCDF for the base case without basement 
construction, Figure 4.1, confirms that the two curves are nearly identical and basement 
excavation has negligible impact on the cumulative release for a 4-m (13-ft) cover. 
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Figure 4.6  Summary of alternative engineered barrier effectiveness rankings. 
 
Individual Protection Requirements 
  
The IPR TEDE reduction data fall into six groups that share a common cover thickness 
(Figure 4.7).  Increasing cover thickness reduces the member of public TEDE.  The relative 
decrease for the different barriers is constant over time.  The highest weight was assigned to 
alternatives 3 and 4, the alternatives with the thickest cover (Figure 4.7).  Alternatives 8 and 12 
include the boulder mound intruder barrier, which was assumed to preclude a residence directly 
above the trench.  The remaining groups share common cover thicknesses of 5 m (16 ft) 
(alternative 5), 4.0 m (13 ft) (alternatives 1, 2, 9, 10, 11), and 2.8 m (9 ft) (base case, alternatives 
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Base Case 0.11 
Alt. 1 0.19 
Alt. 2 0.19 
Alt. 3 0.19 
Alt. 4 0.19 
Alt. 5 0.35 
Alt. 6 0.12 
Alt. 7 0.14 
Alt. 8 0.21 
Alt. 9 0.19 
Alt. 10 0.25 
Alt. 11 0.32 
Alt. 12 1.00 
Base Case 0.11 
Alt. 1 0.38 
Alt. 2 0.38 
Alt. 3 0.99 
Alt. 4 1.00 
Alt. 5 0.54 
Alt. 6 0.11 
Alt. 7 0.12 
Alt. 8 0.13 
Alt. 9 0.38 
Alt. 10 0.38 
Alt. 11 0.39 
Alt. 12 0.41 
Base Case 0.11
Alt. 1 0.23 
Alt. 2 0.23 
Alt. 3 1.00 
Alt. 4 1.00 
Alt. 5 0.32 
Alt. 6 0.23 
Alt. 7 0.11 
Alt. 8 0.53 
Alt. 9 0.23 
Alt. 10 0.23 
Alt. 11 0.23 
Alt. 12 0.68 
Base Case 0.18 
Alt. 1 0.43 
Alt. 2 0.67 
Alt. 3 0.91 
Alt. 4 1.00 
Alt. 5 0.65 
Alt. 6 0.26 
Alt. 7 0.13 
Alt. 8 0.08 
Alt. 9 0.52 
Alt. 10 0.38 
Alt. 11 0.23 
Alt. 12 0.11 
Base Case 0.81
Alt. 1 0.55 
Alt. 2 0.28 
Alt. 3 0.14 
Alt. 4 0.14 
Alt. 5 0.29 
Alt. 6 0.55 
Alt. 7 0.55 
Alt. 8 0.55 
Alt. 9 1.00 
Alt. 10 0.55 
Alt. 11 0.55 
Alt. 12 0.55 
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Figure 4.7  Effectiveness of alternative engineered barrier designs on the on site resident TEDE. 
 
4.2.2 Alternative Engineered Barrier Costs 
 
The base case and 12 alternative engineered barriers were ranked with respect to five cost criteria 
using professional judgment (Figure 4.8).  Criteria that involved capital expenditures at closure 
were judged to have high and equal importance.  The consistency ratio of all matrixes was less 
than 0.1.  The 1.5-m (5-ft) reinforced concrete subsurface intruder barrier (alternative 5) was 
judged the most costly to construct and to have the highest material costs.  The 9-m (30-ft) waste 
tire and bailing wire subsurface intruder barriers (alternatives 3 and 4) were judged most costly 
to maintain and integrate into the surrounding cover.  The 4-m (13-ft) monolayer-ET covers with 
surface intruder barriers were judged most costly in terms of worker safety because they were 
judged to require the most labor hours with use of heavy equipment. 
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Figure 4.8  Summary of alternative engineered barrier cost rankings. 
 
4.2.3 Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Engineered Barriers 
 
The benefit and cost weights for the various criteria are synthesized into a final score for each 
alternative (Table 4.2).  The greatest benefits are expected for the 9-m (30-ft) waste rubber tire 
and bailing wire subsurface intruder barriers.  Although these alternatives were conceived as 
intruder barriers, the benefit is achieved through the increased cover thickness and its effect on 
undisturbed performance. 
 
The most costly alternative is the reinforced concrete subsurface intruder barrier, followed 
closely by the 9-m (30-ft) waste rubber tire and bailing wire subsurface intruder barriers.   
 
Only three alternatives were judged to be more cost-effective than the base case option.  The best 
benefit/cost ratio is obtained for the 4-m (13-ft) monolayer-ET cover.  The second most cost-
effective barrier is the 4-m (13-ft) monolayer-ET barrier combined with the boulder mound 
surface intruder barrier.  The final alternative ranked above the base case was the 4-m (13-ft) 
monolayer-ET barrier combined with the boulder field surface intruder barrier. 
 
Classified T04C is within the 92-ac LLWMU and will be closed when this entire unit is closed.  
The final closure plan for the LLWMU will be based on a formal cost-benefit analysis of closure 
cover options.  The result of the MCDA of alternative engineered barriers for T04C is that a 
thicker monolayer-ET cover and a thicker monolayer-ET cover with a boulder mound surface 

















Base Case 0.06 
Alt. 2 0.75 
Alt. 4 0.67 
Alt. 5 0.21 
Alt. 6 0.21 
Alt. 7 1.00 
Alt. 8 0.09 
Alt. 9 0.12 
Alt. 10 0.17 
Alt. 11 0.24 
Alt. 12 0.35 
Alt. 13 0.47 
Alt. 14 0.83 
Base Case 0.07 
Alt. 2 0.79 
Alt. 4 0.20 
Alt. 5 0.54 
Alt. 6 0.61 
Alt. 7 1.00 
Alt. 8 0.11 
Alt. 9 0.19 
Alt. 10 0.29 
Alt. 11 0.11 
Alt. 12 0.11 
Alt. 13 0.17 
Alt. 14 0.35 
Base Case 0.62 
Alt. 2 0.22 
Alt. 4 0.22 
Alt. 5 1.00 
Alt. 6 1.00 
Alt. 7 0.22 
Alt. 8 0.62 
Alt. 9 0.62 
Alt. 10 0.62 
Alt. 11 0.22 
Alt. 12 0.22 
Alt. 13 0.22 
Alt. 14 0.22 
Base Case 0.19 
Alt. 2 0.65 
Alt. 4 0.65 
Alt. 5 0.35 
Alt. 6 0.36 
Alt. 7 0.43 
Alt. 8 0.78 
Alt. 9 0.78 
Alt. 10 0.78 
Alt. 11 0.97 
Alt. 12 1.00 
Alt. 13 1.00 
Alt. 14 1.00 
Base Case 0.07 
Alt. 2 0.15 
Alt. 4 0.15 
Alt. 5 1.00 
Alt. 6 1.00 
Alt. 7 0.31 
Alt. 8 0.07 
Alt. 9 0.07 
Alt. 10 0.08 
Alt. 11 0.15 
Alt. 12 0.23 
Alt. 13 0.23 
Alt. 14 0.22 
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Base 2.8 m ET Cover 0.160 0.147 1.085 4
Alt. 1 Asphalt Layer @ 1.35 m, 4-m Cover 0.301 0.510 0.589 13
Alt. 2 Capillary Break Layer @ 0.7 m, 4-m Cover 0.307 0.352 0.870 8
Alt. 3 9 m Rubber Tire Layer @ 1.1 m, 12.5-m Cover 0.619 0.626 0.988 6
Alt. 4 9 m Bailing Wire Layer @ 1.1 m, 12.5-m Cover 0.628 0.642 0.978 7
Alt. 5 1.5 m Reinforced Concrete Barrier @ 1.1 m, 5-m Cover 0.428 0.661 0.646 12
Alt. 6 Boulder Field, 2.8-m ET Cover 0.170 0.202 0.843 10
Alt. 7 Boulder Wall, 2.8-m ET Cover 0.154 0.231 0.666 11
Alt. 8 Boulder Mound, 2.8-m ET Cover 0.234 0.270 0.865 9
Alt. 9 Thick (4-m) ET Cover 0.337 0.227 1.481 1
Alt. 10 Boulder Field, 4.0-m ET Cover 0.318 0.284 1.121 3
Alt. 11 Boulder Wall, 4.0-m ET Cover 0.337 0.336 1.005 5
Alt. 12 Boulder Mound, 4.0-m ET Cover 0.659 0.475 1.388 2
 
4.3 Individual Protection Requirements 
 
The 40 CFR 191.15 IPRs limit the member of public TEDE to less than 0.15 mSv in a year.  The 
member of public TEDE was estimated for an on site resident living directly on T04C using 
5,000 LHS realizations.   
 
4.3.1 Dose Consequences 
 
Environmental Media Radionuclide Concentrations 
 
The TEDE received by a resident is a function of the radionuclide concentration in soil and air.  
The IPR analysis considers undisturbed performance only and does not include releases by 
intrusion.  The concentration in soil of most radionucludes is increasing throughout the 10,000-
year compliance period (Figure 4.9).  The highest activity concentration radionuclides released to 
surface soil are not from the regulated TRU waste, but are from LLW disposed in T04C.   
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Figure 4.9  Mean radionuclide activity concentration in surface soil for undisturbed performance 
case. 
 
Radionuclides transported by gaseous diffusion, 3H, 222Rn, and its progeny lead-210 (210Pb), have 
the highest initial concentrations in surface soil.  Tritium decays to negligible levels within a few 
hundred years.  Radon-222 and 210Pb concentrations change gradually reflecting the changing 
222Rn production rate in the waste.  The remaining radionuclides show a gradual build-up of 
concentration over time as they are transported to the surface by liquid diffusion, liquid 
advection, and bioturbation.  By 1,200 years, technetium-99 (99Tc) becomes the highest 
concentration radionuclide.  Technetium is preferentially released because its high solubility and 
poor adsorption on soil allows faster upward transport by liquid advection and diffusion.  Once 
99Tc is released to cover soil below the NLFB where liquid diffusion and advection operate, plant 
uptake and animal burrowing transport it to surface soil.   
 
The trends in air activity concentration closely follow that observed in soil.  The activity 
concentration of gaseous species, 3H and 222Rn, are significantly enhanced relative to particulate 
radionuclides (Figure 4.10).  Overall, air concentrations are many orders of magnitude less than 
soil concentrations. 
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Figure 4.10  Mean radionuclide activity concentration in air above T04C. 
 
On Site Resident Total Effective Dose Equivalent 
 
The IPRs are assessed for an on site resident.  Five thousand realizations of the TEDE were 
calculated for a period of 10,000 years after closure of the Area 5 RWMS.  The mean TEDE 
reaches a maximum at 10,000 years (Figure 4.11).  The mean, median, and 95th percentile 
TEDEs are less than the 0.15 mSv IPR throughout the 10,000-year compliance period 
(Table 4.3).  The simulated on site resident TEDE results provide a reasonable expectation of 
meeting the 40 CFR 191.15 IPRs. 
 
Table 4.3  Summary of TEDE results for the individual protection requirements on site resident 
scenario. 
 
Scenario Individual Protection 
Requirement (mSv) 
Time of Maximum 
TEDE 





On Site Resident 0.15 10,000 yrs 0.055 0.15 
 
The TEDE to an on site resident is mostly from radionuclides released from the LLW disposed in 
T04C (Figure 4.12).  Ninety-seven percent of the TEDE at 10,000 years is from external 
irradiation from 214Pb and bismuth-214 (214Bi), short-lived progeny deposited in cover soil by 
222Rn diffusing in the gas phase.  Another 2.5 percent is contributed by inadvertent ingestion of 
soil containing 210Pb+P, another 222Rn progeny.  The TRU waste component in T04C contributes 
approximately 0.1 percent of the TEDE. 
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Figure 4.11  Total effective dose equivalent to an on site resident from waste disposed in T04C. 
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Figure 4.12 Total effective dose equivalent by radionuclide to an on site resident from waste 
disposed in T04C. 
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4.3.2 Uncertainty Analysis 
 
Local maxima of the on site resident TEDE occur at 100 and 10,000 years after closure.  The 
probability of exceeding the 0.15 mSv IPR was evaluated at these two times.  A majority of the 
TEDE probability distribution at both times lies below the IPR (Figure 4.13).  At 100 years, 99 
percent of the cumulative probability is less than the 0.15 mSv limit.  Ninety-five percent of the 
cumulative probability lies below the limit at 10,000 years.  The probability distributions of the 












































Figure 4.13  Relative frequency histogram and cumulative probabilities of on site resident 
exposure scenario TEDE at 100 and 10,000 years 
 
The precision of the member of public TEDE as a function of sample size was investigated by 
estimating result statistics using resampling with replacement.  Two thousand estimates of the 
mean and 95th percentile were generated from samples with different seed numbers ranging in 
size from 500 to 10,000 realizations.  The mean and 95th percentile IPR results appear stable by 
approximately 5,000 realizations (Figure 4.14).  A sample size of 5,000 was judged to provide 
acceptable precision.   
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Figure 4.14  Boxplots of bootstrapped mean and 95th percentile on site resident TEDE at 10,000 
years as a function of sample size.  Boxplots show mean (yellow), median, 25th and 75th 
percentiles (box), 10th and 90th percentile (whiskers), and outliers (dots). 
 
Length of Compliance Period 
 
The model duration was increased to assess the likelihood that uncertainty in the model’s time 
response could impact the confidence in the conclusion that the requirements are met.  The 
model duration was increased to 20,000 years. 
 
From 10,000 to 20,000 years the resident TEDE continues to increase (Figure 4.15).  The on site 
resident TEDE is expected to approximately double from 10,000 to 20,000 years (Table 4.4).  
The increases are still not sufficient for the mean to exceed the IPR limit.  The 95th percentile, 
however, exceeds the IPR limit after approximately 10,000 years. 
 
Table 4.4  Summary of TEDE results for the IPR on site resident scenario. 
 
Scenario Individual Protection 
Requirement (mSv) 
Time of Maximum 
TEDE 
Mean TEDE  
(mSv) 
95th Percentile TEDE 
(mSv) 
On Site Resident 0.15 10,000 yrs 0.055 0.15 
On Site Resident 0.15 20,000 yrs 0.12 0.33 
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Figure 4.15  On site resident exposure scenario TEDE over 20,000 years. 
 
Alternative Exposure Scenarios 
 
Exposure of the public may occur under a range of exposure scenarios with different 
probabilities of occurrence.  Alternative exposure scenarios were evaluated to assess uncertainty 
contributed by exposure scenario selection.  Four alternative scenarios previously used for 
Area 5 RMWS PAs were evaluated.   
 
The transient visitor scenario assumes that a person is directly over the site for 40 hours per 
week.  The resident farmer scenario is identical to the resident scenario except that the resident 
farmer produces agricultural products (i.e., beef, chicken, milk, eggs, fruits, and vegetables) at 
the site and resides at the 100-m (330-ft) site boundary.  The open rangeland scenario assumes 
that a ranch has been established at a remote site and free-range cattle can graze at the site.  The 
ranch residents are exposed primarily through milk and beef from cattle grazing at the site.  The 
open rangeland scenario was evaluated with a ranch located at Cane Spring (14.3 km [8.8 mi] 
west) and at the nearest NTS boundary. 
 
The mean TEDEs for the alternative scenarios remain below the 0.15 mSv limit except for the 
resident farmer scenario (Table 4.5).  The 95th percentile equals or exceeds the limit for all 







Special Analysis of TRU in T04C  93  
Table 4.5  Summary of TEDE results for the IPR using alternative exposure scenarios. 
 
Scenario Time of Maximum Mean TEDE  
(mSv) 
95th Percentile TEDE 
(mSv) 
Transient Visitor 10,000 yrs 0.033 0.087 
Resident Farmer 10,000 yrs 0.21 0.45 
Open Rangeland: Cane Springs 100 yrs 0.036 0.15 
Open Rangeland: NTS Boundary 100 yrs 0.037 0.15 
 
 
The transient visitor TEDE is contributed mostly by external irradiation from 214Pb and 214Bi 
deposited in soil by diffusing 222Rn.  The transient visitor TEDE displays a similar time-
dependence as the on site resident scenario and remains less than the IPR limit throughout the 
10,000 year compliance period (Figure 4.16).   
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Figure 4.16  Alternative exposure scenarios mean TEDE over time. 
 
The resident farmer and open rangeland scenarios display a similar time-dependence with early 
and late maxima.  The early maxima for both scenarios are due to 3H.  The resident farmer 
maximum at 10,000 years is contributed mostly by ingestion of 210Pb+P in vegetables grown on 
site.  The open rangeland maxima at 10,000 years are due to ingestion of 210Pb+P in beef from 
cattle grazing on site.  The resident farmer TEDE exceeds the IPRs by approximately 4,500 
years. 
 
The alternative exposure scenario results should be considered in light of their likelihood and 
relation to the regulated TRU waste disposed in T04C.  The doses that exceed the IPR in the 
resident farmer scenario are caused by radionuclides from the LLW co-located in T04C.  That is 
to say that all disposal units at the Area 5 RWMS would likely fail this analysis due to the more 
restrictive 40 CFR 191 IPR limit.  More restrictive requirements include evaluation of a 10,000-
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year compliance period and a lower dose limit.  These results would comply with the DOE M 
435.1-1 performance objectives.   
 
The likelihood of these scenarios is also low.  The resident farmer scenario assumes non-
commercial agricultural production, a rare event at sites throughout southern Nevada without 
surface water or shallow groundwater.  The transient visitor scenario assumes that a transient is 
on site 40 hours per week (2,000 hours per year), an extremely unlikely event unless the transient 
were employed at the site.  The foot print of the TRU waste could range from approximately 4 to 
10 m2 (43 - 107  ft2) making it highly unlikely that a transient would be confined to this small 
area for such a long period.  A much more likely scenario is transient visitation of the site for 
some short-term recreational activity.   
 
While these results indicate the exposure scenario is an important source of uncertainty in the 
estimation of the dose to the member of public, the low probability of the scenario that exceeds 
the IPR argues that there is still a reasonable expectation of meeting the IPR. 
 
Hydrogeologic Conceptual Model 
 
The effect of assuming upward advection ceases during the glacial-transition climate regime was 
evaluated by running an alternative model with upward advection continuing throughout the 
glacial-transition period.  The upward advection pdf was the same as during the present-day 
period.  
 
The resident TEDE with upward advection continuing through the glacial-transition is nearly 
identical to the base case TEDE.  The mean TEDE at 10,000 years increases from 0.055 to 0.056 
mSv with continuing upward advection.  Uncertainty concerning the status of upward advection 
during the glacial-transition period contributes negligibly to uncertainty in the resident TEDE.  
 
4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The sensitivity of the on site resident TEDE was evaluated at 100, 1,000 and 10,000 years.  The 
coefficients of determination were significantly better for the gbm than the normal linear models 
and the gbm results are considered more accurate.  The adjusted coefficients of determination for 
the on site resident TEDE gbm at 100, 1,000, and 10,000 years was 0.94, 0.95, and 0.99, 
respectively. 
 
The sensitivity of the on site resident TEDE at 100 and 1,000 years was similar.  The gbm 
predicted on site resident TEDE was strongly sensitive to the co-located low-level waste 
radium-226 (226Ra) inventory and moderately sensitive to the radon emanation coefficient at both 
times.  Slight sensitivity to the residence gamma radiation transmission factor and time spent in 
sedentary activities was also observed. 
 
At 10,000 years, the gbm predicted on site resident TEDE is strongly and approximately equally 
sensitive to the co-located low-level 234U waste inventory and the radon emanation coefficient.  
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Again, slight sensitivity to the residence gamma radiation transmission factor and time spent in 
sedentary activities was observed. 
 
The onsite resident TEDE is predominately from external irradiation from short-lived 222Rn 
progeny in soil.  The sensitive model parameters are all related to this exposure pathway.  The 
most sensitive parameters are related to the production and release of 222Rn from the low-level 
co-located waste.  The residence gamma radiation transmission factor and time spent in 
sedentary activities are also related to external irradiation.  Time spent in sedentary activities is 
negatively related to the on site resident TEDE, because these activities are assumed to occur 
indoors where the residence provides partial shielding from gamma emitting 214Pb and 214Bi in 
soil. 
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5.0 Performance Evaluation 
 
The purpose of the SA is to evaluate the impacts of inadvertent disposal of small quantities of 
TRU waste in T04C at the Area 5 RWMS.  Review of the composite analysis results and the 
DAS confirms that the Area 5 RWMS with the TRU waste in T04C is compliant with all 
DOE O 435.1-1 requirements.    
 
Although not required, supplemental 40 CFR 191 analyses were performed.  Quantitative 
modeling was performed to simulate releases and doses for comparison with the 40 CFR 191.13 
CRs, and the 40 CFR 191.15 IPRs.  The modeling was performed using the 40 CFR 191 SA 
v1.002 GoldSim model developed from the LLW PA model.  Additional modeling was also 
performed to rank the cost-effectiveness of alternative engineered barriers required under 40 
CFR 191.14 to increase confidence in the long-term compliance with the CRs. 
 
The CRs limit the probability of the normalized cumulative release, R, exceeding one times the 
release limit to less than 1 chance in 10 (Pr[R>1] < 0.1) and the Pr(R>10) to less than 1 chance in 
1,000.  The SA simulated Pr(R>1) was 0.009 and Pr(R>10) was less than 1 in 10,000.  
Uncertainty analysis indicates that there is a very high likelihood that the CRs will be met.  
Uncertainty in the cumulative release is contributed predominately by uncertainty in the number 
of intruder boreholes. 
 
The intent of the assurance requirements is to increase confidence in long-term compliance by 
requiring institutional controls (i.e., active and passive institutional controls, and monitoring) and 
protective site features (i.e., multiple natural and engineered barriers, lack of attractive resources, 
and capability to retrieve waste).  Review of closure plans and DOE policies indicates that the 
required controls will be implemented and that the site possesses the desired features.  An 
MCDA of alternative engineered barriers indicates that the most cost-effective engineered 
barriers are a thicker monolayer-ET cover and a boulder mound intruder surface barrier on a 
thicker monolayer-ET cover.  Final closure planning will include a formal quantitative cost-
benefit analysis of these two alternatives.  
 
The IPRs limit the dose to the public to less than 0.15 mSv in a year during the 10,000 year 
compliance period.  The SA calculated a maximum 0.055 mSv mean TEDE for an on site 
resident at 10,000 years.  Uncertainty analysis indicates that there is a high likelihood of meeting 
the IPRs.  Uncertainty in the on site resident TEDE is contributed predominately by the 222Rn 
source term.  The exposure scenario is another potentially significant source of uncertainty. 
 
The Subpart C groundwater protection requirements stipulate that there must be a reasonable 
expectation of meeting the requirements of the National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 
40 CFR 141.  Past performance assessment modeling has shown that there is a negligible 
probability of a groundwater pathway under present-day conditions.  The SA results indicate that 
this conclusion is likely valid for 10,000 years even with changing climate.  Therefore, the SA 
concludes that there will be no groundwater pathway for 10,000 years and there is a reasonable 
expectation of meeting the groundwater protection standards. 
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The conclusion of the SA is that there is a reasonable expectation that the TRU waste disposed in 
T04C with implementation of the planned institutional controls meets the requirements of 
DOE M 435.1-1.  The approved composite analysis and DAS issued after review of the 
composite analysis confirm that the requirements of DOE 435.1-1 have been met. Evidence of 
meeting the 40 CFR 191.13 CRs is provided by the CCDF which indicates the cumulative 
releases are substantially below the limits.  Consistency with the 40 CFR 191.14 assurance 
requirements is confirmed by closure plans which include all required features.  Reasonable 
expectation of meeting the 40 CFR 191.15 IPRs is provided by the distribution of TEDEs 
calculated for a future resident which indicate a high level of confidence of meeting the 0.15 
mSv dose limit. 
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7.0 Appendices 
A1 Waste Inventory 
 
The inventory of T04C was estimated using the Area 5 Inventory Model, version 2.021.  
The model is implemented in the probabilistic GoldSim modeling platform, allowing 
estimation of inventory uncertainty by Monte Carlo simulation.  Inventory radioactive 
decay and ingrowth during the operational period is also handled by native GoldSim 
routines for solution of the Bateman equations.  Model input data, data sources, 
assumptions, and methods are documented in notes, comments, hyperlinks, and graphics 
included within the model. 
 
The model algorithm follows the following sequence: 
 
1) Get individual nuclide annual disposal rates (Bq yr-1) and volume disposal rate (m3 
yr-1) summed over all generators by fiscal year from inventory records. 
2) Estimate future disposal rates based on generator projections of future waste volume 
and past annual mean waste activity concentrations. 
3) Estimate scaling factors for nuclides not recorded on past inventory records.  
Estimate the volume of waste not included in inventory queries. 
4) Correct past disposal rates for radionuclides and waste volume not included in 
inventory records.  Integrate corrected disposal rates over time, including effects of 
radioactive decay and ingrowth. 
 
Important model inputs are probability density functions (pdfs) representing uncertainty.  
Input pdfs are repeatedly sampled and propagated through the model to produce a 
distribution of model results.  The model output distributions are well represented by 
lognormal distributions and are input into the 40 CFR 191 SA model as lognormal 
distributions with the geometric mean and standard deviation of the inventory model 
outputs. 
 
A1.2 Data Sources 
 
Inventory records for the Area 5 RWMS are maintained in three major sources:  the 
waste management logbook, the waste management database (WMD), and the low-level 
waste information system (LWIS).  In addition to the database records, unclassified 
records accompanying the shipment, on site survey records, and receipt records are 
maintained in an electronic imaging system. 
 
Three data sources were used to estimate the inventory in T04C.  The TRU waste 
inventory is estimated from an unclassified memorandum (Sandia 1992).  The co-located 
low-level waste inventory data sources are the waste management logbook, in use from 
1961 to 1978, and the WMD, an electronic database in use from approximately 1978 to 
1993. 
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The records described above have numerous limitations that have been noted in the past 
(Shott et al. 1998; 2000).  Known problems include: 
• Waste characterization before 1994 is not complete.  Important radionuclides may not 
be reported.  In early records, no radionuclides may be identified and disposals are 
simply recorded as “Curies.”  Some records indicate mixtures of radionuclides, such 
as mixed fission products, depleted uranium, enriched uranium, plutonium, or 
plutonium scrap codes (e.g., PU51, PU52, or PU57). 
• Inventory records are not complete.  Not all disposals were entered into waste 
management records.  During some periods, classified disposals were not recorded in 
the databases.  The disposals in T04C apparently occurred during this period, and 
very few of the disposals in T04C are recorded in the WMD. 
• The pre-1993 relational database (i.e., the WMD) tables are not completely populated 
with data.  Consequently, some records in different database tables cannot be linked 
and retrieved in queries.   
• The pre-1993 database nuclide quantity data is recorded by shipment rather than by 
container.  If containers within a shipment were sent to different disposal units, the 
total shipment inventory will be recorded as disposed in each unit.  This may cause 
multiple counting of some inventories. 
 
The T04C TRU waste inventory is reported in an unclassified memorandum which 
summarizes the waste inventory (SNL 1992).  The data in the memorandum were 
extracted from the original shipping records, which remain classified. 
Because specific disposal records are not available for T04C, the co-located low-level 
waste inventory is estimated as the mean waste activity concentration of waste disposed 
before 26 September 1988. 
 
A1.3 Important Model Assumptions 
 
Model methods and assumptions are documented within the model itself.  Important 
model assumptions include: 
 
• Radionuclides included in the inventory are limited to those with a half-life greater 
than five years or those that decay to a progeny with a half-life greater than 5 years.  
Short-lived progeny are assumed to be in secular equilibrium with a long-lived 
parent.  Radionuclides not appearing in Figure A1.1 are those assumed to be in 
equilibrium. 
• Uncertainty in disposed waste inventories is poorly known.  Therefore, waste 
uncertainty is represented by what is believed to be a conservative distribution.  The 
annual sums of radionuclide activity disposed before 1 October 1988, are assumed to 
be the median of a loguniform distribution.   
• Waste disposed before fiscal year (FY) 1994 is assumed to be incompletely 
characterized.  Radionuclide disposal rates before FY 1994 are corrected for 
unreported radionuclides.  Activity disposed as gross activity or mixed fission product 
activity is scaled to estimate individual radionuclide activity assuming that the 
mixture has the same radionuclide composition as the Nevada Test Site underground 
testing areas (Bowen et al. 2001).  The reported gross activity or fission product 
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activity is assumed to be the activity of 137Cs and all other fission product and 
activation product activity is scaled from 137Cs.  The activity of 238U and 235U 
disposed before FY 1994 is assumed to be the activity of depleted and enriched 
uranium, respectively.  Scaling factors for other uranium isotopes are based on a 
published relationship between specific activity and enrichment of uranium for the 
gaseous diffusion process (DOE 2001).  Scaling factors for minor contaminants in 
uranium are estimated from data provided by generators.  Plutonium disposed as 
PU51, PU52, and PU57 are assigned individual radionuclide activities based on 
isotopic composition of standard plutonium scrap codes (ANSI 1987) and typical 
values expected for weapons-grade plutonium. 
• Waste management databases do not include data for all disposed wastes.  Some 
waste shipments were not recorded in the databases.  Some database tables are not 
fully populated and waste inventories cannot be retrieved by queries.  The potential 
missing waste has been estimated by subtracting the volume of disposed waste 
retrieved from the databases from the physical volume of filled waste disposal units.  
The missing volume has been added to the inventory assuming it has the mean 


















Cm245 Pu241 Am241 Np237 U233 Th229
Zr93 Nb93m
*see note
*the radon emanation factor for all materials is incorporated by branching from Ra226 to Rn222 and Pb210  
Figure A1.1 Long-lived radionuclides included in model decay chains. 
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A1.4 Waste Inventory 
 
A1.4.1 TRU Waste Inventory 
 
The inventory of waste in the 102 TRU waste containers from Rocky Flats is summarized 
in Table A1.1.  The inventory has been revised to account for other radionuclides likely 
present in weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium, but not reported in the 
disposal records.  The inventory is also decayed to the assumed date of final site closure 
in 2028 (Table A1.1).  The data are reported as the geometric mean and standard 
deviation of a lognormal distribution. 
 













210Pb 1.3E+02 2.68 235U 5.3E+06 2.77 
226Ra 4.1E+02 2.65 236U 1.3E+06 2.28 
228Ra 1.2E-03 2.10 238U 4.4E+03 2.85 
227Ac 2.1E+03 2.85 237Np 1.3E+07 2.35 
228Th 1.1E-03 2.09 238Pu 9.3E+10 2.89 
229Th 1.5E+00 2.44 239Pu 3.1E+12 2.93 
230Th 4.6E+04 2.58 240Pu 7.5E+11 2.85 
232Th 1.7E-03 2.13 241Pu 8.3E+11 2.89 
231Pa 4.6E+03 2.83 242Pu 4.5E+07 2.81 
233U 1.1E+03 2.40 241Am 1.0E+12 2.27 
234U 1.3E+08 2.45 Total 5.7E+12  
 
 
A1.4.2 Co-Located LLW Inventory 
 
The dose assessment for the IPRs includes the dose from LLW disposed in T04C.  This 
waste is referred to as the co-located low-level waste.  Because there are no database 
records identifying this waste, the inventory is estimated as the product of the T04C 
trench volume, corrected for the TRU volume, and the mean activity concentration of 
pre-1988 LLW.  The LLW inventory is summarized in Table A1.2 as the geometric mean 
and standard deviation of a lognormal distribution.  The waste inventory has been 
corrected for radionuclides likely present in LLW, but not recorded in disposal records.  
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3H 7.0E+14 1.57 210Pb 2.4E+10 2.52 
14C 5.7E+09 1.56 226Ra 3.1E+10 2.53 
26Al 1.8E+05 1.70 228Ra 9.2E+08 2.09 
36Cl 1.0E+09 1.65 227Ac 2.5E+08 1.61 
39Ar 4.5E+09 1.67 228Th 1.2E+09 1.78 
40K 2.6E+08 1.61 229Th 3.5E+06 1.83 
41Ca 7.4E+09 1.66 230Th 8.7E+08 1.59 
60Co 4.6E+10 2.27 232Th 9.3E+08 2.09 
59Ni 1.9E+08 1.65 231Pa 1.6E+08 1.62 
63Ni 1.4E+10 1.66 232U 2.4E+08 1.67 
85Kr 9.0E+09 2.25 233U 7.6E+08 1.90 
90Sr 3.4E+13 3.56 234U 1.7E+12 1.73 
93Zr 2.5E+07 1.61 235U 7.0E+10 1.75 
93mNb 2.4E+09 1.67 236U 2.3E+10 2.36 
94Nb 6.2E+09 1.65 238U 2.0E+12 1.90 
99Tc 2.6E+11 2.38 237Np 4.8E+09 1.74 
107Pd 1.1E+06 1.61 238Pu 1.3E+11 1.69 
113mCd 2.0E+09 1.67 239Pu 1.9E+11 1.49 
121mSn 5.4E+10 1.65 240Pu 4.4E+10 1.47 
126Sn 1.1E+07 1.61 241Pu 5.1E+10 1.49 
129I 7.9E+05 1.56 242Pu 1.3E+07 1.52 
133Ba 4.0E+06 2.54 244Pu 1.1E+08 3.92 
135Cs 1.9E+07 1.61 241Am 5.8E+10 1.44 
137Cs 8.3E+13 2.84 243Am 1.1E+07 2.14 
151Sm 2.2E+10 1.61 243Cm 1.3E+08 2.16 
150Eu 7.9E+09 1.76 244Cm 1.6E+09 2.65 
152Eu 5.6E+10 2.05 245Cm 3.1E+03 2.89 
154Eu 6.6E+09 1.94 246Cm 1.8E+03 2.50 
152Gd 3.4E-02 2.11 248Cm 1.5E+03 2.95 
166mHo 2.4E+08 1.64 250Cf 5.7E+03 2.13 
207Bi 1.3E+04 3.03 Total 8.2E+14  
 
A1.5 Quality Assurance 
 
The Area 5 Inventory GoldSim model is subject to the same Software Quality Assurance 
Plan as described for the 40 CFR 191 SA GoldSim model in Appendix A2. 
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A2 Software Quality Assurance 
 
The 40 CFR 191 SA, v 1.002, GoldSim model was developed and controlled under the National 
Security Technologies (NSTec) Software Quality Assurance Plan (SQAP), Software Quality 
Assurance Plan for the GoldSim Models Supporting the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste 
Management Site Performance Assessment Program (NSTec 2007).  The SQAP implements 
quality requirements described in the NSTec Company Directive CD-3500.009, Software Quality 
Assurance; and Requirements Document RD-3200.001, Quality Assurance Requirements 
Document.  These NSTec documents implement the requirements of DOE Order 414.1C, Quality 
Assurance (DOE 2002).  The following sections briefly summarize important features of the 
SQAP. 
 
A2.1 Model Development 
 
The Area 3 and Area 5 GoldSim Performance Assessment models are subject to a continuous 
process of improvement as summarized in Figure A2.1.  The 40 CFR 191 SA v1.002 model was 
developed from the A5 RWMS v4.000 performance assessment model.  Development of the 40 
CFR 191 SA model required the addition of new model components (i.e. the cumulative release 
calculations and climate change effects) and removal of unnecessary model components.  These 




The current version of each GoldSim model is maintained throughout the development process 
in a network model repository in a single file.  Write privileges for the model repository are 
granted to a single person designated as the model custodian.  A custody log is maintained that 
records the custodian’s identity and the version number of the current version over time.  When a 
new version is created, a copy is saved in an archive folder in the model repository. 
 
Periodically after completing acceptance testing, the current model version is issued as a baseline 
model for routine application.  Approved baseline models are maintained in a separate write 
protected repository file.  Baseline models are also issued to project members on a compact disk 
for archival purposes.  Analysts performing calculations for the SA, obtain a copy of the baseline 
model from the repository and document their calculation in an Engineering 
Analysis/Calculation package which includes a copy of all models saved with results. 
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Figure A2.1 GoldSim model development process.  
 
Special Analysis of TRU in T04C  119  
Documentation and Records 
 
Multiple records are maintained to document the model development process.  The GoldSim 
software includes a versioning feature that automatically records model changes.  Periodically 
during the model development process, the model custodian will create a new model version and 
save a copy in the model repository archive.  Each archived version represents a snapshot of the 
model at a particular time in the development process.  The GoldSim software can generate a 
report listing changes between any two model versions and can highlight changed elements in 
the model browser window.   
 
In addition to GoldSim’s automatic change tracking, model developers maintain several 
important records within and external to the model.  Whenever an element is changed, a version 
change note pane is available where the analyst, date, and nature of changes are recorded.  
Version change notes are included in the GoldSim version report described above.  A higher 
level, chronological history of changes is recorded in a note pane associated with the 
\Documentation container.  A brief summary of the most significant changes for each version is 
maintained in the \Whats_New container.  An external model run log is also maintained in an 
Excel spreadsheet that records the result of important model end points (e.g., scenario dose, 
surface soil concentrations) for each model version.  The model run log allows review of how 
model results have changed over time in response to model changes and improvements. 
 
Additional notes can be recorded in the note pane associated with each model element.  These 
notes are used to explain the function or performance of an element, the data source for data or 
stochastic input elements, and record quality assurance checks made by reviewers.  Complex 
model components or data inputs may be supported by external documentation or Engineering 
Analysis/Calculation packages maintained in the model reference folder.  External documents 
are hot-linked to the model by icons located throughout the model. 
 
A2.2 Model Review and Acceptability Testing 
 
Throughout the model development process, model changes are checked by a reviewer for 
correctness and completeness and approved by the PA/CA task leader.  Model versions prepared 
as baseline models for release are submitted to the National Nuclear Security Administration 
Nevada Site Office for acceptability testing.  Acceptability testing produces a report 
summarizing the model’s performance and describing appropriate application and limitations on 
use of the model. 
 
A2.3 Model Application 
 
Each calculation supporting the SA is a model application documented by an Engineering 
Analysis/Calculation package.  The analyst prepares the calculation documenting the software 
version used, assumptions, input data, calculations, and results.  Each Engineering 
Analysis/Calculation package is checked by a subject matter expert and approved for use by the 
responsible manager. 
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A3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis is the process of quantifying how uncertainty in model input contributes to 
model output uncertainty.  Understanding this relationship can be useful for understanding and 
interpreting model behavior, comparing model behavior with real system behavior, building 
model credibility, identifying model errors, and/or reducing output uncertainty.   
 
Preferred sensitivity analysis methods should be global, quantitative, and model independent 
(Saltelli et al. 1999).  A global sensitivity analysis investigates the model output response 
throughout the input sample space.  Local sensitivity methods investigate the model response 
with respect to one input parameter while all other inputs are conditioned at a single value, 
typically the mean or median.  A quantitative sensitivity analysis determines the quantitative 
fraction of the output variance that can be attributed to each input parameter.  Model independent 
methods require no assumptions regarding the relationship between inputs and outputs.  Model 
dependent methods typically assume that a linear or monotonic relationship exists between the 
input variable and output.  If the model dependent assumptions are correct, then model 
dependent sensitivity indices may be nearly quantitative.    
 
The 40 CFR 191 SA v1.002 model presents several challenges for sensitivity analysis.  The 
model is non-linear, has non-monotonic relationships, is highly dimensional, and has limited 
built-in sensitivity analysis capabilities.  The selected sensitivity analysis approach is to use 
multiple methods to confirm sensitivity ranking as recommended by Frey and Patil (2002).  The 
methods used are the methods included in the GoldSim multivariate result element and Sobol’ 
sensitivity indices (SIs) calculated for a generalized boosted model (gbm), a type of non-
parametric regression model, fit to GoldSim model inputs and outputs (R Project 2007; 
Ridgeway 2007; Sobol’ 2001).  Sensitivity is evaluated for four model end points: the 
normalized cumulative release at 10,000 years and the on site resident total effective dose 
equivalent (TEDE) at 100, 1,000, and 10,000 years. 
 
The GoldSim multivariate result element calculates the correlation coefficient, standardized 
regression coefficient (SRC), partial correlation coefficient (PCC), and the variance-based 
importance measure.  The correlation coefficient, SRC, and PCC are model dependent methods 
that are reliable when the relationship between input and output is linear.  The importance 
measure is a model independent method, but is itself a random variable and may be very 
uncertain if the sample size is too small (Shott et al. 2007).   
 
The gbm package fits a non-parametric regression model to the data using the methods of 
Freidman (2001, 2002).  The package returns a plot of the residual sum of squares versus 
iteration, the relative influence, and the marginal dependence of the explanatory parameters.  The 
relative influence is a sensitivity index calculated as the Type III sum of squares error 
normalized to 100.  The Type III sum of squares error measures the reduction in the residual sum 
of squares due to adding the parameter to the model with all other parameters included.  The 
marginal dependence graphically represents the relationship between a single model input and 
the model prediction.  The marginal dependence indicates the range over which a parameter is 
sensitive and indicates where thresholds may occur.  Main effect and total effect Sobol’ SIs were 
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calculated for the gbm.  The Sobol’ SI is a global, model independent SI.  However, the Sobol’ 
SIs are not strictly quantitative for the GoldSim model because they are calculated for the gbm.  
The main effect SI quantifies the fraction of the model prediction variance that is attributable to 
variance in the input factor.  The total effect SI indicates the fraction of the model variance that 
is attributable to the model input and all of its higher order interactions with other parameters.  If 
the main effect and total effect SI are significantly different, this indicates that higher order 
interactions are present. 
 
A3.1 Sensitivity Analysis of Cumulative Release 
 
The SA relies on regression techniques which adequately describe sensitivity to the extent that 
the regression model fits the data.  The adjusted coefficient of determination indicates that the 
cumulative release regression models fit the data reasonably well and should provide accurate 
qualitative ranking of input parameter sensitivity (Table A3.1).  The gbm provided the best fit of 
the data (Figure A3.1) 
 
Table A3.1  Sensitivity analysis regression model adjusted coefficient of determination for the 
normalized cumulative release. 
 
Model Output Normal Linear Regression Generalized Boosted Regression 
Normalized Cumulative Release 0.90 0.95 
 
















Adjusted R-Squared = 0.952
No. of trees = 169
Loss Function: gaussian
 
Figure A3.1 Gbm predicted normalized cumulative release, R, versus GoldSim results.  
 
All of the GoldSim sensitivity analysis methods indicate that the normalized cumulative release 
is strongly sensitive to the total number of intruder boreholes, except the GoldSim importance 
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(Table A3.2).  The cause of the poor performance of the GoldSim importance to detect the 
sensitivity of the total number of boreholes is unknown.   
 




Coefficient SRC PCC 
GoldSim 
Importance 
Number of Boreholes 0.948 0.947 0.948 0 
 
The gbm predicted cumulative release was also strongly sensitive to the number of intruder 
boreholes with 78 percent of the model variance explained by this parameter (Table A3.3).  The 
total effect of the number of intruder boreholes accounted for 100 percent of the model variance.  
Moderate total effects sensitivity to the number of boreholes per intrusion event and slight 
sensitivity to the 239Pu inventory was observed.  These parameters influence model variance 
through interactions with other model parameters. 
 
Table A3.3 Main and total effects Sobol’ SIs for the normalized cumulative release.  
 
Parameter Description Main Effects SI Total Effect SI 
Total Number of Intruder Boreholes 0.78 1.00 
Number of Wells per Intrusion N.D. 0.15 
239Pu TRU Inventory N.D. 0.03 
Total 0.78 1.18 
N.D. – sensitivity not detected 
 
The gbm model marginal dependencies indicate that the cumulative release is an approximately 
linearly increasing step function of the total number of intruder boreholes and the number of 
boreholes per intrusion event (Figure A3.2).  The 239Pu TRU inventory shows a non-linear 
rapidly increasing relationship with the cumulative release.  The decreasing relationship between 
cumulative release and 241Am inventory appears to be a spurious relationship in the gbm. 
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Figure A3.2 Histogram (gray) and marginal dependence (blue) of most sensitive input parameters 
for the cumulative release as measured by the gbm relative influence.  
 
The scatterplot matrix shows a strong relationship between the cumulative release and two input 
parameters: the total number of boreholes and the number of wells per intrusion event 
(Figure A3.3).  The total number of boreholes is not a stochastic input parameter, but rather an 
intermediate value calculated as the product of the number of intrusion events and number of 
wells per intrusion event.  Before this calculated value was included in the sensitivity analysis, 
the gbm fit of the data was poor.  The poor fit was likely caused by the nonmonotonic 
relationship that can be seen in the scatterplot of the cumulative release and the number of wells 
per intrusion event (row 1, column 3).  The nonmonotonic relationship occurs, because the wells 
per intrusion event probability mass function is sampled every realization, but most realizations 
do not include an intrusion event.  Therefore, for each discrete value of the number of wells per 
intrusion event there are two possible outcomes: an increase in cumulative release if intrusion 
occurs and no increase if intrusion does not occur.  The scatterplots are generally consistent with 
the relative influences and marginal dependencies from the gbm model. 
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Figure A3.3  Scatterplot matrix for the cumulative release and most sensitive input 
parameters as measured by the gbm relative influence.  Histogram of the underlying 
parameter distributions appears on the leading diagonal.  Off-diagonal elements are pair-
wise scatterplots of variables.  Red line shows a smoothed (LOESS - locally weighted 
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A3.2 Sensitivity Analysis of On Site Resident TEDE at 100 Years 
 
The sensitivity of the on site resident TEDE was evaluated at 100, 1,000, and 10,000 
years.  The adjusted coefficient of determination for the regressions was significantly 
better for the gbm than the normal linear model (Table A3.4).  Therefore, the gbm model 
results are considered more reliable.  The fit for the data at 10,000 years was slightly 
better than at 100 and 1,000 years due to a single outlier (Figures A3.4 and A3.5). 
 
Table A3.4  On site resident TEDE regression models coefficient of determination. 
 




On Site Resident TEDE at 100 years 0.74 0.94 
On Site Resident TEDE at 1,000 years 0.78 0.95 
On Site Resident TEDE at 10,000 years 0.85 0.99 
 




























Adjusted R-Squared = 0.941
No. of trees = 5000
Loss Function: gaussian
 
Figure A3.4 Gbm predicted TEDE at 100 years versus GoldSim model results.  
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Adjusted R-Squared = 0.993
No. of trees = 5000
Loss Function: gaussian
 
Figure A3.5 Gbm predicted TEDE versus GoldSim results at 10,000 years.  
 
The GoldSim SIs all indicate that the on site resident TEDE at 100 years is strongly 
sensitive to the co-located low-level waste 226Ra inventory, although there is significant 
variation among the different methods (Table A3.5).  The radon emanation coefficient is 
identified as the second most sensitive parameter, followed by a slight to moderate 
sensitivity to the residence gamma radiation transmission factor. 
 
Table A3.5 Summary of GoldSim sensitivity analysis sorted by SRC for the resident TEDE 




Coefficient SRC PCC 
GoldSim 
Importance 
Co-Located Ra-226 Inventory 0.767 0.767 0.843 0.454 
Radon Emanation Coefficient 0.375 0.379 0.610 0.149 
Residence Gamma Transmission 0.123 0.124 0.245 0.025 
 
The gbm marginal dependence shows a strong positively increasing relationship between 
the TEDE and the 226Ra inventory, radon emanation coefficient, and the residence gamma 
radiation transmission factor (Figure A3.6).  The relationships are linear except for the 
relationship with 226Ra inventory which exhibits a threshold and irregular behavior at 
high inventories.  These irregularities may reflect the low frequency of model realizations 
with high 226Ra inventory.  A linearly decreasing relationship is observed for the time 
spent in sedentary activity.  Increasing time spent in sedentary activity increases the time 
indoors where external gamma irradiation is attenuated by the residence.  
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Figure A3.6 Histogram (gray) and marginal dependence (blue) of most sensitive input 
parameters for resident TEDE at 100 years as measured by the relative influence.  
 
The Sobol’ SIs indicate the resident TEDE at 100 years is strongly sensitive to the co-
located 226Ra inventory, moderately sensitive to the radon emanation coefficient, and 
slightly sensitive to the residence gamma transmission factor and time spent in sedentary 
activity (Table A3.6).  First order effects account for approximately 75 percent of the 
model variance.  The total effects SIs are significantly increased relative to the main 
effect for the 226Ra inventory and radon emanation coefficient, indicating that interactions 
with other factors are occurring.  It is suspected that this interaction is between these two 
parameters themselves, as the difference between the main and total effects SIs are 
approximately equal for both parameters. 
 
Table A3.6 Main and total effects Sobol’ SIs for the on site resident TEDE at 100 years. .  
 
Parameter Description Main Effects SI Total Effect SI 
226Ra Co-Located Waste Inventory 0.58 0.83 
Radon Emanation Coefficient 0.15 0.37 
Residence Gamma Transmission Factor 0.01 0.03 
Time Spent in Sedentary Activity 0.008 0.02 
Total 0.75 1.25 
 
 
A3.3 Sensitivity Analysis of On Site Resident TEDE at 1,000 Years 
 
The sensitivity of the on site resident TEDE at 1,000 years is similar to the results for 100 
years.  A slight decrease in the sensitivity of the 226Ra inventory and increase in the 
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sensitivity of the emanation coefficient and residence gamma transmission factor is noted 
(Table A3.7). 
 
Table A3.7 Summary of GoldSim sensitivity analyses sorted by SRC for the resident TEDE 




Coefficient SRC PCC 
GoldSim 
Importance 
Co-Located 226Ra Inventory 0.75 0.751 0.842 0.434 
Radon Emanation Coefficient 0.41 0.413 0.65 0.176 
Residence Gamma Transmission 0.132 0.134 0.268 0.027 
 
The gbm marginal dependence shows a strong positively increasing relationship between 
the TEDE and the 226Ra inventory, radon emanation coefficient, and the residence gamma 
radiation transmission factor (Figure A3.7).  The relationships are linear except for the 
relationship with 226Ra inventory which exhibits a threshold and irregular behavior at 
high inventories.  These irregularities may reflect the low frequency of model realizations 
with high 226Ra inventory.  A linearly decreasing relationship is observed for the time 
spent in sedentary activity.  Increasing time spent in sedentary activity increases the time 
indoors where external gamma irradiation is attenuated by the residence.   
 





























































































































































Figure A3.7 Histogram (gray) and marginal dependence (blue) of most sensitive input 
parameters for resident TEDE at 1,000 years as measured by the relative influence. .  
 
The same trends observed for the GoldSim SIs are seen in the Sobol’ SIs (Table A3.8).  
A very slight sensitivity to the 234U co-located waste inventory appears at 1,000 years.  
Important interactions appear to exist for the 226Ra inventory and emanation coefficient. 
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Table A3.8 Main and total effects Sobol’ SIs for the on site resident TEDE at 1,000 years.  
 
Parameter Description Main Effects SI Total Effect SI 
226Ra Co-Located Waste Inventory 0.55 0.79 
234U Co-Located Waste Inventory N.D. 0.004 
Radon Emanation Coefficient 0.18 0.40 
Residence Gamma Transmission Factor 0.01 0.04 
Time Spent in Sedentary Activity 0.008 0.02 
Total 0.75 1.25 
N.D. – sensitivity not detected 
 
A3.4 Sensitivity Analysis of On Site Resident TEDE at 10,000 Years 
 
The sensitivity of the on site resident TEDE at 10,000 years is similar to the result at 100 
years except that the sensitivity to 226Ra inventory is replaced by the co-located low-level 
waste 234U inventory (Table A3.9).  By 10,000 years, most 222Rn released from the site 
will be produced by the decay of 234U.  The radon emanation coefficient has 
approximately equal sensitivity to the 234U inventory at 10,000 years.  The GoldSim SIs 
identify moderate to slight sensitivity to the time spent in sedentary activity for the first 
time.  
 
Table A3.9 Summary of GoldSim sensitivity anlayses sorted by SRC for the resident TEDE 




Coefficient SRC PCC 
GoldSim 
Importance 
Radon Emanation Coefficient 0.614 0.61 0.833 0.384 
Co-Located 234U Inventory 0.638 0.638 0.845 0.318 
Residence Gamma Transmission 0.167 0.185 0.416 0.03 
Time Spent in Sedentary Activity (hr/yr) -0.153 -0.155 -0.36 0.03 
 
The gbm indicates linearly increasing relationships between the on site resident TEDE at 
10,000 years and the sensitive parameters (Figure A3.8). 
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Figure A3.8 Histogram (gray) and marginal dependence (blue) of most sensitive input 
parameters for resident TEDE at 10,000 years as measured by the relative influence.  
 
The Sobol’ SIs indicate strong and approximately equal sensitivity to the 234U inventory 
and radon emanation coefficient (Table A3.10).  Slight sensitivity to the residence 
gamma transmission factor and time spent in sedentary activity is observed.  Significant 
interactions are present for all the parameters, but again it is likely that these interactions 
are mostly among the sensitive parameters themselves, rather than unidentified 
parameters. 
 
Table A3.10 Main and total effects Sobol’ SIs for the on site resident TEDE at 10,000 years.  
 
Parameter Description Main Effects SI Total Effect SI 
234U Co-Located Waste Inventory 0.38 0.57 
Radon Emanation Coefficient 0.35 0.54 
Residence Gamma Transmission Factor 0.02 0.07 
Time Spent in Sedentary Activity 0.01 0.04 
Total 0.76 1.22 
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A4 Preparation of Revision 1 
 
Revision 1 to the Special Analysis of Transuranic Waste In Trench T04C at the Area 5 
Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada was prepared in 
response to comments received from the Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review 
Group (LFRG) Review Team.  The purpose of the LFRG Review Team was to review the 
Special Analysis (SA) dated September 2007, to ensure compliance with DOE Order 435.1 and 
the Nevada Site Office’s (NSO) Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site low-level waste 
Disposal Authorization Statement.  In addition, the Review Team was requested to review the 
Special Analysis (SA) to the requirements of 40 CFR 191 to supplement the DOE Order 435.1 
compliance review.  The LFRG review team utilized the Draft LFRG Manual dated November 
2007 and the associated low-level waste and transuranic waste review criteria in the performance 
of the review. 
 
The Review Team concluded that the inadvertent disposal of TRU in Trench T04C in Area 5 is 
covered under the Nevada Site Office’s Composite Analysis and the NSO’s Disposal 
Authorization Statement dated December 5, 2000 as required by DOE M435.1-1, Chapter IV, P 
(3), Composite Analysis. The Review Team, however, did identify two key issues and eight 
secondary issues.  Revision 1 was prepared to respond to the key and secondary issues.  The 
following sections describe the key and secondary issues and how revision 1 responds to them.  
 
A4.1 Key Issues 
 
Key Issue 1: 3.2.3.2 Criterion 2: The performance assessment specifies that the dose limit is an 
annual committed effective dose of 15 mrem to any member of the public in the 
accessible environment. 
Section 3.2.10 in the SA, Member of the Public Exposure Scenarios, identifies the point of 
compliance for a member of the public being at 100 m from the facility boundary.  This is 
contrary to 40 CFR 191.15 IPR which states that the point of assessment is the accessible 
environment.  40 CFR 191.12, Definitions, defines the “Accessible Environment” to include the 
land surface. 
 
NSO shall re-evaluate the IPR dose at the surface of T04C. The review team determined that this 




The SA, revision 0, calculated the dose to a resident using the on site soil concentration for all 
radionuclides, except noble gases, and the atmospheric concentrations at the 100-m (330-ft) site 
boundary.  The revised 40 CFR 191 SA model, version 1.002, was modified to calculate the dose 
using the on site soil concentration for all radionuclides and the on site atmospheric 
concentration.  The primary impact of this change is a significant increase in the dose from 
external irradiation from 214Pb and 214Bi, which are short-lived progeny of 222Rn deposited in 
cover soil by diffusing radon gas. 
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All IPR results, alternative barrier evaluations, uncertainty analyses, and sensitivity analyses 
were re-evaluated with the revised model.  The SA has been revised to include the results for the 
on site resident dose. 
 
Key Issue 2:  3.2.5.4 Criterion 4:  The determination in the current CA that dose from the active 
LLW disposal facility and all interacting sources of radioactive material, 
including inadvertently disposed TRU, remains compliant with the performance 
measures of the CA. 
 
The Special Analysis, Executive Summary, page i, 1st paragraph:  It is stated that under DOE M 
435.1-1, TRU waste in a regulated disposal site must meet the requirements of 40 CFR 191.  
This is not the case.  In fact this waste was disposed in a Low-Level Waste (LLW) disposal 
facility in 1986 and the facility must meet the requirements under DOE M 435.1-1 Chapter IV, 
Low-Level Waste.  For waste disposed prior to 1988 that may interact with the active LLW 
disposal facility in Area 5, the DOE M 435.1-1 requirement that should be met is stated as 
follows: 
 
IV. P.(3) Composite Analysis. For disposal facilities which received waste after 
September 26, 1988, a site-specific radiological composite analysis shall be prepared 
and maintained that accounts for all sources of radioactive material that may be left at 
the DOE site and may interact with the low-level waste disposal facility, contributing to 
the dose projected to a hypothetical member of the public from the existing or future 
disposal facilities. Performance measures shall be consistent with DOE requirements 
for protection of the public and environment and evaluated for a 1,000 year period 
following disposal facility closure. The composite analysis results shall be used for 
planning, radiation protection activities, and future use commitments to minimize the 
likelihood that current low-level waste disposal activities will result in the need for 
future corrective or remedial actions to adequately protect the public and the 
environment. 
 
The SA under review by the team should have been prepared under the Chapter IV Maintenance 
requirements for LLW and should defend the argument that the disposal of this TRU waste is 
within the approved DAS. Since the waste was disposed prior to 1988, the waste should have 
been included in the NTS CA that is part of the NTS Area 5 DAS. The SA does not state whether 
the TRU inventory was included in the CA and that the CA Performance Measures continue to 
be met.   
 
A discussion should be included as to whether the Chapter IV requirements for a CA have been 
met or not. NTS has not created a TRU disposal facility, because it was discovered that TRU 
waste was inadvertently disposed in the LLW disposal facility. The 40 CFR 191 SA supplements 
the argument that the disposal is protective of the public and the environment.  The review team 
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Response: 
 
The executive summary, Section 1.2.1, and Section 1.2.2 were revised.  The intent of the 
revisions is to (1) confirm that a CA has been prepared and approved that includes the TRU in 
T04C, and (2) clarify that the SA considers 40 CFR 191 a relevant appropriate regulation, based 
on its inclusion in DOE Orders and previous application at the Area 5 RWMS, but not a strictly 
legally applicable regulation. 
 
A4.2 Secondary Issues 
 
Secondary Issue 1: 3.2.1.4 Criterion 4: The performance assessment accounts for all relevant 
mechanisms for releasing radionuclides from the waste and making them 
available for environmental transport, including diffusion, advection, and 
vapor phase transport. The mechanisms analyzed are justified by reference 
to relevant studies, available data, and supporting analyses. 
 
NSO should provide a discussion in the SA on the potential transport-enhancing materials in the 
waste. The review team requested additional information from NTS because the Review Team 
has a concern that the composition of the waste might enhance mobilization of the radionuclides. 




Sections 2.4.2 and 3.2.3 was revised to include a more complete description of the waste form 
and confirm that no transport enhancing materials are present.    
 
Secondary Issue 2: 3.2.1.5 Criterion 5: The performance assessment presents information on 
the environment and the disposal system (hydrogeological setting) 
sufficient to support the analysis present in the performance assessment 
and justifies the information by reference to relevant studies, available 
data, or supporting analyses. 
 
Addition of historical discussion of TO4C, T04C-1 and T09C in the SA is needed.  NSO should 
incorporate a description of the TRU waste disposal system, its design and nearby facilities. The 




Section 1.3.4 was revised to more completely describe the history of T04C.  Section 2.1.2 was 
revised to more completely describe the disposal unit. 
 
Secondary Issue 3: 3.2.1.5 Criterion 5c: The performance assessment presents information on 
the engineered barrier system including, but not limited to, facility design 
features that address water infiltration, disposal unit cover integrity, and 
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structural stability in detail sufficient to support the analysis, and justifies 
the information. 
 
NSO should provide clarification in the SA that no credit was taken for the waste containers in 




Section 3.2.3 was revised to clarify that no credit for container performance is taken for the CR 
and IPR analyses. 
 
Secondary Issue 4: 3.2.1.6 Criterion 6f: The conceptual model identifies and describes 
reasonable scenarios for the disturbed performance of the facility, which 
are consistent with the site- and facility-specific effects of the disposal 
system’s environmental and design attributes, local or regional customs 
and construction practices (including well-drilling practices), and passive 
institutional controls. 
 
NSO needs to provide a justification for not considering a basement (environmental and design 
attributes and local or regional practices/passive institutional controls) in the SA. The review 
team considered a basement in a resident’s home to be a human-induced disruptive event and 
should either be included in the conceptual model or justified as being not consistent with local 




Section 3.2.7 was revised to explain that excavation of a basement is not included in the base 
case analysis because it is not expected to have any impact on the complementary cumulative 
distribution function for a 4-m (13-ft) thick cover.  The small impact is due to a low probability 
of an intrusion event, low probability of a basement given an intrusion event, and a small 
consequence for a thick cover. 
 
The alternative barrier analyses, however, include evaluations of thinner covers.  Therefore, the 
CR analysis models for the alternative barrier evaluation were modified to include basement 
excavation with a frequency of 4 basements per 396 intrusion events.  The alternative barrier 
evaluation sections were revised to reflect these changes. 
 
Secondary Issue 5: 3.2.1.10 Criterion 10: The performance assessment discusses the quality 
assurance measures applied to the preparation of the analysis and its 
documentation. 
 
NSO should provide references and a discussion on QA measures to support the SA. The review 
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Response: 
 
Appendix A2, Quality Assurance, was added to the revised document. 
 
Secondary Issue 6: 3.2.2.7 Criterion 7b: Documentation establishes that retrievability of the 
waste is feasible. 
 
NSO should include reference to the Remediation Options for Accidentally Disposed 
Transuranic Materials in Trench T04C at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex, 




Section 1.2.2 was revised to summarize the remediation options considered by the Nevada Site 
Office and to cite the remediation options position paper. 
 
Secondary Issue 7: 3.2.3.2 Criterion 2a: The performance assessment provides a reasonable 
expectation that the undisturbed performance of the disposal system shall 
not cause the annual committed effective dose, received through all 
potential pathways from the disposal systems, to any member of the public 
in the accessible environment, to exceed 15 millirems (150 microsieverts) 
 
IPR doses include radon and progeny, which are not required to be included. NSO should 
recalculate dose without the radon and progeny contribution. The review team also believes this 





The 40 CFR 191 SA, version 1.002, model was revised to calculate the dose to an on site 
resident excluding the dose from inhalation of  222Rn and its short-lived progeny in air, consistent 
with DOE Manual 435.1-1 which excludes this exposure pathway.  The SA document was 
revised to include the new results.  However, moving the point of compliance to directly above 
the disposal unit has added the new exposure pathway of external irradiation by short-lived 222Rn 
progeny deposited in cover soil.  Consequently, 222Rn remains the most important source of dose 
to the member of public. 
 
Secondary Issue 8: 3.2.3.8 Criterion 8g: The performance assessment identifies and justifies 
the dose conversion factor and methodology used in the dose analysis. 
 
NSO should provide a description of the abbreviated decay chains that are used in the dose 
conversion factors. The review team determined that this criterion was met. 
Response: 
 
Section 3.3.4 was revised to describe that some short-lived progeny are assumed to be in secular 
equilibrium with long-lived parents and that the dose conversion factors of the short-lived 
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progeny are summed with the parents’ dose conversion factors.  Figure A1.1 in Appendix A1 
was added to the document to clarify the use of abbreviated decay chains.  
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